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ABSTRACT
This thesis is devoted to investigating possible approaches to endogenous modeling of market
microstructure of an auction-based exchange. In chapter II we develop the framework in discrete
time and apply it to understanding the economics of trading at high frequency. In chapter III
we adapt our modeling approach to continuous time and develop a rich beliefs-driven model of
limit-order book evolution between two trades. In the last chapter we introduce discrete admissible
prices (i.e. a finite tick size) into our model and investigate the special spatial structures of the
equilibria this produces.
Given the novelty of the approach, we have to solve somewhat unusual mathematical problems
throughout. We derive a novel estimate of conditional tails of general Ito processes in chapter II,
solve a ’non-monotone oblique reflection’ RBSDE system and a discontinuous infinite-dimensional
fixed point problem in chapter III, and solve a system of control-stopping problems discontinuously
coupled through stopping barriers in chapter IV.
We also develop some numerical examples in chapters II, III to illustrate the features of our




This thesis is devoted to investigating possible approaches to endogenous model-
ing of market microstructure, that is, dynamics of orders, trades, prices etc., on an
auction-based exchange. We refer the reader to the introductions of the individual
chapters for a more detailed discussion of the promise and advantages of such mod-
els. Our aim is to develop endogenous models which also have realistic mechanics,
capturing a possibly simplified but sensible view of the actual exchanges’ mechanism.
The disadvantage of this approach is that the resulting models are rather complex
and hard to analyze. We hope to convince the reader that hard in this case does not
mean impossible, and demonstrate that the resulting models are rich and interesting
and can shed light on various subtle microstructure issues.
This work is comprised of three somewhat independent projects, which are nev-
ertheless closely linked by the commonalities in the framework, modeling approach
and sometimes even mathematical issues arising. Below, we first describe how these
projects contribute to the development of our microstructure modeling framework
and what microstructure issues they deal with. We then describe mathematical
challenges and contributions of each project.
In the first project, described in chapter II, we develop a discrete-time continuous-
1
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price model of a limit-order book formation at an auction-style exchange, in which a
continuum of players can submit both market and limit orders at any prices based on
their beliefs about the future order flow. After setting up and motivating the model,
we proceed to analyze how the market behavior, in particular the liquidity provision,
changes with increasing frequency of trading, arriving at the characterization of
efficiency-fragility role of high trading frequency. The results are valid for a very
general class of models, and thus should be viewed as concerning the fundamental
economics of trading on auction-style exchanges rather than specifics of a particular
model.
In the second project, described in chapter III, we focus on the market partici-
pants’ behavior between two consecutive trades. We extend the modeling framework
to continuous-time, and then investigate the trade-off between market and limit or-
ders faced by the agents. The resulting “microscopic” model, in equilibrium, can
produce rich dynamics of posted prices and limit-order book shapes. This model
allows us to investigate the impact of agents’ beliefs (or changes in the signals that
affect their beliefs) on the bid-ask spread and on the limit-order book evolution, al-
lowing one to model such beliefs-driven phenomena as for example indirect market
impact of both limit and market orders (e.g. the so-called “spoofing” effect).
In the last project, described in chapter IV, we consider a continuous-time and
discrete-price framework, by introducing a non-zero tick size. This allows one to
explore the interplay between the continuous “true price” estimate and the discrete
admissible order price levels, resulting in different behavior depending on whether
the “true price” estimate is close to admissible price level or not. Resulting models
can be used to explain the clustering of market orders over time and to predict the
consequences of changing the tick size.
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On the mathematical side, the first project stands somewhat separate from the
other two. The main issues there arise from dealing with unusual functionals of
general Itô processes under multiple measures, leading us to develop some novel
estimates of conditional tails of general Itô processes.
The other two projects are similar in that they deal with (continuum- or two-
player) games, coupled through controls and stopping barriers in a way that lacks any
of the traditional monotonicity, convexity, contractivity or sometimes even continuity
properties, which makes them hard to solve.
In the second project, the difficulties arise from the fact that there are multiple
(>2) players whose stopping barriers are given by functionals of all other players’
value functions, making the players’ interdependence rather discontinuous. Such
continuum-player problem appears intractable in general, but under certain mono-
tonicity assumptions on agents’ beliefs we manage to split the problem into a 2-agent
control-stopping game and an infinite-dimensional fixed point problem. This 2-player
game we are then able to reduce to a somewhat unusual 2-dimensional system of RB-
SDEs with solutions reflected against each other. This system is still not amenable to
standard methods, but we manage to solve it by exploiting certain geometric proper-
ties of its generator and the specific nature of the reflection. The infinite-dimensional
fixed point problem above is also not trivial as its objective is discontinuous. We
solve it by exploiting the structure of the problem allowing us to show we can replace
that objective by its ’mollification’ to which standard fixed-point results can then be
applied.
The main challenge of the third project is solving a system of two (control-
stopping) optimization problems coupled through controls and barriers which are
discontinuous functionals of other agent’s value function. Because of the presence of
4
those discontinuous functionals, the fixed point problem corresponding to this sys-
tem is in a sense even more discontinuous than the one from the second project and
doesn’t appear tractable. This fixed point problem turns out to be continuous if we
can ensure certain monotonicity of individual agents’ value functions. We show this
monotonicity in the case of a sufficient noise using the recent geometric approach
to the optimal stopping of linear diffusions (with irregular barriers) combined with
certain special features of the problem.
CHAPTER II
Liquidity Effects of Trading Frequency
2.1 Introduction
This chapter is concerned with liquidity effects of trading frequency on an auction-
style exchange, in which the participating agents can post limit or market orders. On
the one hand, higher trading frequency provides more opportunities for the market
participants to trade, hence, improving the liquidity of the market and increasing
the market efficiency. On the other hand, higher trading frequency also provides
more opportunities for some participants to manipulate the price and disrupt the
market liquidity. Such a manipulation creates a new type of risk, which reveals itself
in unusually high price deviations, which cannot be explained by the changes in the
present, or projected, fundamental value of the asset. The most famous example of
this phenomenon is the “flash crash” of 2010. This example motivates the need for a
comprehensive study of the tradeoff between the liquidity providing role of strategic
players and the liquidity risk they generate, and its relation to trading frequency.
The collective liquidity of the market is captured by the Limit Order Book (LOB),
which contains all the limit buy and sell orders.
The goal of the present chapter is two-fold. First, we develop a new framework
for modeling market microstructure, in which the shape of the LOB, and its dynam-
5
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ics, arise endogenously from the interactions between the agents. Among the many
advantages of such approach is the possibility of modeling the market reaction to
changes in the rules of the exchange: e.g. limited trading frequency, transaction tax,
etc. The second, and most important, goal of the present work is to investigate the
liquidity effects of trading frequency, using the proposed modeling framework. In
particular, the main results of this chapter (cf. the discussion in Section 2.3, as well
as Theorems II.19, II.21 and Corollary II.20, in Section 3.4) describe the dual effect
of high trading frequency. On the one hand, if the agents choose to provide liquidity
in equilibrium, higher trading frequency decreases the bid-ask spread and makes the
expected profits of all market participants converge to the same (fundamental) value,
thus, improving the market efficiency. On the other hand, higher trading frequency
also makes the LOB more sensitive to the deviations of the agents from market-
neutrality. It is, of course, clear that a strong bullish or bearish signal makes the
market participants trade at a higher or lower price. However, the novelty of our
observation is in the role that the trading frequency plays in amplifying this effect.
Namely, we show that, if the trading frequency is high, even if the agents have plenty
of inventory, a very small deviation from market-neutrality may cause the agents to
stop providing liquidity, by either withdrawing from the market completely, or by
posting the limit orders very far away from the fundamental price. Such actions
cause disproportional deviations in the LOB, which cannot be explained by any fun-
damental reasons: they are much higher than the trading signal (i.e. the expected
change in the fundamental price), and they occur without any shortage of supply or
demand for the asset. We refer to such a deviation as an internal (or, self-inflicted)
liquidity crisis, because it is due to the trading mechanism (i.e. the rules by which
the market participants interact), rather than any fundamental reasons (note the
7
similarity with the flash crash). Our framework allows us to provide more insight
into how such liquidity crisis unfolds, connecting it to the so-called adverse selection
effect. In particular, Section 2.3 constructs an equilibrium model in which an internal
liquidity crisis does not occur because of an abnormally large market order, wiping
out the liquidity on one side of the LOB, but it occurs because the optimal strategies
of the agents require them to stop providing liquidity on one side of the LOB. On
the mathematical side, our analysis makes use of the properties of conditional tails
of the increments of a general Itô process, with the corresponding result stated in
Lemma II.23. This lemma provides a uniform exponential bound on the conditional
tails of the increments of a general Itô process. We believe that this result is useful
in its own right, and, to the best of our knowledge, it is not available in existing
literature.
In recent years, we observed an explosion in the amount of literature devoted to
the study of market microstructure. In addition to various empirical studies, a large
part of the existing theoretical work focuses on the problem of optimal execution:
see, among others, [48], [3], [54], [31], [22], [6], [5],[7], [24], [51], [36], [19], [37],
[57], and references therein. In these publications, the dynamics and shape of the
LOB are modeled exogenously, or, equivalently, the arrival processes of the limit
and market orders are specified exogenously. In particular, none of these works
attempt to explain the shape and dynamics of the LOB, arising directly from the
interaction between the market participants. A different approach to the analysis of
market microstructure has its roots in the economic literature. For example, [50],
[29], [34], [17], [44], [52], [27], [9], [10], [12] consider equilibrium models of market
microstructure, and they are more closely related to the present work. However, the
models proposed in the aforementioned papers do not aim to represent the mechanics
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of an auction-style exchange with sufficient precision, and, in particular, they are not
well suited for analyzing the liquidity effects of trading frequency, which is the main
focus of the present chapter. A somewhat related strand of literature focuses on the
endogenous formation of LOB in markets with a designated market maker: see e.g.
[33], [43], [28], [18], [1]. In these papers, the LOB is not an outcome of a multi-agent
equilibrium: instead, it is controlled by a single agent, the market maker. In the
present chapter, we model the entire LOB as an output of an equilibrium between
a large number of agents, each of whom is allowed to both consume and provide
liquidity (in particular, we have no designated market maker). Our setting is related
to the literature on double auctions (cf. [58], [27]), with the crucial difference that
the participants of each auction are allowed to choose two “asymmetric” types of
strategies: market or limit orders. In addition, the present framework assumes that,
ex ante, all agents have access to the same information, and, in this sense, it is similar
to [50], [34], [52]. In particular, the adverse selection effect, herein, does not arise
from any a priori information asymmetry of the agents, and, instead, it is caused by
the mechanics of the exchange. We formulate the problem as a continuum-player
game – this abstraction allows us to obtain computationally tractable results (cf. [4],
[56], [15] for more on the concept of a continuum-player game, and [46], [14], [16],
[45] for the particular subclass of mean field games).
The chapter is organized as follows. Subsection 3.2 describes the probabilistic
setting, along with the execution rules of the exchange and the resulting state pro-
cesses of the agents. Subsection 2.2.2 defines the equilibrium and introduces the
notion of degeneracy of the market (which represents an internal liquidity cirsis). In
Section 2.3, we construct an equilibrium in a simple model, illustrating how an in-
ternal liquidity crisis unfolds, and how it is connected to the adverse selection effect.
9
Theorems II.19, II.21, and Corollary II.20, in Section 3.4, are the main results of the
chapter: they formalize and generalize the conclusions of Section 2.3. In Section 2.5,
we prove the key technical results on the (conditional) tails of marginal distributions
of Itô processes. Sections 2.6, 2.7 contain the proofs of the main results. We conclude
in Section 2.8.
2.2 Modeling framework for a finite-frequency auction-style exchange
2.2.1 Mechanics of the exchange
We consider an exchange in which trading can only occur at discrete times n =
0, 1, . . . , N . We assume that the market participants are split into two groups: the
external investors, who are “impatient”, in the sense that they only submit market
orders, and the strategic players, who can submit both market and limit orders, and
who are willing to optimize their actions over a given (short) time horizon, in order
to get a better execution price.1 In our study, we focus on the strategic players,
who are referred to as agents, and we model the behavior of the external investors
exogenously, via the exogenous demand. The interpretation of the external investors
is clear: these are the investors who either have a longer-term view on the market,
or who simply need to buy or sell the asset for reasons other than the short-term
profits. The strategic players (i.e. agents), on contrary, are the short-term traders,
who attempt to maximize their objective at a shorter time horizon N . During every
time period [n, n+ 1), all the orders coming to the exchange are split into the limit
and market orders. The limit orders are collected in the so-called Limit Order Book
(LOB), and the market orders form the demand curve. At time n + 1, the market
orders in the demand curve are executed against the limit orders in the LOB. Then,
1We do not distinguish the “aggressive” limit orders, which are posted at the price level of an opposite limit order,
and treat them as market orders. This causes no loss of generality, as the market participants in our setting have a
perfect observation of the LOB.
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the same is repeated in the next time interval. In particular, during a time period
[n, n+1) (for simplicity, we say “at time n”), an agent is allowed to submit a market
order, post a limit buy or sell order, or wait (i.e. do nothing). If a limit order is
not executed in a given time period, it costs nothing to cancel or re-position it for
the next time period. Notice that our framework does not allow to model the time-
priority of limit orders. However, introducing a time-priority would not change the
agents’ maximum objective value, as the “tick size” is assumed to be zero (i.e. the
set of possible price levels is R), and, hence, an agent can always achieve a priority by
posting her order “infinitesimally” above or below a given competing order. Further
details on modeling the formation of an LOB and the execution rules are presented
below.
The demand curves are modeled exogenously by a random field
D = (Dn(p))p∈R,n=1,...,N
on a filtered probability space
(
Ω,F = (Fn)Nn=0 ,P
)
, such that F0 is a trivial sigma-
algebra, completed w.r.t. P. The random variable D+n (p) = max(Dn(p), 0) denotes
the amount of asset that the external investors and the agents submitting market
orders are willing to purchase at or below the price p, accumulated over the time
period [n − 1, n), and D−n (p) = −min(Dn(p), 0) denotes the amount of asset that
the external investors and the agents submitting market orders are willing to sell
at or above the price p, in the same time period. We assume that Dn(·) is a.s.
nonincreasing and measurable w.r.t. Fn ⊗ B(R). We denote by A a Borel space
of beliefs, and, for each α ∈ A, there exists a subjective probability measure Pα on
(Ω,FN), which is absolutely continuous with resect to P. We assume that, for any n =
0, . . . , N and any α ∈ A, there exists a regular version of the conditional probability
11
Pα given Fn, denoted Pαn.2 We denote the associated conditional expectations by Eαn.
We also need to assume that, for any α ∈ A, there exists a modification of the family
{Pαn}
N
n=0, which satisfies the tower property with respect to P, in the following sense:
for any n ≤ m and any r.v. ξ, such that Eαξ+ <∞, we have
EαnEαmξ = Eαnξ, P-a.s.
There exists such a modification, for example, if Pα ∼ P. In any market model,
for every α, we fix such a modification of conditional probabilities (up to a set of
P-measure zero) and assume that all conditional expectations {Eαn} are taken under
this family of measures. The Limit Order Book (LOB) is given by a pair of adapted








n is a finite sigma-additive random
measure on R (w.r.t. Fn ⊗ B(R)). Herein, ν+n corresponds to the cumulative limit
sell orders, and ν−n corresponds to the cumulative limit buy orders, posted at time
n.The bid and ask prices at any time n = 0, . . . , N are given by the random variables




n = inf supp(ν
+
n ),
respectively. Notice that these extended random variables are always well defined
but may take infinite values.
We define the state space of an agent as S = R × A, where the first component
denotes the inventory of an agent (i.e. how much asset she currently holds), and
the second component denotes her beliefs. Every agent in state (s, α) models the
future outcomes using the subjective probability measure Pα. There are infinitely
many agents, and their distribution over the state space is given by the empirical
distribution process µ = (µn)
N
n=0, such that every µ is a finite sigma-additive random
measure on S (w.r.t. Fn⊗B(S)). In particular, the total mass of agents in the set S ⊂
2This assumption holds, for example, if FN is generated by a random element with values in a standard Borel
space.
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S at time n is given by µn(S). The inventory level s represents the number of shares
per agent, held by the agents at state (s, α). In particular, the total number of shares
held by all agents in the set S ⊂ S is given by
∫
S
sµn(ds, dα). The interpretation of
this definition in a finite-player game is discussed in Remark II.1 below. We refer
the reader to [15] for more on the general concept a continuum-player game.
Remark II.1. The continuum-player game defined in this section can be related to a
finite-player game as follows. Denote by µ0 the empirical distribution of the agents’
states at a given time. Recall that µ0 is a measure on S = R × A, and assume




i=1 δ(si,αi). In this
case, we interpret si as the number of shares per agent held by the agents in the
ith group. Let us explain how this notion is related to the actual inventory levels
(i.e. the actual numbers of shares held by the agents) in the associated finite-player
game. To this end, consider a collection of M agents, whose states are given by
their (actual) inventories and beliefs, denoted (s, α), with the current states being
{(s̃i = si/M,αi)}. Define the “unit mass” of agents to be M . In this finite-player
collection, the mass of agents (measured relative to the unit mass, M) at any state
(Ms, α) is precisely µ0({(s, α)}), and their total inventory is Msµ0({(s, α)}). The
number of shares per agent is, then, defined as the total inventory held by these agents
divided by their mass, and it is equal to Ms. Choosing s = s̃i, we conclude that,
in the finite-player collection, the number of shares per agent held by the agents at
state (s̃i, αi) is given by Ms̃i = si, which coincides with our interpretation of si in the
continuum-player game. It is also easy to show that an equilibrium in the proposed
continuum-player game (defined in the next subsection) produces an approximate
equilibrium in the associated finite-player game, when the inventory levels {s̃i} are
small (cf. Subsection 2.3 in the extended version of this chapter, [32])
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As the parameter α does not change over time, the state process of an agent, de-
noted (Sn), is an adapted R-valued process, representing her inventory.3 The control
of every agent is given by a triplet of adapted processes (p, q, r) = (pn, qn, rn)
N−1
n=0 on
(Ω,F), with values in R2 × {0, 1}. The first coordinate, pn, indicates the location of
a limit order placed at time n, and qn indicates the size of the order (measured in
shares per agent, and with negative values corresponding to buy orders).4 The last
coordinate rn shows whether the agent submits a market order (if rn = 1) or a limit
order (if rn = 0). Assume that an agent posts a limit sell order at a price level pn.
If the demand to buy the asset at this price level, D+n+1(pn), exceeds the amount of
all limit sell orders posted below pn at time n, then (and only then) the limit sell
order of the agent is executed. Market orders of the agents are always executed at
the bid or ask price available at the time when the order is submitted. We interpret
an internal market order (i.e. the one submitted by an agent) as the decision of
an agent to join the external investors, in the given time period. Summing up the
above, we obtain the following dynamics for the state process of an agent, starting
with initial inventory s ∈ R at time m = 0, . . . , N − 1:
S(p,q,r)m (m, s, ν) = s, ∆S
(p,q,r)
n+1 (m, s, ν) =
S
(p,q,r)








, n = m, . . . , N−1.
The above dynamics represent an optimistic view on the execution by the agents. In
particular, they imply that all limit orders at the same price level are executed in full,
3Note that, although Pα does not change over time, the conditional distribution of the future demand, as perceived
by the agent, changes dynamically, according to the new information received.
4Note each agent is only allowed to place her limit order at a single price level, at any given time. However, this
results in no loss of optimality. Indeed, using the Dynamic Programming Principle derived in Appendix A, one can
show, by induction, that, in equilibrium, an agent does not benefit from posting multiple limit orders at the same
time. As shown in [56], this is typical for a continuum-player game.
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once the demand reaches them: i.e. each agent believes that her limit order will be
executed first among all orders at a given price level. In addition, all agents’ market
orders are executed at the bid and ask prices: i.e. each agent believes that her market
order will be executed first, when the demand curve is cleared against the LOB, at
the end of a given time period. These assumptions can be partially justified by the
fact that the agents’ orders are infinitesimal: qn is measured in shares per agent,
and an individual agent has zero mass. However, if a non-zero mass of agents submit
limit orders at the same price level, or execute market orders, at the same time, then,
the above state dynamics may violate the market clearance condition: the total size
of executed market orders (both in shares and in dollars) may not coincide with the
total size of executed limit orders (at least, as viewed by the agents). Nevertheless,
this issue is resolved if, at any time, the mass of the agents positing limit orders at
the same price level is zero, as well as the mass of the agents posting market orders.
In other words, (ν, p, q, r) satisfy, P-a.s.: νn is continuous, as a measure on R (i.e. it
has no atoms), and rn = 0. Such an equilibrium is constructed in Section 8 of the
extended version of this chapter, [32]. The general definition of a continuum-player
game and its connection to a finite-player game can be found, e.g., in [15] and in the
references therein (see also Subsection 2.3 in the extended version of this chapter,
[32]).
The proposed modeling framework has a close connection to the models of double
auctions, existing in the economic literature (cf. [27], [58]). The main difference
of the present setting is in the non-standard design of the auction. Namely, in the
proposed setting, the auction participants may choose different styles of trading, i.e.
market or limit orders, which generates an ex-post information asymmetry between
the participants: the limit orders have to be submitted before the demand curve is
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observed, while the market orders are submitted using a complete information about
the LOB. This difference is not coincidental – it is, in fact, crucial for a realistic
representation of the risks associated with each order type, and it is at the core of
the results established herein. A more detailed discussion of the information structure
of the proposed framework is provided in the next subsection.
2.2.2 Equilibrium
The objective function of an agent, starting at the initial state (s, α) ∈ S, at any
time m = 0, . . . , N , and using the control (p, q, r), is given by the Fm-measurable
random variable:

























n+1 (m, s, ν)
]
where we assume that 0 · ∞ = 0. In the above expression, we assume that, at the
final time n = N , each agent is forced to liquidate her position at the bid or ask
price available at that time. Alternatively, one can think of it as marking to market
of the residual inventory, right after the last external market order is executed.
Definition II.2. For a given LOB ν, integer m = 0, . . . , N − 1, and state (s, α) ∈ S,
the triplet of adapted processes (p, q, r) is an admissible control if the positive part
of the expression inside the expectation in (2.2) has a finite expectation under Pα.
For a given LOB ν, an initial condition (m, s, α), and a triplet of F×B(S)-adapted
random fields (p, q, r), we identify the latter (whenever it causes no confusion) with
stochastic processes (p, q, r) via:
pn = pn
(
S(p,q,r)n (m, s, ν), α
)
, qn = qn
(









and the state dynamics (2.1), for n = m, . . . , N . This system determines (p, q, r) and
S(p,q,r) recursively.
Definition II.3. For a given LOB ν, we call the triplet of progressively measurable
random fields (p, q, r) an optimal control if, for any m = 0, . . . , N and any (s, α) ∈
S, we have:
• (p, q, r) is admissible,
• J (p,q,r)(m, s, α, ν) ≥ J (p′,q′,r′)(m, s, α, ν),
P-a.s., for any admissible control (p′, q′, r′).
In the above, we make the standard simplifying assumption of continuum-player
games: each agent is too small to affect the empirical distribution of cumulative
controls (reflected in ν) when she changes her control (cf. [15]). Note also that our
definition of the optimal control implies that it is time consistent: re-evaluation of
the optimality at any future step, using the same terminal criteria, must lead to the
same optimal strategy. Next, we discuss the notion of equilibrium in the proposed
game. First, we notice that, if pbN or p
a
N becomes infinite, the agents with positive or
negative inventory may face the objective value of “−∞”, for any control they use.
In such a case, their optimal controls may be chosen in an arbitrary way, resulting
in unrealistic equilibria. To avoid this, we impose the additional regularity condition
on ν.
Definition II.4. A given LOB ν is admissible if, for any m = 0, . . . , N − 1 and any
α ∈ A, we have, P-a.s.:
Eαm|paN | ∨ |pbN | <∞.
Let us consider the (stochastic) value function of an agent for a fixed (m, s, α, ν):
(2.3) V νm(s, α) = esssupp,q,rJ
(p,q,r) (m, s, α, ν) ,
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where the essential supremum is taken under P, over all admissible controls (p, q, r),
and J (p,q,r) is given by (2.2). Appendix A shows that, for any admissible ν, V νm(·, α)
has a continuous modification under P, which we refer to as the value function of
an agent with beliefs α. Using the Dynamic Programming Principle, Appendix A
provides an explicit system of recursive equations that characterize optimal strategies
and the value function. In particular, the results of Appendix A (cf. Corollary II.31)
yield the following proposition.
Proposition II.5. Assume that, for an admissible LOB ν, there exists an optimal
control (p̂, q̂, r̂). Then, for any (s, α) ∈ S, the following holds P-a.s., for all n =
0, . . . , N − 1:
V νn (s, α) = s
+λan(α)− s−λbn(α)






The values of λa(α) and λb(α) can be interpreted as the expected execution prices
of the agents with beliefs α, who are long and short the asset, respectively.
Definition II.6. Consider an empirical distribution process µ = (µn)
N
n=0 and a
market model, as described in Subsection 3.2. We say that a given LOB process ν
and a control (p, q, r) form an equilibrium, if there exists a Borel set Ã ⊂ A, called







= 0, P-a.s., for all n,
2. ν is admissible, and (p, q, r) is an optimal control for ν, on the state space
S̃ = R× Ã,
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3. and, for any n = 0, . . . , N − 1, we have, P-a.s.:





n (s, α)µn(ds, dα), ∀x ∈ R,





n (s, α)µn(ds, dα), ∀x ∈ R.
Remark II.7. It follows from Proposition II.5 that, in equilibrium, it is optimal for
an agent with zero initial inventory to do nothing. Hence, in equilibrium, roundtrip
strategies are impossible. To allow for roundtrip strategies in equilibrium, one can
e.g. introduce an upper bound on |q| or on the total inventory of an agent (as it
is done, e.g., in [13]). However, we do not believe that such a modification would
change the qualitative behavior of market liquidity as a function of trading frequency,
which is the main focus of the present chapter.
Notice that, because the optimal controls are required to be time consistent under
P, the above definition, in fact, defines a sub-game perfect equilibrium. It is also
worth mentioning that Definition III.6 defines a partial equilibrium, as the empirical
distribution process µ is given exogenously. A more traditional version of Nash
equilibrium would require µ to be determined by the initial distribution and the
values of the state processes:




S(p,q,r)n (0, s, ν), α
))−1
,
which must hold P-a.s., for all n = 0, . . . , N , with S(p,q,r)n (0, s, ν) defined via (2.1),
in addition to the other conditions in Definition III.6. Nevertheless, we choose not
to enforce the condition (2.6) in the definition of equilibrium, in order to allow new
agents to enter the game, which, in effect, amounts to modeling µ exogenously. If
one assumes that no new agents arrive to the market, then, the fixed-point condition
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(2.6) has to be enforced. Note also that our interpretation of the demand curve
Dn(·) implies that it consists of both the external (i.e. due external investors) and
internal (i.e. due to the agents) market orders. Therefore, it may be reasonable
to consider an additional consistency condition for an equilibrium. A part of this
condition is to ensure that a non-zero mass of agents submit market buy orders only
if the fundamental price rises above the ask price (i.e. only if a market buy order
is actually executed), and, similarly, a non-zero mass of agents submit market sell
orders only if the fundamental price falls below the bid price. We assume that the
agents’ market orders enter into the demand curve with the highest level of priority:
e.g. their market buy orders enter the demand curve at the price level infinitesimally
close to, but below, the fundamental price, in order to guarantee that they are the
first ones to be executed. Thus, another part of the aforementioned consistency
condition is to ensure that the absolute value of the demand curve to the left or
to the right of the fundamental price is sufficiently large to account for all internal
market orders. Mathematically, such consistency condition can be formulated as
follows:
(2.7) dbn := µn ({(s, α) : qn(s, α) < 0, rn(s, α) = 1}) > 0
⇒ p0n+1 > pan, lim
p↑p0n+1
D+n+1(p) ≥ dbn,
(2.8) dan := µn ({(s, α) : qn(s, α) > 0, rn(s, α) = 1}) > 0
⇒ p0n+1 < pbn, lim
p↓p0n+1
D−n+1(p) ≥ dan.
The above conditions become redundant if the agents never submit market orders
in equilibrium. Section 8 of the extended version of this chapter, [32], shows how
to construct an equilibrium which satisfies condition (2.6), and in which the agents
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never submit market orders (hence, (2.7) and (2.8) are also satisfied). However, it is
important to emphasize that the main results of the present work (cf. Section 3.4)
provide necessary conditions for all equilibria: for those satisfying the conditions
(2.6), (2.7), (2.8) and for the ones that do not.
Remark II.8. Let us comment on the information structure of the game. In the
present setting, all agents observe the same information, given by the filtration F.
We consider an open-loop Nash equilibrium, in which the agent’s strategy is viewed
as an adapted stochastic process (rather than a function of the states and controls
of other players), and the definition of optimality is chosen accordingly. In addition,
as µ is adapted to F, each agent has a complete information about the present and
past states of other agents, and their beliefs. However, as the agents use different
(subjective) measures {Pα}, their views on the future values of µ may be different. Of
course, it would be more realistic to assume that the agents do not have a complete
information about each other’s current states, but this would make the problem sig-
nificantly more complicated. In the present setting, the agents also have a complete
information about the current location of the fundamental price. In the next chapter
we relax this assumption, which allows us to develop a more realistic model for the
“local” behavior of an individual agent. However, such a relaxation does not seem
necessary for the questions analyzed herein.
As all agents use the same information, the present work belongs to the strand of
literature that attempts to explain microstructure phenomena without information
asymmetry (cf. [34], [52], [50], [29]). Nevertheless, it is important to mention that
certain information asymmetry arises ex-post, between the market participants sub-
mitting market and limit orders. This asymmetry is not due to superior information
a priori available to any of the agents. Instead, it stems from the very nature of limit
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orders, which are “passive” by design (cf. the discussion on the last paragraph of
Subsection 3.2). Similar observation is made in [34].
Next, we need to add another condition to the notion of equilibrium. Notice that
equations (3.7)–(3.8) should serve as the fixed-point constraints that allow one to
obtain the optimal controls (p, q, r), along with the LOB ν. However, these equations
only hold for n = 0, . . . , N−1: indeed, the agents do not need to choose their controls
at time n = N , as the game is over and their residual inventory is marked to the bid
and ask prices. However, the terminal bid and ask prices are determined by the LOB
νN , which, in turn, can be chosen arbitrarily. To avoid such ambiguity, we impose an
additional constraint on the equilibria studied herein. First, we introduce the notion
of a fundamental price.
Definition II.9. Assume that P-a.s., for any n = 1, . . . , N , there exists a unique p0n
satisfying Dn (p
0




n=1 is called the fundamental
price process.
Whenever the notion of a fundamental price is invoked, we assume that it is well
defined. The intuition behind p0 is clear: it is a price level at which the immediate
demand is balanced. However, it is important to stress that we do not assume that
the asset can be traded at the fundamental price level. Rather, p0 is a feature of
the abstract immediate demand curve, whereas all actual trading happens on the
exchange, against the current LOB. This makes our setting different from many
other approaches existing in the literature.
Definition II.10. Assume that the fundamental price is well defined and denote
ξN = p
0
N −p0N−1. Then, an equilibrium with LOB ν is linear at terminal crossing
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(LTC) if
(2.9) νN = νN−1 ◦ (x 7→ x+ ξN)−1, P-a.s.
The above definition assumes that the terminal LOB νN is obtained from νN−1 by a
simple shift, with the size of the shift equal to the increment of the fundamental price.
This definition connects the LOB at the terminal time with the demand process,
ruling out many unnatural equilibria. In particular, the question of existence of an
equilibrium becomes non-trivial. However, the mere existence of an equilibrium is
not the main focus of the present work: the existence results, established herein, are
limited to Section 2.3, which constructs an LTC equilibrium in a specific Gaussian
random walk model (a slightly more general existence result is given in Section
8 of the extended version of this chapter, [32]). What is central to the present
investigation is the observation that the agents may reach an equilibrium in which
one side of the LOB becomes empty (as demonstrated by the example of Section
2.3). We call such LOB, and the associated equilibrium, degenerate.
Definition II.11. We say that an equilibrium with LOB ν is non-degenerate if
ν+n (R) > 0 and ν−n (R) > 0, for all n = 0, . . . , N − 1, P-a.s..
Intuitively, the degeneracy of LOB refers to a situation where, with positive proba-
bility, one side of the LOB disappears from the market: i.e. ν+n (R) or ν−n (R) becomes
zero. Clearly, this happens when the agents who are supposed to provide liquidity
choose to post market orders (i.e. consume liquidity) or wait (neither provide nor
consume liquidity). Such a degeneracy can be interpreted as the internal (or, self-
inflicted) liquidity crisis – the one that arises purely from the interaction between
the agents, and cannot be justified by any fundamental economic reasons (e.g. the
external demand for the asset may still be high, on both sides). Taking an optimistic
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point of view, we assume that the agents choose a non-degenerate equilibrium, when-
ever one is available. However, if a non-degenerate equilibrium does not exist, an
internal liquidity crisis may occur with positive probability. One of the main goals
of this chapter is to provide insights into the occurrence of an internal liquidity crisis
and its relation to trading frequency.
2.3 Example: a Gaussian random walk model
In this section, we consider a specific market model for the external demand D to
construct a non-degenerate LTC equilibrium. More importantly, using this model,
we illustrate the liquidity effects of trading frequency, which, as mentioned in the
introduction, is the main goal of the present work. The present example, albeit
very simplistic, allows us to identify certain important phenomena that occur to the
optimal strategies of the agents (and, hence, to the LOB) as the trading frequency
increases. In particular, we demonstrate how the adverse selection effect may be
amplified disproportionally by the high trading frequency and may cause a liquidity
crisis. Note that the adverse selection phenomenon, in the present setting, is not a
consequence of any ex-ante information asymmetry but is due to the mechanics of
the exchange (i.e. the nature of limit orders), which is similar to the phenomena
documented in [34], [29]. In the rest of the chapter, we show that the conclusions
of this section are not due to the particular choice of a model made in the present
section and, in fact, persist in a much more general setting.
On a complete stochastic basis (Ω, F̃ = (F̃t)t∈[0,T ],P), we consider a continuous
time process p̃0:
(2.10) p̃0t = p
0
0 + αt+ σWt, p
0
0 ∈ R, t ∈ [0, T ],
where α ∈ R and σ > 0 are constants, and W is a Brownian motion. We also consider
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an arbitrary progressively measurable random field (D̃t(p)), s.t., P-a.s., the function
D̃t(·) − D̃s(·) is strictly decreasing and vanishing at zero, for any 0 ≤ s < t ≤ T .
Finally, we introduce the empirical distribution process (µ̃t), with values in the space
of finite sigma-additive measures on S. We partition the time interval [0, T ] into N
subintervals of size ∆t = T/N . A discrete time model is obtained by discretizing the
continuous time one:5
Fn = F̃n∆t, p0n = p̃0n∆t, Dn(p) = (D̃n∆t − D̃(n−1)∆t)(p− p0n), µn = µ̃n∆t.
In this section, for simplicity, we assume that the set of agents’ beliefs is a sin-
gleton: A = {α} and Pα = P. We also assume that (at least, from the agents’
point of view) there are always some long and short agents present in the market:
µn ((0,∞)× A) , µn ((−∞, 0)× A) > 0, P-a.s., for all n. Clearly, N represents the
trading frequency, and the continuous time model represents the “limiting model”,
which the agents use as a benchmark, in order to make consistent predictions in the
markets with different trading frequencies. We assume that the benchmark model is
fixed, and N is allowed to vary. In the remainder of this section, we propose a method
for constructing a non-degenerate LTC equilibrium in the above discrete time model.
We show that the method succeeds for any (N, σ) if α = 0. However, for α 6= 0, we
demonstrate numerically that the method fails as N becomes large enough. We show
why, precisely, the proposed construction fails, providing an economic interpretation
of this phenomenon. Moreover, we analyze the market close to the moment when a
non-degenerate equilibrium fails to exist and demonstrate that the agents’ behavior
at this time follows the pattern typical for an internal (or, self-inflicted) liquidity
crisis.
5In order to ensure the existence of regular conditional probabilities for the discrete time model, we can, for
example, assume that F̃T is generated by a random element with values in a standard Borel space.
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In view of Proposition II.5, in order to construct a non-degenerate LTC equilib-
rium, we need to find a control (p̂, q̂, r̂), and the expected execution prices (λ̂a, λ̂b), s.t.
the value function of an agent with inventory s is given by Vn(s) = s
+λ̂an−s−λ̂bn, and
it is attained by the strategy (p̂, q̂, r̂). In addition, we need to find a non-degenerate



































where δ is the Dirac measure, (p̂a, p̂b, λ̂a, λ̂b) are deterministic processes, and han =∫∞
0




−∞ |s|µn(ds) > 0. With such an ansatz, the conditions (3.7),
(3.8) are satisfied automatically. Thus, we only need to choose finite deterministic






N−1 (so that the equilibrium is LTC)
and the associated (p̂, q̂, 0) form an optimal control, producing the value function
Vn(s) = s
+λan − s−λbn. Appendix A contains necessary and sufficient conditions for
characterizing such families (pa, pb, λa, λb). In particular, we deduce from Corollaries






N−1) form a suitable family in a single-period
case, [N − 1, N ], if they solve the following system:
(2.11)

p̂aN−1 ∈ arg maxp∈R E
(
(p− p̂bN−1 − ξ)1{ξ>p}
)
, p̂bN−1 < 0,
p̂bN−1 ∈ arg maxp∈R E
(
(p̂aN−1 − p+ ξ)1{ξ<p}
)
, p̂aN−1 > 0,
λ̂aN−1 = p̂
b
N−1 + α∆t+ E
(





N−1 + α∆t− E
(
(p̂aN−1 − p̂bN−1 + ξ)1{ξ<p̂bN−1}
)
,
p̂bN−1 ≤ λ̂aN−1, λ̂bN−1 ≤ p̂aN−1, p̂aN−1 ≥ p̂bN−1 + |α|∆t,
where ξ = ∆p0N ∼ N (α∆t, σ2∆t). Let us comment on the economic meaning of
the equations in (2.11). The expectations in the first two lines represent the relative
expected profit from executing a limit order at time N , at the chosen price level
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p+p0N−1, versus marking the inventory to market at timeN , at the best price available
on the other side of the book: i.e. pbN = p̂
b






N−1 + ξ + p
0
N−1.
Notice that a limit order is executed if and only if the fundamental price at time N
is above or below the chosen level of agent’s limit order: i.e. if p0N−1 + ξ > p+ p
0
N−1
or p0N−1 + ξ < p + p
0
N−1.
6 Clearly, it is only optimal for an agent to post a limit
order if the relative expected profit is nonnegative, which is the case if and only
if p̂bN−1 < 0 < p̂
a
N−1. The third and fourth lines in (2.11) represent the expected
execution prices of the agents at time N − 1, assuming they use the controls given
by (p̂aN−1, p̂
b
N−1). Each of the right hand sides is a sum of two components: the
relative expected profit from posting a limit order and the expected value of marking
to market at time N , measured relative to p0N−1. Let us analyze the inequalities in
the last line of (2.11). If the bid price at time N − 1 exceeds the expected execution






N−1, then every agent with
positive inventory prefers to submit a market order, rather than a limit order, at
time N − 1, which causes the ask side of the LOB to degenerate. Similarly, we
establish λ̂bN−1 ≤ p̂aN−1. Finally, if α > 0 and p̂aN−1 < p̂bN−1 +α∆t, an agent may buy
the asset using a market order at time N − 1, at the price p̂aN−1 + p0N−1, and sell it at
time N , at the expected price p̂bN−1 + p
0




N−1 (a reverse strategy
works for α < 0). This strategy can be scaled to generate infinite expected profit
and, hence, is excluded by the last inequality in the last line of (2.11).
We construct a solution to (2.11) by solving a fixed-point problem given by the first
two lines of (2.11) and verifying that the desired inequalities hold.7 We implement
this computation in MatLab, and the results can be seen as the right-most points
6The execution of limit orders simplifies in the chosen ansatz, because the agents on each side of the book (i.e.
long or short) post orders at the same prices level.
7In fact, it is not difficult to prove rigorously that, for any (α, σ), there exists a unique solution to such system,
provided ∆t is small enough. We omit this result for the sake of brevity.
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on the graphs in Figure 3.2. From the numerical solution, we see that, whenever ∆t
is small enough, the conditions p̂bN−1 ≤ λ̂aN−1 and λ̂bN−1 ≤ p̂aN−1 are satisfied (cf. the
right part of Figure 3.2).8 In addition, for α ≥ 0, we have
0 < E
(
p̂aN−1 − p̂bN−1 − ξ | ξ > p̂aN−1
)
=
p̂aN−1 − p̂bN−1 − E
(
ξ | ξ > p̂aN−1
)
≤ p̂aN−1 − p̂bN−1 − α∆t,
which yields the last inequality in (2.11). The case of α < 0 is treated similarly.










N . Thus, the single-period
equilibrium we have constructed satisfies:
(2.12) p̂bn ≤ λ̂an, λ̂bn ≤ p̂an, λ̂an+1 < 0, λ̂bn+1 > 0,
for n = N − 1. If one of the first two inequalities in (2.12) fails, the agents choose
to submit market orders, as opposed to limit orders, which leads to degeneracy of
the LOB – one side of it disappears. If one of the last two inequalities fails, the
execution of a limit order, at any price level, yields a negative relative expected
profit for the agents on one side of the book (given by the expectation in the first or
second line of (2.11)). As a result, it becomes optimal for all such agents to not post
any limit orders, and the LOB degenerates. The latter is interpreted as the adverse
selection effect. For example, if the third inequality in (2.12) fails, then, every long
agent believes that, no matter at which price level her limit order is posted, if it is
executed in the next time period, her expected execution price at the next time step
will be higher than the price at which the limit order is executed. Hence, it does not
make sense to post a limit order at all.
In a single period [N − 1, N ], by choosing small enough ∆t, we can ensure that
the inequalities in (2.12) are satisfied. However, it turns out that, as we progress





recursively backwards, constructing an equilibrium, we may encounter a time step
at which one of the inequalities in (2.12) fails, implying that a non-degenerate LTC
equilibrium cannot be constructed for the given time period (at least, using the
proposed method). To see this, consider the recursive equations for (p̂a, λ̂a) (which





n ∈ arg maxp∈R E
((







n+1 + α∆t+ E
((





and similarly for (p̂b, λ̂b). Using the properties of Gaussian distribution, it is easy to
see that, if λ̂an+1 < 0, we have p̂
a
n > 0. Similar conclusion holds for (λ̂
b, p̂b). Thus,
if λ̂ak < 0 < λ̂
b
k, for k = n + 1, . . . , N , our method allows us to construct a non-
degenerate LTC equilibrium on the time interval [n,N ], with p̂b < 0 < p̂a. Such a
construction always succeeds if the agents are market-neutral: i.e. α = 0. Indeed, in
this case, assuming λ̂an+1 < 0 < λ̂
b
n+1, we have: p̂
b

















(p̂an − ξ) 1{ξ>p̂an)}
)
< 0.
Hence, λ̂an < 0, and, similarly, we deduce that λ̂
b
n > 0. By induction, we obtain a
non-degenerate LTC equilibrium on [0, N ], for any (N, σ), as long as α = 0. Corollary
II.20 shows that, as N → ∞, the processes (λ̂a, λ̂b) converge to zero, which means
that the expected execution prices converge to the fundamental price. The latter is
interpreted as market efficiency in the high-frequency trading regime: any market
participant expects to buy or sell the asset at the fundamental price. The left hand
side of Figure 3.3 shows that the bid and ask prices also converge to the fundamental
price if α = 0. This can be interpreted as a positive liquidity effect of increasing the
trading frequency.
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However, the situation is quite different if α 6= 0. Assume, for example, that
α > 0. Then, the second line of (2.13) implies that λ̂a increases by, at least, α∆t at
each step of the (backward) recursion. Recall that the number of steps is N = T/∆t,
hence, λ̂a0 ≥ λ̂aN + αT . If |λ̂aN | is small (which is typically the case if N is large),
then, we may obtain λ̂an+1 ≥ 0, at some time n, which violates the third inequality
in (2.12), or, equivalently, implies that the objective in the first line of (2.13) is
strictly negative for all p. The latter implies that it is suboptimal for the agents with
positive inventory to post limit orders, and the proposed method fails to produce a
non-degenerate LTC equilibrium in the interval [n,N ]. Figure 3.2 shows that this
does, indeed, occur. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 also show that, for a given (finite) frequency
N , if |α| is small enough, a non-degenerate equilibrium may still be constructed.
Nevertheless, for any |α| 6= 0, however small it is, there exists a large enough N , s.t.
the non-degenerate LTC equilibrium fails to exist (at least, within the class defined
by the proposed method). This is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
It is important to provide an economic interpretation of why such degeneracy
occurs. A careful examination of Figure 3.2 reveals that, around the time when λ̂a
becomes nonnegative, the ask price p̂a explodes. This means that the agents who
want to sell the asset are only willing to sell it at a very high price. Notice also that
this price is several magnitudes larger than the expected change in the fundamental
price (represented by the black dashed line in the left hand side of Figure 3.2).
Hence, such a behavior cannot be justified by the fundamental reasons. Indeed, this
is precisely what is called an internal (or, self-inflicted) liquidity crisis. So, what
causes such a liquidity crisis? Recall that there are two potential reasons for the
market to degenerate: the agents may choose to submit market orders (if p̂bn > λ̂
a
n
or p̂an < λ̂
b
n), or they may choose to wait and do nothing (if λ̂
a
n+1 ≥ 0 or λ̂bn+1 ≤ 0).
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The right hand side of Figure 3.2 shows that the degeneracy is caused by the second
scenario. This means that the naive explanation of the internal liquidity crisis, based
on the claim that, in a bullish market, those who need to buy the asset will submit
market orders wiping out liquidity on the sell side of the book, is wrong. Instead, if
the agents on the sell side of the book have the same beliefs, they will increase the
ask price so that it is no longer profitable for the agents who want to buy the asset to
submit market buy orders. In fact, the ask price may increase disproportionally to
the expected change in the fundamental price (i.e. the signal), and this is what causes
an internal liquidity crisis. The size of the resulting change in the bid or ask price
depends not only on the signal, but also on the trading frequency, which demonstrates
the negative liquidity effect of increasing the trading frequency: it makes the market
more fragile with respect to deviations of the agents from market-neutrality. The
latter, in turn, is explained by the fact that higher trading frequency makes the
adverse selection effect more pronounced. To see this, consider e.g. an agent who is
trying to sell one share of the asset. Increasing the trading frequency increases the
expected execution value of this agent, bringing it closer to the fundamental price:
this corresponds to λ̂a approaching zero (from below). Assume that the agent posts
a limit sell order at a price level p. If this order is executed in the next period, then,
the agent receives p, but, for this to happen, the fundamental price value at the next
time step, p0n+1, has to be above p. On the other hand, the expected execution price
of the agent at the next time step is p0n+1 + λ̂
a
n+1. Thus, the expected relative profit
of the agent, given the execution of her limit order, is En(p− p0n+1− λ̂an+1 | p0n+1 > p).
The latter expression cannot be positive, unless λ̂an+1 < 0 and |λ̂an+1| is sufficiently
large. Therefore, if |λ̂an+1| is small relative to En(p0n+1 − p | p0n+1 > p), the agent is
reluctant to post a limit order at the price level p. Hence, p needs to be sufficiently
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large, to ensure that En(p0n+1 − p | p0n+1 > p) is smaller than |λ̂an+1| (in the Gaussian
model of this section, the latter expectation vanishes as p → ∞) – and smallest
such level of p determines the effect of adverse selection. It turns out that, if the
agents are market-neutral (i.e. α = 0), as the frequency N increases, the quantity
En(p0n+1− p | p0n+1 > p), for any fixed p, converges to zero at the same rate as |λ̂an+1|,
hence, the above adverse selection effect does not get amplified. On contrary, if the
agents are not market-neutral, λ̂an+1 reaches zero at some high enough (but finite)
frequency, while En(p0n+1 − p | p0n+1 > p) remains strictly positive, for any p, which
amplifies the adverse selection effect infinitely and causes the market to degenerate.
Of course, so far, these conclusions are based on a very specific example and on a
particular method of constructing an equilibrium. The next section shows that all
these conclusions remain valid in any model (with, possibly, heterogeneous beliefs)
in which the fundamental price is given by an Itô process.
It is worth mentioning that a similar adverse selection effect arises in [34], and
it is referred to as the “winner’s curse” in [29]. However, the latter papers do not
investigate the nature of this phenomenon and focus on other questions instead. In
the literature on double auctions (cf. [27], [58]), a similar effect arises when the
auction participants choose to decrease their trading activity in a given auction,
because they expect many more opportunities to trade in the future. The latter
is similar to the agents choosing not to post limit orders and wait, in the present
example.
2.4 Main results
In this section, we generalize the conclusions made in the previous section, so that
they hold in a general model and for any choice of an equilibrium. As before, we
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begin with the “limiting” continuous time model. Consider a terminal time horizon
T > 0 and a complete stochastic basis (Ω, F̃ = (F̃t)t∈[0,T ],P), with a Brownian motion
W on it.9 We define the adapted process p̃0 as a continuous modification of








where σ is a progressively measurable locally square integrable process.
Assumption II.12. There exists a constant C > 1, such that, 1/C ≤ σt ≤ C, for
all t ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s..
Consider a Borel set of beliefs A and the associated family of measures {Pα}α∈A












0 ∈ R, Pα-a.s., ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
where Wα is a Brownian motion under Pα, and Aα is a process of finite variation.
We assume that Aα is absolutely continuous: i.e. for any α ∈ A, there exists a locally




µαs ds, Pα-a.s., ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
Assumption II.13. For any α ∈ A, the process µα is P-a.s. right-continuous, and
there exists a constant C > 0, such that |µαt | ≤ C, for all t ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s..
Thus, we can rewrite the dynamics of p̃0, under each Pα, as follows: Pα-a.s., the
following holds for all t ∈ [0, T ]:













In addition, we modify the above stochastic integral on a set of Pα-measure zero, so
that (2.15) holds for all (t, ω). In what follows, we often need to analyze the future
9In order to ensure the existence of regular conditional probabilities for the discrete time model, we can, for
example, assume that F̃T is generated by a random element with values in a standard Borel space.
33
dynamics of p̃0 under Pα, conditional on F̃t, for various (t, α) simultaneously. This
is why we need the following joint regularity assumption.







such that it satisfies the tower property with respect to P (as described in Section
3.2).
Assumption II.14 is satisfied, for example, if Pα ∼ P, for all α ∈ A, or if the set
A is countable. Throughout the rest of the chapter, P̃αt refers to a member of the
family appearing in Assumption II.14. All conditional expectations Ẽαt are taken
under such P̃αt .
The main results of this section require additional continuity assumptions on σ and
µα. The following assumption can be viewed as a stronger version of L2-continuity
of σ.
Assumption II.15. There exists a function ε(·) ≥ 0, such that ε(∆t) → 0, as










holds for all t ∈ [0, T −∆t], all s ∈ [t, t + ∆t], all stopping times t ≤ τ ≤ s, and all
α ∈ A.
The above assumption is satisfied, for example, if σ is an Itô process with bounded
drift and diffusion coefficients. Next, we state a continuity assumption on the drift,
which can be interpreted as a uniform right-continuity in probability of the martin-
gale Ẽαt µαs .
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Assumption II.16. For any α ∈ A and any t ∈ [0, T ), there exists a deterministic








∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε(∆t)) ≤ ε(∆t)
holds for all t ≤ t′ ≤ t′′ ≤ t+ ∆t ≤ T .
Notice that Assumptions II.14, II.15, and II.16 are not quite standard. Therefore,
below, we describe a more specific (although, still, rather general) diffusion-based
framework, in which the Assumptions II.12–II.16 reduce to standard regularity con-
ditions on the diffusion coefficients, and are easily verified. To this end, consider
a model in which µαt = µ̄
α(t, Yt), σt = σ̄(t, Yt), and, under P, the process Y is a
diffusion taking values in Rd:
dYt = Γ(t, Yt)dt+ Σ(t, Yt)dB̄t,
where Γ : [0, T ] × Rd → Rd, Σ = (Σi,j) is a mapping on [0, T ] × Rd with values in
the space of d×m matrices, and B̄ is m-dimensional Brownian motion under P (on
the original stochastic basis). We assume that Γ and Σ possess enough regularity to
conclude that Y is a strongly Markov process. Notice that Assumptions II.12 and
II.13 reduce to the upper and lower bounds on the functions µ̄α and σ̄. Assumption
II.14 is satisfied if we assume that Pα ∼ P, for all α ∈ A. Let us further assume that















with an Rd-valued function γα, for each α ∈ A. Let us assume that all entries of
Γ, γα and Σ are absolutely bounded by a constant (uniformly over α ∈ A). As-
suming, in addition, that σ̄ is globally Lipschitz, we easily verify Assumption II.15.
In order to verify Assumption II.16, we assume that the quadratic form generated
35
by A(t, y) := Σ(t, y)ΣT (t, y) is bounded away from zero, uniformly over all (t, y),
and that the entries of Γ, γα and Σ are continuously differentiable with absolutely
bounded derivatives (uniformly over α ∈ A). Then, the Feynman-Kac formula im-
plies that, for any t ≤ s,
Ẽαt µαs = us,α(t, Yt),













0, (t, y) ∈ (0, s)× Rd, us,α(s, y) = µ̄α(s, y),
and Γα = Γ + Σγα. Assume that, for each s ∈ [0, T ], the function µ̄α(s, ·) is contin-
uously differentiable with absolutely bounded derivatives, uniformly over all (s, α).
Then, the standard Gaussian estimates for derivatives of the fundamental solution
to the above PDE (cf. Theorem 9.4.2 in [30]) imply that every ∂yiu
s,α is absolutely
bounded, uniformly over all (s, α). Then, Itô’s formula and Itô’s isometry yield, for


















dv ≤ C1(t′′ ∧ s − t′),
with some constant C1 > 0. The above estimate and Jensen’s inequality imply the
statement of Assumption II.16 and complete the description of the diffusion-based
setting.
As in Section 2.3, we also consider a progressively measurable random field D̃,
s.t. P-a.s. the function D̃t(·)− D̃s(·) is strictly decreasing and vanishing at zero, for
any 0 ≤ s < t ≤ T . We assume that the demand curve, D̃t(·) − D̃s(·), cannot be
“too flat”.
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Assumption II.17. There exists ε > 0, s.t., for any 0 ≤ t − ε ≤ s < t ≤ T , there
exists a F̃s ⊗ B(R)-measurable random function κs(·), s.t., P-a.s., κs(·) is strictly
decreasing and
∣∣∣D̃t(p)− D̃s(p)∣∣∣ ≥ |κs(p)|, for all p ∈ R.
Finally, we introduce the empirical distribution process (µ̃t), with values in the
space of finite sigma-additive measures on S. The next assumption states that every
µ̃t is dominated by a deterministic measure.
Assumption II.18. For any t ∈ [0, T ], there exists a finite sigma-additive measure
µ0t on (S,B (S)), s.t., P-a.s., µ̃t is absolutely continuous w.r.t. µ0t .
We partition the time interval [0, T ] into N subintervals of size ∆t = T/N . A
discrete time model is obtained by discretizing the continuous time one:
Fn = F̃n∆t, p0n = p̃0n∆t, Dn(p) = (D̃n∆t − D̃(n−1)∆t)(p− p0n), µn = µ̃n∆t.
Before we present the main results, let us comment on the above assumptions. These
assumptions are important from a technical point of view, however, some of them
have economic interpretation that may provide (partial) intuitive explanations of the
results that follow. In particular, Assumption II.12 ensures that the fundamental
price remains “noisy”, which implies that an agent can execute a limit order very
quickly by posting it close to the present value of p0, if there are no other orders
posted there. In combination with Assumption II.17, the latter implies that, when
the frequency, N , is high, an agent has a lot of opportunities to execute her limit order
at a price close to the fundamental price (at least, if no other orders are posted too
close to the fundamental price). Intuitively, this means that the agent’s execution
value should improve as the frequency increases. Assumption II.16 ensures that,
if an agent has a signal about the direction of the fundamental price, this signal
is persistent – i.e. it is continuous in the appropriate sense. When the trading
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frequency N is large, such persistency means that an agent has a large number of
opportunities to exploit the signal, implying that she is in no rush to have her order
executed immediately. The main results of this work, presented below, along with
their proofs, confirm that these heuristic conclusions are, indeed, correct.
As mentioned in the preceding sections, our main goal is to analyze the liquidity
effects of increasing the trading frequency. Therefore, we fix a limiting continuous
time model, and consider a sequence of discrete time models, obtained from the
limiting one as described above, for N → ∞. This can be interpreted as observing
the same population of agents, each of whom has a fixed continuous time model for
future demand, in various exchanges that allow for different trading frequencies. We
begin with the following theorem, which shows that, if every market model in a given
sequence admits a non-degenerate equilibrium, then, the terminal bid and ask prices
converge to the fundamental price, as the trading frequency goes to infinity.
Theorem II.19. Let Assumptions II.12, II.13, II.14, II.15, II.17, II.18 hold. Con-
sider a family of uniform partitions of a given time interval [0, T ], with diameters
{∆t = T/N > 0} and with the associated family of discrete time models, and denote
the associated fundamental price process by p0,∆t. Assume that every such model ad-
mits a non-degenerate LTC equilibrium, and denote the associated bid and ask prices
by pb,∆t and pa,∆t respectively. Then, there exists a deterministic function ε(·), s.t.
ε(∆t)→ 0, as ∆t→ 0, and, for all small enough ∆t > 0, the following holds P-a.s.:
∣∣∣pa,∆tN − p0,∆tN ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣pb,∆tN − p0,∆tN ∣∣∣ ≤ ε(∆t)
The above theorem has a useful corollary, which can be interpreted as follows:
if the market does not degenerate as the frequency increases, then, such an increase
improves market efficiency. Here, we understand the “improving efficiency” in the
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sense that the expected execution price (i.e. the price per share that an agent expects
to receive or pay by the end of the game) of every agent converges to the fundamental
price.
Corollary II.20. Under the assumptions of Theorem II.19, denote the support of
every equilibrium by Ã∆t and the associated expected execution prices by λa,∆t and
λb,∆t. Then, there exists a deterministic function ε(·), such that ε(∆t) → 0, as
∆t→ 0, and, P-a.s.,
sup
n=0,...,N, α∈Ã∆t
(∣∣λa,∆tn (α)− p0,∆tn ∣∣+ ∣∣λb,∆tn (α)− p0,∆tn ∣∣) ≤ ε(∆t),
for all small enough ∆t > 0.
Proof: Denote Eαn = Ẽαn∆t. It follows from Corollary II.31, in Appendix A, and




N (α) = p
a,∆t
N . It
also follows from Corollary II.31 (or, more generally, from the definition of a value
function) that λa,∆t(α) is a supermartingale, and λb,∆t(α) is a submartingale, under




n (α) ≤ Eαnp
a,∆t
N . On the other hand,




n (α) ≥ Eαnp
b,∆t
N . Assume,
for example, that λa,∆tn (α) > Eαnp
a,∆t
N on the event Ω
′ of positive Pα-probability.
Consider an agent at state (0, α), who follows the optimal strategy of an agent at
state (1, α), starting from time n and onward, on the event Ω′ (otherwise, she does










which contradicts Corollary II.31. The second inequality is shown similarly. Thus,












which, in turn, converges to zero, as ∆t → 0, due to the deterministic bounds
obtained in the proof of Proposition II.19.
The results of Theorem II.19 and Corollary II.20 can be viewed as a specific case
of a more general observation: markets become more efficient as the frictions become
smaller. In the present setting, the limited trading frequency is viewed as friction,
and the market efficiency is measured by the difference between the bid and ask
prices, or between the expected execution prices. Many more instances of analogous
results can be found in the literature, depending on the choice of a friction type.
For example, the markets become efficient in [33] and [43] as the number of insiders
vanishes. Similarly, the markets become efficient in [27] as the trading frequency
increases and the size of private signals vanishes. It is also mentioned in [13] that
the market would become efficient if there was no restriction on the size of agents’
inventories therein.
The above results demonstrate the positive role of high trading frequency. How-
ever, they are based on the assumption that the market does not degenerate as
frequency increases. In the context of Section 2.3, we saw that the markets do not
degenerate only if the agents are market-neutral (i.e. α = 0). If this condition is vio-
lated and the frequency N is sufficiently high, the market admits no non-degenerate
equilibrium (i.e. there exists no safe regime, in which the liquidity crisis would never
occur). It turns out that this conclusion still holds in the general setting considered
herein.
Theorem II.21. Let Assumptions II.12, II.13, II.14, II.15, II.16, II.17, II.18 hold.
Consider a family of uniform partitions of a given time interval [0, T ], with diameters
{∆t = T/N > 0}, containing arbitrarily small ∆t, and with the associated family
of discrete time models. Assume that every such model admits a non-degenerate
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LTC equilibrium, with the same support Ã. Then, for all α ∈ Ã, we have: p̃0 is a
martingale under Pα.
The above theorem shows that the market degenerates even if the signal µα is very
small (but non-zero), provided the trading frequency N is large enough. Therefore,
as discussed at the end of Section 2.3, such degeneracy cannot be attributed to any
fundamental reasons, and we refer to it as the internal (or, self-inflicted) liquidity
crisis. Let us provide an intuitive (heuristic) argument for why the statement of
Theorem II.21 holds. Assume, first, that all long agents (i.e. those having positive
inventory) are bullish about the asset (i.e. have a positive drift µα). Then, similar
to Section 2.3, the higher trading frequency amplifies the adverse selection effect,
forcing the long agents to withdraw liquidity from the market (i.e. they prefer to
do nothing and wait for a higher fundamental price level). Note that, in the present
setting, the agents may have different beliefs, the LOB may have a complicated
shape and dynamics, and the expected execution prices are no longer deterministic.
All this makes it difficult to provide a simple description of how the high frequency
amplifies the adverse selection. Nevertheless, the general analysis of this case is still
based on the idea discussed at the end of Section 2.3: it has to do with how fast
Ẽαn∆t(p0n+1 − p | p0n+1 > p) vanishes (as the frequency increases), relative to the rate
at which the expected execution prices approach the fundamental price. Thus, there
must be a non-zero mass of long agents who are market-neutral or bearish. As the
trading frequency grows, these agents will post their limit orders at lower levels.
Next, assume that there exists a bullish agent (long, short, or with zero inventory).
Then, at a sufficiently high trading frequency, the agent’s expected value of a long
position in a single share of the asset will exceed the ask prices posted by the market-
neutral and bearish long agents. In this case, the bullish agent prefers to buy more
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asset at the posted ask price, in order to sell it later. As the agents are small and
their objectives are linear, the bullish agent can scale up her strategy to generate
infinite expected profits. This contradicts the definition of optimality and implies
that an equilibrium fails to exist. Thus, all agents have to be either market-neutral
or bearish. Applying a symmetric argument, we conclude that all agents must be
market-neutral.10 A rigorous formulation of the above arguments, which constitutes
the proof of Theorem II.21, is given in Section 2.7.
It is worth mentioning that the possible degeneracy of LOB is also documented
in [33], and is referred to as a “market shut down”. The setting used in the latter
paper is very different: it analyzes a quote-driven exchange (i.e. the one with a
designated market maker) and assumes the existence of insiders with superior in-
formation. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw a parallel with the LOB degeneracy
in the present setting. Namely, the degeneracy in [33] occurs when the number of
insiders increases, which implies that the signal, generated by the insiders’ trading,
becomes sufficiently large. The latter is similar to the deviation from martingality
of the fundamental price in the present setting. However, an increase in the number
of insiders in [33] also implies an increase in frictions (since the insiders can be inter-
preted as friction in [33]). Theorem II.21, on the other hand, states that a market
degeneracy will occur when the frictions are sufficiently small. Perhaps, this dual
role of the number of insiders did not allow for a detailed analysis of market shut
downs in [33]. Many other models of market microstructure (cf. [34], [52], [50], [29],
[27]) are not well suited for the analysis of market degeneracy, either because the
agents in these models pursue “one-shot” strategies (i.e. they cannot choose to wait
and post a limit order later) or because the fundamental price (or its analogue) is
10This argument, along with the fact that Definition II.3 requires an optimal control to be optimal for all α,
explains why the statement of Theorem II.21 holds for all, as opposed to µn-a.e., α ∈ Ã.
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restricted to be a martingale.
2.5 Conditional tails of the marginal distributions of Itô processes
As follows form the discussion in the preceding sections, in order to prove the main
results of the chapter, we need to investigate the properties of marginal distributions
of the fundamental price p̃0 (more precisely, the distributions of its increments).
In order to prove Theorem II.19, we need to show that the difference between the
fundamental price and the bid or ask price converges to zero, as the frequency N
increases to infinity. It turns out that, for this purpose, it suffices to show that
the distribution of a normalized increment of p̃0 converges to the standard normal
distribution. The following lemma summarizes these results. It is rather simple,
but technical, hence, its proof is postponed to Appendix B. In order to formulate
the result (and to facilitate the derivations in subsequent sections), we introduce
addiitonal notation. For convenience, we drop the superscript ∆t in many variables
which do, in fact, depend on ∆t, hoping it causes no confusion (we emphasize this
dependence whenever it is important). For any market model on the time interval
[0, T ], associated with a uniform partition with diameter ∆t = T/N > 0, and having








n = Ẽαtn , P
α
n = P̃αtn , tn = n∆t, n = 1, . . . , NT/∆t.
We denote by η0 a standard normal random variable (on a, possibly, extended prob-
ability space), which is independent of FN under every Pα.
Lemma II.22. Let Assumptions II.12, II.13, II.14, II.15 hold. Then, there exists a
function ε(·) ≥ 0, s.t. ε(∆t)→ 0, as ∆t→ 0, and the following holds P-a.s., for all
p ∈ R, all α ∈ A, and all n = 1, . . . , N :
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(i) (|p| ∨ 1)
∣∣∣Pαn−1 ( ξn√∆t > p)− Pαn−1 (σtn−1η0 > p)∣∣∣ ≤ ε(∆t)
(ii)
∣∣∣Eαn−1 ( ξn√∆t1{ξn/√∆t>p})− Eαn−1 (σtn−1η01{σtn−1η0>p})∣∣∣ ≤ ε(∆t)
In addition, the above estimates hold if we replace (ξn, η0, p) by (−ξn,−η0,−p).
In order to prove Theorem II.21 we need to compare the rates at which the con-
ditional expectations Eαn(p0n+1 − p | p0n+1 > p) vanish (as the frequency N goes to
infinity) to the rate at which the expected execution prices converge to the fun-
damental price. This requires a more delicate analysis – in particular, the mere
proximity of the distribution of a (normalized) fundamental price increment to the
Gaussian distribution is no longer sufficient. In fact, what we need is a precise
uniform estimate of the conditional tail of the distribution of a fundamental price
increment. The desired property is formulated in the following lemma, which, we
believe, is valuable in its own right. This result allows us to estimate the tails of the
conditional marginal distribution of an Itô process X uniformly by an exponential.
To the best of our knowledge, this result is new. The main difficulties in establishing
the desired estimates are: (a) the fact that we estimate the conditional, as opposed
to the regular, tail, and (b) the fact that the estimates need to be uniform over the
values of the argument. Note that, even in the case of a diffusion process X, the
classical Gaussian-type bounds for the tails of the marginal distributions of X are
not sufficient to establish the desired estimates. The reason is that, in general, the
Gaussian estimates of the regular tails from above and from below have different
orders of decay, for the large values of the argument, which makes them useless for
estimating the conditional tail (which is a ratio of two regular tails).
Lemma II.23. Consider the following continuous semimartingale on a stochastic
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σ̂udBu, t ∈ [0, 1],
where B is a Brownian motion (with respect to the given stochastic basis), µ̂ and σ̂
are progressively measurable processes, such that the above integrals are well defined.
Assume that, for any stopping time τ with values in [0, 1], c ≤ |σ̂τ | ≤ C holds a.s.
with some constants c, C > 0. Then, there exists ε > 0, depending only on (c, C),
s.t., if
µ̂2τ ≤ ε, Ê
(
(σ̂s∨τ − σ̂τ )2 | F̂τ
)
≤ ε a.s.,
for all s ∈ [0, 1] and all stopping time τ , with values in [0, 1], then, for any c1 > 0,
there exists C1 > 0, depending only on (c, C, ε, c1), s.t. the following holds:
P̂(X1 > x+ z |X1 > x) ≤ C1e−c1z, ∀x, z ≥ 0.
Proof: In the course of this proof, we will use the shorthand notation, Êτ and P̂τ ,









For any x ≥ 0, let us introduce τx = 1 ∧ inf {t ∈ [0, 1] : Xt = x}. Then
P̂(X1 > x+ z) ≤ P̂( sup
t∈[0,1]






(Xs − x) > z
))
Notice that, on {τx ≤ s}, we have: Xs− x = As∨τx −Aτx +Gs∨τx −Gτx . In addition,
the process (Y )s∈[0,1], with Ys = As∨τx − Aτx , is adapted to the filtration (F̂τx∨s),
while the process (Z)s∈[0,1], with Zs = Gs∨τx − Gτx , is a martingale with respect to



































where we used the fact that 〈Z〉s ≤ 〈X〉1 ≤ C2, for all s ∈ [0, 1]. Using the Novikov’s








, s ∈ [0, 1],
is a true martingale, and, hence, we can apply the Doob’s martingale inequality to

































Collecting the above inequalities, we obtain
(2.17)
P̂(X1 > x+z) ≤ P̂( sup
t∈[0,1]
Xt > x+z) ≤ C2(ε)e−c1zP̂(τx < 1) = C2(ε)e−c1zP̂( sup
t∈[0,1]
Xt > x).
The next step is to estimate the distribution tails of a running maximum via the
tails of the distribution of X1. To do this, we proceed as before:
(2.18) P̂(X1 > x) = Ê
(
1{τx<1}P̂τx (Y1 + Z1 > 0)
)
,
with Y and Z defined above. Notice that, on {τx < 1},
















(σ̂u∨τx − σ̂τx)dBxu > 0
)
,





(σ̂u∨τx − σ̂τx)dBxu, s ∈ [0, 1],
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and notice that it is a square-integrable martingale with respect to (F̂s∨τx). Then,


























Collecting the above and using Chebyshev’s inequality, we obtain, on {τx < 1}:∣∣∣∣P̂τx (Y1 + Z1 > 0)− P̂τx (σ̂τxB1 −Bτx√1− τx ≤ −ε1/3
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2ε1/6.
On the other hand, due to the strong Markov property of Brownian motion, on
















where ξ is a standard normal. As σ̂τx ∈ [c, C], we conclude that the right hand side
of the above converges to 1/2, as ε→ 0, uniformly over almost all random outcomes
in {τx < 1}. In particular, for all small enough ε > 0, we have:
1{τx<1}
∣∣∣P̂τx (Y1 + Z1 ≤ 0)− P̂τx (Y1 + Z1 > 0)∣∣∣ ≤ 1{τx<1}δ(ε) < 1,
and, in view of (2.18),
P̂(X1 > x) ≥ Ê
(
1{τx<1}P̂τx (Y1 + Z1 ≤ 0)
)
− δ(ε)P̂(τx < 1)
Summing up the above inequality and (2.18), we obtain
2P̂(X1 > x) ≥ (1− δ(ε))P̂(τx < 1) = (1− δ(ε))P̂( sup
t∈[0,1]
Xt > x),
which, along with (2.17), yields the statement of the lemma.
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2.6 Proof of Theorem II.19
Within the scope of this proof, we adopt the notation introduced in (2.16) and
use the following convention.
Notation II.24. The LOB, the bid and ask prices, the expected execution prices,
and the demand, are all measured relative to p0. Namely, we use νn to denote
νn ◦ (x 7→ x+p0n)−1, pan to denote pan−p0n, pbn to denote pbn−p0n, λan to denote λan−p0n,
λbn to denote λ
b
n − p0n, and Dn(p) to denote Dn(p0n + p).
Herein, we are only concerned with what happens in the last trading period – at
time (N − 1), where N = T/∆t. Hence, we omit the subscript N − 1 whenever it is
clear from the context. In particular, we write pa and pb for paN−1 and p
b
N−1, ν for
νN−1, and ξ for ξN . Note also that, in an LTC equilibrium, we have: p
a = paN = p
a
N−1,
with similar equalities for pb and ν. For convenience, we also drop the superscript
∆t in the LOB and the associated bid and ask prices. Finally, we denote by Ã the
support of a given equilibrium. As the roles of pa and pb in our model are symmetric,
we will only prove the statement of the proposition for pb. We are going to show that,
under the assumptions of the theorem, there exists a constant C0 > 0, depending
only on the constant C in Assumptions II.12 and II.13, such that, for all small enough
∆t, we have, P-a.s.:
(2.19) − C0 ≤ pb/
√
∆t < 0
First, we introduce Âα(p;x), which we refer to as the simplified objective:





Recall that the expected relative profit from posting a limit sell order at price level
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p, in the last time period,11 is given by Aα(p; pbN), where
(2.21) Aα(p;x) = EαN−1
(
(p− x− ξ)1{D+N (p−ξ)>ν+((−∞,p))}
)
.
The simplified objective is similar to Aα, but it assumes that there are no orders
posted at better prices than the one posted by the agent. In particular, Âα(p;x) =
Aα(p;x) for p ≤ pa. Corollary II.31, in Appendix A, states that, in equilibrium,
P-a.s., if the agents in the state (s, α) post limit sell orders, then they post them
at a price level p that maximizes the true objective Aα(p; pb). The following lemma
shows that the value of the modified objective becomes close to the value of the true
objective, for the agents posting limit sell orders close to the ask price.
Lemma II.25. P-a.s., either ν+({pa}) > 0 or we have:
∣∣∣Aα(p; pb)− Âα(pa; pb)∣∣∣→ 0,
as p ↓ pa, uniformly over all α ∈ Ã.
Proof: If ν+({pa}) = 0, then ν+ is continuous at pa, and ν+((−∞, p])→ 0, as p ↓ pa.
Then, we have ∣∣∣Aα(p; pb)− Âα(pa; pb)∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣EαN−1 ((p− pb − ξ)1{D+N (p−ξ)>ν+((−∞,p))})− EαN−1 ((pa − pb − ξ)1{ξ>pa})∣∣∣
≤ |p− pa|+
∥∥pa − pb − ξ∥∥L2(PαN−1) PαN−1 (ξ > pa, D+N(p− ξ) ≤ ν+((−∞, p)))
Thus, it suffices to show that: (i)
∥∥pa − pb − ξ∥∥L2(PαN−1) is bounded by a finite random








11Recall that everything is measured relative to the fundamental price, according to the Notational Convention
II.24
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as p ↓ pa, uniformly over α. For (i), we have:
∥∥pa − pb − ξ∥∥L2(PαN−1) ≤ |pa − pb|+ ‖ξ‖L2(PαN−1) ≤ |pa − pb|+ 2C√∆t,
where the constant C appears in Assumptions II.12 and II.13. For (ii), we note that
{ξN > pa, D+N(p− ξ) ≤ ν





as DN(·) is strictly decreasing, with DN(0) = 0. Assumption II.17 implies that
κ−1(ν+((−∞, p))) ≤ D−1N (ν
+((−∞, p))) < 0,
where κ is known at time N − 1. Therefore,
PαN−1
(







pa, p− κ−1(ν+((−∞, p)))
])
.
It remains to show that, P-a.s., the right hand side of the above converges to zero,
uniformly over all α. Assume that it does not hold. Then, with positive probability
P, there exists ε > 0 and a sequence of (pk, αk), such that pk ↓ pa and
PαkN−1
(
ξ ∈ (pa, pk − κ−1(ν+((−∞, pk)))]
)
≥ ε.
Notice that, P-a.s., the family of measures
{
µ̂k = PαkN−1 ◦ ξ−1
}
k
is tight. The latter
follows, for example, from the fact that, P-a.s., the conditional second moments of ξ
are bounded uniformly over all α (which, in turn, is a standard exercise in stochastic
calculus). Prokhorov’s theorem, then, implies that there is a subsequence of these
measures that converges weakly to some measure µ̂ on R. Next, notice that, for any
fixed k in the chosen subsequence, there exists a large enough k′, such that
∣∣µ̂ ((pa, pk − κ−1(ν+((−∞, pk)))])− µk′ ((pa, pk − κ−1(ν+((−∞, pk)))])∣∣ ≤ ε/2.
Thus, for any k in the subsequence, we have
µ̂
((




The above is a contradiction, as the intersection of the corresponding intervals,
(pa, pk − κ−1(ν+((−∞, pk)))], over all k is empty.
Now we are ready to prove the upper bound in (2.19).
Lemma II.26. In any non-degenerate LTC equilibrium, pb < 0 < pa, P-a.s..
Proof: We only show that pb < 0 hold, the other inequality being very similar.
Assume that pb ≥ 0 on some positive P-probability set Ω′ ∈ FN−1. We are going
to show that this results in a contradiction. First, Corollary II.31, in Appendix A,
implies that, P-a.s., if the agents in state (s, α) post a limit sell order, then we must
have: sup
p∈R
Aα(p; pb) ≥ 0. In addition, on Ω′, we have: Âα(pa; pb) < 0 for all α ∈ Ã, as
ξ has full support in R under every PαN−1 (which, in turn, follows from the fact that σ
is bounded uniformly away from zero). Then, Lemma II.25 implies that there exists
a FN−1-measurable p̄ ≥ pa, such that, on Ω′, the following holds a.s.: if ν+({pa}) = 0
then p̄ > pa, and, in all cases,
(2.22) Aα(p; pb) < 0, ∀p ∈ [pa, p̄], ∀α ∈ Ã
Clearly, it is suboptimal for an agent to post a limit sell order below p̄. However, an
agent’s strategy only needs to be optimal up to a set of P-measure zero, and these
sets can be different for different (s, α). Therefore, a little more work is required to
obtain the desired contradiction. Consider the set B ⊂ Ω′ × R× Ã:
B = {(ω, s, α) | q̂(s, α) > 0, p̂(s, α) ≤ p̄} .




, due to the measurability
properties of q̂ and p̂. Notice that, due to the above discussion and the optimality
of agents’ actions (cf. Corollary II.31, in Appendix A), for any (s, α) ∈ R × Ã, we
have:






1B(ω, s, α)µN−1(ds, dα) =∫
R×Ã
EN−1 (1B(ω, s, α)ρN−1(ω, s, α))µ0N−1(ds, dα) = 0,
where ρN−1 is the Radon-Nikodym density of µN−1 w.r.t. to the deterministic mea-
sure µ0N−1 (cf. Assumption II.18).
The above implies that, PN−1-a.s., 1B(ω, s, α)ρN−1(ω, s, α) = 0, for µ0N−1-a.e.
(s, α). Notice also that, for all (ω, s, α) ∈ Ω′ × R× Ã,
1{p̂(s,α)≤p̄}q̂
+(s, α)1Bc = 0.
From the above observations and the condition (3.7) in the definition of equilibrium
(cf. Definition III.6), we conclude that, on Ω′, the following holds a.s.:
ν+([pa, p̄]) = 0,
where p̄ ≥ pa, and, if ν+({pa}) = 0, then p̄ > pa. This contradicts the definition of
pa (recall that pa is P-a.s. finite, due to non-degeneracy of the LOB).
It only remains to prove the lower bound on pb in (2.19). Assume that it does not
hold. That is, assume that there exists a family of equilibria, with arbitrary small
∆t, and positive P-probability FN−1-measurable sets Ω∆t, such that pb < −C0
√
∆t
on Ω∆t. We are going to show that this leads to a contradiction with pa > 0. To this
end, assume that the agents maximize the simplified objective function, Âα, instead
of the true one, Aα. Then, it turns out that, if pb is negative enough, the optimal
price levels become negative for all α. The precise formulation of this is given by the
following lemma.
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Lemma II.27. There exists a constant C0 > 0, s.t., for any small enough ∆t, there
exist constants ε, δ > 0, s.t., P-a.s., we have:
Âα(−δ;x) ≥ ε+ sup
y≥0
Âα(y;x),
for all α ∈ Ã and all x ≤ −C0
√
∆t.
Proof: Denote ξ̄ = ξ/
√


















and, hence, we can reformulate the statement of the lemma as follows: there exists
a constant C0 > 0, s.t., for any small enough ∆t, there exist constants ε, δ > 0, s.t.,
P-a.s., we have:
Āα(−δ;x) ≥ ε+ sup
y≥0
Āα(y;x),


















is non-increasing in x, and, hence, such is Āα(−δ;x)−sup
y≥0
Āα(y;x). Hence, it suffices
to prove the above statement for x = −C0. Next, consider the deterministic function
Aσ(p;x), defined via





where η0 is a standard normal random variable on some auxiliary probability space
(Ω̂, P̂). It follows from Lemma II.22 that there exists a function ε2(·) ≥ 0, s.t.
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ε2(∆t)→ 0, as ∆t→ 0, and, P-a.s., we have:∣∣∣Āα(p;−C0)− AσtN−1 (p;−C0)∣∣∣ ≤ ε2(∆t),
for all α ∈ Ã and all p ∈ R. Then, as we can always choose ∆t small enough, so
that ε2(∆t) < ε, the statements of the lemma would follow if we can show that there
exist constants ε, δ, C0 > 0, s.t., P-a.s.,
AσtN−1 (−δ;−C0) ≥ 3ε+ sup
y≥0
AσtN−1 (y;−C0)
As σtN−1(ω) ∈ [1/C,C], P-a.s., it suffices to find ε, δ, C0 > 0, s.t.
Aσ(−δ;−C0) ≥ 3ε+ sup
y≥0
Aσ(y;−C0), ∀σ ∈ [1/C,C].
Note that the above inequality does not involve ω or ξ, and it is simply a property of
a deterministic function. Notice also that Aσ(p;x) = σA1 (p/σ;x/σ), with A1 given
in (2.23). Then, if we denote by F (x) and f(x), respectively, the cdf and pdf of a
standard normal, we obtain:




A straightforward calculation gives us the following useful properties of A1 and Aσ:
(i) For any σ > 0 and any x < 0, the function p 7→ Aσ(p;x) has a unique maximizer
pσ(x), in particular, it is increasing in p ≤ pσ(x) and decreasing in p ≥ pσ(x).
(ii) The function
x 7→ pσ(x) = σp1(x/σ) = σ ((1− F )/f)−1 (−x/σ)
is increasing in x < 0 and converges to −∞, as x→ −∞.
Then, choosing C0 large enough, so that p1(−C0/C) < 0, ensures pσ(−C0) < 0,
for all σ ∈ [1/C,C]. Setting δ = −p1(−C0/C)/C guarantees that pσ(−C0) ≤ −δ, for
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all σ ∈ [1/C,C]. Then, by property (i) above, we have, for all σ ∈ [1/C,C]:
Aσ(−δ;−C0) > Aσ(0;−C0) = sup
y≥0
Aσ(y;−C0).
Finally, as Aσ(−δ;−C0) − Aσ(0;−C0) is a continuous function of σ ∈ [1/C,C], we
can find ε, such that
Aσ(−δ;−C0) ≥ 3ε+ sup
y≥0
Aσ(y;−C0), ∀σ ∈ [1/C,C].
Recall that our assumption is that pb < −C0
√
∆t holds on a set Ω∆t of positive
P-measure. Recall also that pa > 0, P-a.s., due to Lemma II.26. Then, Lemmas II.25
and II.27 imply that there exists FN−1-measurable p̄ ≥ pa, s.t., on Ω∆t, we have a.s.:
if ν+({pa}) = 0 then p̄ > pa, and, in all cases,
Aα(p; pb) < sup
p′∈R
Aα(p′; pb), ∀p ∈ [pa, p̄], ∀α ∈ Ã.
It is intuitively clear that posting limit sell orders at the above price levels p must
be suboptimal for the agents. However, the above inequality, on its own, does not
yield a contradiction, as the agents’ strategies are only optimal up to a set of P-
probability zero, and these sets may be different for different states (s, α). To obtain
a contradiction with the definition of pa, we simply repeat the last part of the proof
of Lemma II.26 (following equation (2.22)). This ensures that (2.19) holds and
completes the proof of the theorem.
2.7 Proof of Theorem II.21
Within the scope of this proof, we adopt the notation introduced in (2.16) and
use Notational Convention II.24 (i.e. we measure the LOB, the expected execution
prices, and the demand, relative to p0, but keep the same variables’ names). Assume
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that the statement of the theorem does not hold: i.e. there exists α0 ∈ Ã, such that
p̃0 is not a martingale under Pα0 . Then, there exists s ∈ [0, T ), s.t., with positive
probability Pα0 , we have:
Ẽα0s p̃0T 6= p̃0s.
Without loss of generality, we assume that there exists a constant δ > 0 and a set
Ω′ ∈ Fs, having positive probability Pα0 (and hence P), s.t., for all random outcomes
in Ω′, we have:
(2.24) Ẽα0s (p̃0T − p̃0s) ≥ δ
(the case of negative values is analogous). Next, we fix an arbitrary ∆t from a given
family and consider the associated non-degenerate LTC equilibrium.
Lemma II.28. There exists a deterministic function ε(·) ≥ 0, s.t. ε(∆t) → 0, as
∆t → 0, and, for any small enough ∆t > 0, there exists n = 0, . . . , N − 3 and










Proof: The proof follows from Assumption II.16. Consider t = t′ = s and t′′ = tn+2.








∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε(∆t)) ≤ ε(∆t)
on Ω′, a.s.. Notice also that


















µα0u du ≥ 3δ/4,
on Ω′′. Next, we choose t = s, t′ = tn+2, t











∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε(∆t)) ≤ ε(∆t),







µα0u du ≤ δ/2
)
≤ ε(∆t).
Finally, due to Assumption II.13, and as ∆t is small, we can replace
∫ T
s
µα0u du by∫ T
tn+3
µα0u du, and δ/2 by δ/4, in the above equation. This completes the proof of the
lemma.
Using the strategy at which the agent in state (1, α0) waits until the last moment
n = N , we conclude that the process (λan(α0) +p
0
n) must be a supermartingale under









Eα0n+3(p0N − p0n+3) + ξn+3
)
.
Recall that λaN(α0) = p
b
N and, due to Theorem II.19 (more precisely, it follows from
the proof of the theorem), there exists a constant C0 > 0, s.t., for all small enough
∆t > 0, the following holds P-a.s.:
−C0
√
∆t ≤ pbN < 0 < paN ≤ C0
√
∆t.
Thus, we have, P-a.s.:








Due to Assumption II.13, we have, P-a.s.:
Eα0n+2ξn+3 ≤ C∆t,




∆t+ CT + C∆t.
In addition, making use of Lemma II.28, we conclude that, for any small enough ∆t,









≤ ε(∆t), on Ω′′.
Using (2.25) and assuming that ∆t is small enough, we obtain:
λan+2(α0) ≥ δ/4, on Ω′′.






∣∣ξn+2 < pbn+1) .
Thus, on Ω′′, we obtain:





∣∣ξn+2 < pbn+1) ≥ δ/4.
The following lemma shows that, for any number p, the conditional expectation
of the fundamental price increment, Eα0n+1(ξn+2|ξn+2 < p), approaches p as the size of
the time interval vanishes. This result follows from Lemma II.23.
Lemma II.29. There exists a constant C3 > 0, s.t., for all small enough ∆t > 0,
and for any t ∈ [0, T −∆t], the following holds P-a.s.:
sup
p≤0
∣∣∣p− Ẽα0t (p̃0t+∆t − p̃0t ∣∣ p̃0t+∆t − p̃0t < p)∣∣∣ ≤ C3√∆t.
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Proof: Fix t and ∆t > 0 and consider the evolution of p̃0s, for s ∈ [t, t + ∆t], under
Pα0t :









where Wα0 is a Brownian motion under Pα0 . Rescaling by
√
∆t, we obtain
(p̃0s − p̃0t )/
√


















, s ∈ [0, 1].
Notice that the above processes are adapted to the new filtration F̂, with F̂s = F̃t+s∆t,
and, P-a.s., under P̃α0t , Ŵ is a Brownian motion with respect to F̂. Next, due to
Assumptions II.12 and II.15, for any small enough ∆t > 0, P-a.s., the dynamics of
(−Xs), under P̃α0t , satisfy all the assumptions of Lemma II.23. As a result, we obtain:
P̃α0t (X1 < −x− z) ≤ C1e−zP̃α0t (X1 < −x), ∀x, z ≥ 0.
Finally, we notice that
sup
p≤0
∣∣∣p− Ẽα0t (p̃0t+∆t − p̃0t ∣∣p̃0t+∆t − p̃0t < p)∣∣∣ = √∆t sup
p≤0







−p x d P̃
α0
t (X1 < −x)
P̃α0t (X1 < p)




P̃α0t (X1 < p− z)dz
P̃α0t (X1 < p)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ C1√∆t,
which completes the proof of the lemma.
Using (2.26) and Lemma II.29, we conclude that, for all small enough ∆t, we
have: pbn+1 > 0 on Ω
′′, P-a.s.. In addition, Corollary II.31, in Appendix A, implies
that, for any α ∈ Ã, the following holds P-a.s.:
λan+1(α) ≥ pbn+1.
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Next, with a slight abuse of notation (similar notation was introduced in the proof
of Proposition II.19), we consider the simplified objective of an agent who posts a





pan − λan+1 − ξn+1 | ξn+1 > pan
)




n+1) ≤ Eαn (pan − ξn+1 | ξn+1 > pan)−Eαn
(
pbn+11Ω′′ | ξn+1 > pan
)
< 0, ∀α ∈ Ã.
To obtain the last inequality in the above, we recall that Ω′′ ∈ Fn and, P-a.s.,
1Ω′′Pn(Ω \ Ω′′) = 0, pbn+1 > 0 on Ω′′, and Pαn(ξn+1 > pan) > 0, for all α ∈ Ã.
Next, repeating the proof of Lemma II.25 (and using the fact that λan+1 is absolutely
bounded, as shown in Corollary II.20), we conclude that, P-a.s., either ν+n ({pan}) > 0,
or we have: ∣∣∣Aα(p;λan+1)− Âα(pan;λan+1)∣∣∣→ 0,
as p ↓ pa, uniformly over all α ∈ Ã, where we introduce the true objective,
Aα(p;λan+1) = Eαn
((







This convergence, along with (2.27), implies that there exists a Fn-measurable p̄ ≥
pan, such that, on Ω
′′, the following holds P-a.s.: if ν+n ({pan}) = 0 then p̄ > pan, and,
in all cases,
Aα(p;λan+1) < 0, ∀p ∈ [pan, p̄], ∀α ∈ Ã.
Finally, we repeat the last part of the proof of Lemma II.26 (following equation
(2.22)), to obtain a contradiction with the definition of pan, and complete the proof
of the theorem. The last argument also shows that, when ∆t is small enough, it
becomes suboptimal for the agents to post limit sell orders, as the expected relative
profit from this action becomes negative, causing the market to degenerate.
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2.8 Summary and future work
In this chapter, we present a new framework for modeling market microstructure,
which does not require the existence of a designate market maker, and in which the
LOB arises endogenously, as a result of equilibrium between multiple strategic players
(aka agents). This framework is based on a continuum-player game. It reproduces
the mechanics of an auction-style exchange very closely, so that, in particular, it can
be used to analyze the liquidity effects of changes in the rules of the exchange. We
use the proposed modeling framework to study the liquidity effects of high trading
frequency. In particular, we demonstrate the dual nature of high trading frequency.
On the one hand, in the absence of a bullish or bearish signal about the asset, the
higher trading frequency makes market more efficient. On the other hand, at a
sufficiently high trading frequency, even a very small trading signal may amplify the
adverse selection effect, creating a disproportionally large change in the LOB, which
is interpreted as an internal (or, self-inflicted) liquidity crisis.
The present work raises many questions for further research. Notice that the main
results of the present work are of a qualitative nature: they demonstrate the general
behavior of LOB, as a function of trading frequency, but do not immediately allow
for any computations. It would also be interesting to establish quantitative results.
In particular, we would like to construct an equilibrium in a more realistic, and more
concrete, model than the one used in Section 2.3. Such a model would allow for
heterogeneous beliefs, and it would prescribe the specific sources of information (i.e.
relevant market indicators) used by the agents to form their beliefs. A model of this
type could be calibrated to market data and used to study the effects of changes
in relevant market parameters on the LOB. Finally, it is interesting to develop a
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Figure 2.1: On the left: ask price p̂a (in red) and the associated expected execution prices λ̂a (in
blue); different curves correspond to different trading frequencies (N = 20, . . . , 500);
black dashed line is the expected change in the fundamental price α(T − t). On the
right: ask price p̂a (in red) and the associated expected execution price λ̂a (in blue),
bid price p̂b (in orange) and the associated expected execution price λ̂b (in green), for
N = 100. Non-degenerate equilibrium exists only on a time interval where λ̂a < 0. All
prices are measured relative to the fundamental price and are plotted as functions of
time. Positive drift: α = 0.1, σ = 1, T = 1.
continuous time version of the proposed framework, in order to better capture the
present state of the markets, where the trading frequency is not restricted. All these
questions are the subject of the next chapter.
2.9 Appendix A
This section contains several useful technical results on the representation of the
value function of an agent in the proposed game. Notice that (2.1) and (2.2) imply
that, if ν is admissible, then, for any (α,m, p, q, r), we have, P-a.s.:
∣∣J (p,q,r) (m, s, α, ν)− J (p,q,r) (m, s′, α, ν)∣∣ ≤ |s− s′|Eαm|paN | ∨ |pbN |, ∀s, s′ ∈ R
This implies that every J (p,q,r) (m, ·, α, ν) and V νm(·, α) has a continuous modification
under P. Thus, whenever ν is admissible, we define the value function of an agent
as the aforementioned continuous modification of the left hand side of (2.3).
Lemma II.30. Assume that an optimal control exists for an admissible LOB ν.
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Figure 2.2: The horizontal axis represents trading frequency, measured in the number of steps
N . Left: time-zero bid-ask spread in the zero-drift case (α = 0). Right: the maximum
value of drift α for which a non-degenerate equilibrium exists on the entire time interval.
Parameters: σ = 1, T = 1.
Assume also that, for any α ∈ A, the associated value function V νn (·, α), defined
in (2.3), is measurable with respect to Fn ⊗ B(R). Then, it satisfies the following
Dynamic Programming Principle.
• For n = N and all (s, α) ∈ S, we have, P-a.s.:
(2.28) V νN(s, α) = s
+pbN − s−paN
• For all n = N − 1, . . . , 0 and all (s, α) ∈ S, we have:




















n − q−n pan + EαnV νn+1 (s− qn, α)
)}
,
where the essential supremum is taken under P, over all admissible controls
(p, q, r).
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Proof: The most important step is to show that, for all n = 0, . . . N−1 and (s, α) ∈ S,








− gνn (pn, qn, rn, Dn+1)
)
,
where the essential supremum is taken under P, over all admissible controls (p, q, r),
and











does not depend on s. Assume that J (p,q,r) (n, ·, α, ν) is a continuous modification of
the objective function. Notice that, for all m ≤ k ≤ n, we have, P-a.s.:
EαkJ (p,q,r)
(











gνj (pj, qj, rj, Dj+1)
Notice also that, for any (p, q, r) we have, P-a.s.: J (p,q,r) (m, s, α, ν) ≤ V νm(s, α), for
all s ∈ S. Let us show that the left hand side of (2.30) is less than its right hand
side:
V νm(s, α) = essupp,q,rJ
(p,q,r)
(








m+1 , α, ν
)










− gνm (pm, qm, rm, Dm+1)
)
Next, we show that the right hand side of (2.30) is less than its left hand side. For

















m+1 , α, ν
)
− gνm (pm, qm, rm, Dm+1)
)
=
J (p̃,q̃,r̃) (m, s, α, ν) ≤ V νm(s, α),
where (p̃n, q̃n, r̃n) coincide with (p̂n, q̂n, r̂n), for n ≥ m + 1, while they are equal to
(pm, qm, rm), for n = m. The proof is completed easily by plugging the dynamics of
the state process, (2.1), into (2.30).
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The following corollary provides a more explicit recursive formula for the value
function and optimal control. In particular, it states that the value function of an
agent at any time remains linear in s, in both positive and negative half lines (with
possibly different slopes).
Corollary II.31. Assume that an admissible LOB ν has an optimal control (p̂, q̂, r̂).
Then, for any (s, α) ∈ S, the following holds P-a.s., for all n = 0, . . . , N − 1:
1. V νn (s, α) = s
+λan(α) − s−λbn(α), with some adapted processes λa(α) and λb(α),

























λbn+1(α) |D+n+1(p) > ν+n ((−∞, p))
)
;









λan+1(α) |D−n+1(p) > ν−n ((p,∞))
)
;













• if q̂n(s, α) 6= 0 and r̂n(s, α) = 0, then









and p = p̂n(s, α) attains the above supremum,
• if q̂n(s, α) = 0 and r̂n(s, α) = 0, then λan(α) = Eαnλan+1(α),
• if r̂n(s, α) = 1, then λan(α) = pbn;
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• if q̂n(s, α) 6= 0 and r̂n(s, α) = 0, then









and p = p̂n(s, α) attains the above supremum,
• if q̂n(s, α) = 0 and r̂n(s, α) = 0, then λbn(α) = Eαnλbn+1(α),
• if r̂n(s, α) = 1, then λbn(α) = pan.
Proof:
Let us plug the piecewise-linear form of the value function into (2.29):







qnpn + (s− qn)+λan+1(α)− (s− qn)−λbn+1(α)− s+λan+1(α) + s−λbn+1(α)
)
·(






n − q−n pan + (s− qn)+Eαnλan+1(α)− (s− qn)−Eαnλbn+1(α)
)}
First, notice that it suffices to consider the essential supremum over all random
variables (pn, qn, rn).
12 Moreover, the essential supremum can be replaced by the
supremum over all deterministic (pn, qn, rn) ∈ R2 × {0, 1}. To see the latter, it
suffices to assume that the supremum is not attained by the optimal strategy (with
positive probability), and construct a superior strategy via the standard measurable
selection argument (cf. Corollary 18.27 and Theorem 18.26 in [2]), which results in
12The admissibility constraint does not cause any difficulties here, as, in the case where (pn, qn, rn) do not attain
the supremum, they can be improved, so that (pn, qn) increase by no more than a fixed constant.
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a contradiction. It is easy to see that, for any fixed (pn, s, rn), the above function
is piece-wise linear in qn, with the slope changing at qn = 0 and qn = s. Hence,
for a finite maximum to exists, the slope of this function must be nonnegative, at
qn → −∞, and non-positive, at qn → ∞. This must hold for any (pn, rn, s), to
ensure that the value function of an agent is finite: otherwise, an agent can scale up
her position to increase the value function arbitrarily. Considering rn = 1, we obtain
condition 2 of the corollary. The case rn = 0 yields conditions 3 and 4. Notice also
that the maximum of the aforementioned function is always attained at qn = 0 or
qn = s. Considering all possible cases: rn = 0, 1, qn = 0, s, s = 0, s > 0 and s < 0
– we obtain the recursive formulas for λan and λ
b
n (i.e. conditions 5 and 6 of the
corollary). In addition, as the optimal qn takes values 0 and s, it is easy to see that
the piece-wise linear structure of the value function in s is propagated backwards,
and, hence, condition 1 of the corollary holds.
It is also useful to have a converse statement.
Corollary II.32. Consider an admissible LOB ν and admissible control (p̂, q̂, r̂),
such that q̂n(s, α) ∈ {0, s}. Assume that, for any α ∈ A and any n = 0, . . . , N , there
exists a progressively measurable random function V ν· (·, α), such that, for any s ∈ R,
P-a.s., (p̂, q̂, r̂, V ν) satisfy the conditions 1–6 of Corollary II.31. Then, (p̂, q̂, r̂) is an
optimal control for the LOB ν.
Proof: It suffices to revert the arguments in the proof of Corollary II.31, and re-




Proof of Lemma II.22. The following lemma shows that the normalized price
increments are close to Gaussian in the conditional L2 norm.
Lemma II.33. Let Assumptions II.12, II.13, II.14, II.15 hold. Then, there exists a
deterministic function ε(·) ≥ 0, such that ε(∆t)→ 0, as ∆t→ 0, and, P-a.s., for all






























s . Then, using Assumptions II.13, II.15, and Itô’s isometry, we obtain the
statement of the lemma.
The next lemma connects the proximity in terms of L2 norm and the proximity
of expectations of certain functions of random variables. This result would follow
trivially from the classical theory, but, in the present case, we require additional
uniformity – hence, a separate lemma is needed (whose proof is, nevertheless, quite
simple).
Lemma II.34. For any constant C > 1, there exists a deterministic function γ(·) ≥
0, s.t. γ(ε) → 0, as ε → 0, and, for any ε > 0, σ ∈ [1/C,C], and any random
variables η ∼ N (0, σ2) and ξ (the latter is not necessarily Gaussian), satisfying
E(ξ − η)2 ≤ ε, the following holds for all p ∈ R:
(i) (|p| ∨ 1) |P(ξ > p)− P(η > p)| ≤ γ(ε),
(ii)
∣∣E(ξ1{ξ>p})− E(η1{η>p})∣∣ ≤ γ(ε).






P(ξ > p, η ≤ p) + P(ξ ≤ p, η > p),
and
P(ξ > p, η ≤ p) ≤ P(p ≥ η ≥ p− 3
√










≤ (M + 1) 3
√
ε,
where we used the fact that η has a density bounded by a fixed constant M . We can
similarly show that P[ξ ≤ p, η > p] ≤ (M + 1) 3
√
ε. The resulting estimates yield the
statement of the lemma.
Taking ε(∆t) = γ(ε(∆t)) and applying the above lemmas, we get the statement




∆t in place of η0. Finally, we note that the
laws of the two random variables coincide under Pαn−1, and the statement depends
only on these laws. The last statement of Lemma II.22 follows from the fact that




In this chapter, we continue the development of an equilibrium-based modeling
framework for market microstructure, initiated in the previous chapter. As in that
chapter, we analyze the market microstructure in the context of an auction-style
exchange (as most modern exchanges are), in which the participating agents can
post limit or market orders. A crucial component of such a market is the Limit
Order Book (LOB), which contains all the limit buy and sell orders, and whose
shape and dynamics represent the liquidity of the market. We are interested in
developing a modeling framework in which the shape of the LOB, and its dynamics,
arise endogenously from the interactions between the agents. This is in contrast to
many of the existing results on market microstructure, which assume that the shape
and dynamics of the LOB are given exogenously. Among the many advantages of
our approach is the possibility of modeling the reaction of the LOB to the changes
in a relevant market indicator or in the rules of the exchange.1
Herein, we extend the discrete time modeling framework proposed in chapter II
to continuous time. We analyze the dynamics of the LOB between two consecutive
1We refer the reader to chapter II, whose introduction contains a more detailed explanation of the problems of
market microstructure and a motivation for our study.
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trades. The latter simplifies the problem and is justified by the well known empiri-
cal fact that most changes in the market microstructure are not due to trades. We
manage to establish the existence, and obtain a numerically tractable representation,
of an equilibrium in a general continuous time framework, in which the competing
agents have different beliefs about the future demand for the asset. These beliefs
determine the future distribution of the demand, given the (common) information
observed thus far. The latter may, e.g., be generated by a relevant signal (or, market
indicator). One can view such conditional distributions as the “models” that the
market participants use to predict future demand, and which are based on the (com-
monly observed) relevant market indicators. Given the beliefs, the agents choose
their optimal trading strategies (i.e. limit and market orders), aiming to maximize
their expected profits. and find an equilibrium Herein, we obtain the desired “quanti-
tative” description of an equilibrium in such a game, which constitutes an endogenous
model of market microstructure. Such a result can be used for modeling the reaction
of a LOB to various changes in the relevant market indicators. In particular, if the
relevant market indicator depends on the LOB itself, our framework allows one to
model the indirect market impact: i.e. how an initial change to the LOB may cause
further changes to it. Note that the initial change may or may not be due to a trade.
Indeed, a trade (i.e. a market order) eliminates a part of the LOB, thus, making a
direct impact on it. However, it is well known that, even after a trade is completed,
the LOB keeps changing, representing the reaction of the market participants to the
information revealed by the initial change. Similarly, a large incoming limit buy or
sell order does not constitute a trade, nevertheless, it also affects the LOB, which
causes further changes to it, due to the same reason. In fact an extreme example of
the latter activity is called “spoofing”, and it is an illegal activity aimed at manipu-
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lating the market. Our model can be used to quantify such indirect market impact,
and it can be, ultimately, used to improve the optimal execution algorithms or to test
the consequences of “spoofing” activity. We provide a simplistic example illustrating
the use of our model in Section 3.5.
On the mathematical side, the problem we analyze is the construction of an equi-
librium in a control-stopping game with a continuum of players (cf. [4], [56], [15],
for more on the general theory of continuum-player games). The main mathemat-
ical challenges stem from three sources: the complicated dependence between the
individual state dynamics and the controls of other players (which lacks the stan-
dard convexity and continuity properties), the presence of multiple participants (as
opposed to analyzing a two-player game) and the mixed control-stopping nature of
the game. Equilibria in the games with any number of players can often be con-
structed directly, by means of a system of Partial Differentia Equations or a system
of (Forward-) Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (BSDEs). However, as
the number of players grows, solving such systems numerically becomes very chal-
lenging. In such cases, the description of an equilibrium is, typically, limited to the
proof of its existence, which, in turn, is obtained by an abstract fixed-point argu-
ment. However, even the latter method presents a challenge in the game considered
herein. Namely, the complicated dependence structure between the players’ controls
and state processes, along with the mixed-control stopping nature of the game, make
it very challenging (or even impossible) to (a) find the right space for the controls
and states, on which the compactness of the range of the objective function can be
established, and (b) establish the sufficient regularity of the objective function (e.g.
even its continuity may be lacking). In order to overcome these challenges, we make
certain “monotonicity” assumptions on the space of agents’ beliefs (which is a part
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of the state space), which allow us to split the problem into two parts: a control-
stopping game with two players, and a pure control game (without stopping) with a
continuum of players. Such a split simplifies our task dramatically, but both resulting
problems remain challenging. The first one, concerned with the construction of an
equilibrium in a two-player game, leads to a non-standard system of Reflected BS-
DEs (RBSDEs), whose components reflect against each other, and whose generator
lacks to desired regularity. In Subsection 3.3.2, we prove the existence of a solution
to this system, and, in Section 3.5, we show how it can be computed in a simple ex-
ample. The second problem, concerned with the equilibrium in a continuum-player
game (without stopping), reduces to the maximization of an instantaneous reward
function, which depends both on the individual controls and on the joint controls of
all players. The latter is formulated as a fixed-point problem, and is solved in Sub-
section 3.4.1. One of the computational benefits of the solution method proposed
herein is that the aforementioned fixed-point problem can be solved separately for
each (t, ω). In particular, it is not necessary to solve a forward-backward system at
each step of the iteration, as it is, for example, done in a typical mean field game
(cf. [46], [14], [16], [45], for more on mean field games). On the other hand, the
local nature of the fixed-point problem causes additional measurability issues, in the
proof of the existence result (i.e. choosing a measurable selector from the set of
fixed points requires more work than choosing it from the set of maxima points). In
addition, the objective function of the aforementioned fixed-point problem lacks the
desired continuity properties, and, hence, it has to be “mollified” before an abstract
fixed-point argument can be applied. All these issues are addressed in Subsection
3.4.1, and the main existence result is stated in Theorem III.29, in Section 3.4. Of
course, the results of Section 3.3 and Subsection 3.4.1 are also needed to construct
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an equilibrium (which is demonstrated in Section 3.5).
The literature on market microstructure is vast. However, most of the theoretical
work is concerned with the problem of optimal execution, in which an investor needs
to liquidate her position in the asset within a given time horizon, by submitting
smaller (limit or market) orders and aiming to maximize the profits. The relevant
publications, include, among others, [48], [3], [53], [54], [31], [47], [22], [6], [5],[7],
[24], [51], [36], [19], [37], [57], and references therein. In these publications, the
dynamics and shape of the LOB are modeled exogenously, or, equivalently, the arrival
processes of the limit and market orders of other agents are specified exogenously.
In particular, none of these works attempt to explain the shape and dynamics of
the LOB, arising directly from the interaction between market participants. Finally,
several recent papers have applied an equilibrium-based approach to the problem
of optimal execution (cf. [55], [40]). These papers describe an equilibrium between
several agents solving an optimal execution problem, with the LOB (or, the market),
against which these agents trade, being specified exogenously, rather than being
modeled as an output of the equilibrium. The endogenous formation of the LOB is
investigated, e.g., in [50], [29], [34], [17], [44], [52], [9], [10], [11], [12]. However, the
models proposed in the aforementioned papers do not aim to represent the mechanics
of an auction-style exchange with sufficient precision, which is needed to address the
questions we investigate herein.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the proposed continuum-
player game and defines the associated equilibrium. Section 3.3 introduces an aux-
iliary two-player game. This game can be interesting in its own right, but its main
purpose is to facilitate the construction of an equilibrium in the continuum-player
game. The equilibria in the two-player game can be described by a system of RBS-
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DEs, whose generator does not satisfy the desired regularity conditions. Proposition
III.20, in Subsection 3.3.2, provides the existence and uniqueness result for such a sys-
tem, which, to the best of our knowledge, is not available in the existing literature.
Section 3.4 completes the construction of an equilibrium in the continuum-player
game, stating the main result of the chapter, Theorem III.29. Finally, in Section 3.5,
we implement an example of the proposed continuum-player game and show how it
can be used to study certain empirically observed phenomena.
3.2 Modeling framework in continuous time
3.2.1 Preliminary constructions
We consider an auction-style exchange in which the trades may occur, and the
limit orders may be posted, at any time t ∈ [0, T ]. The market participants are
split into two groups: the external investors, who are “impatient”, in the sense that
they only submit market orders and need to execute immediately, and the strategic
players, who can submit both market and limit orders, and who are willing to spend
time doing so, in order to get a better execution price. In our model, we focus
on the strategic players, who we refer to as agents, and we model the behavior of
the external investors exogenously, via the external demand. The external demand
for the asset is modeled using three components: the arrival times of the potential
external market orders, the value of the potential fundamental price at these times,
and the elasticity of the demand. In our previous investigation in chapter II, we have
considered a general family of discrete time games for an auction-style exchange, with
the exogenous demand process given by a discretization of a (very general) continuous
time demand process, over a chosen partition of [0, T ]. One of the main conclusions
of that chapter can be, roughly, interpreted as follows: in order for a non-degenerate
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equilibrium2 to exist in a high-frequency limit (i.e. as the diameter of the partition
vanishes), the agents have to be market-neutral – i.e. they should not expect the
future fundamental price of the asset to increase or decrease. In other words, the
results of chapter II seem to imply that it is hopeless to search for an equilibrium in
a continuous time game (i.e. with unlimited trading frequency) in which the agents
have non-trivial trading signals about the direction of the future moves of the asset
price. This may sound very discouraging, however, there is a subtle feature hidden in
the setting considered in chapter II. Namely, the assumptions of that chapter imply
that, in the limiting high-frequency regime, the (potential) external market orders
arrive with an infinite frequency, while the beliefs of the agents (i.e. their trading
signals) satisfy certain continuity properties. In other words, the agents’ signals are
assumed to be persistent relative to the trades – they cannot change on the same time
scale on which the market orders arrive. It turns out that this assumption is crucial,
and, allowing the (potential) external market orders to arrive at a finite frequency,
and making the agents’ beliefs be short-lived (i.e. only lasting until the next market
order is executed), we can obtain a non-degenerate equilibrium in the continuous
time (i.e. unlimited trading frequency) regime. Thus, herein, we model the arrival
of the (potential) external market orders via a (rather general) point process, and
we assume that the game ends after the first trade occurs.
Let (Ω, F̃ = (F̃t)t∈[0,T ],P) be a stochastic basis, satisfying the usual conditions,
and supporting a (multidimensional) Brownian motion W and a Poisson random
measure N . We assume that the compensator of N is finite on [0, T ] × R (i.e.
N is the jump measure of a compound Poisson process) and that it is absolutely
continuous w.r.t. Lebesgue measure in time and space. We denote by FW the usual
2Degeneracy of an equilibrium is defined formally in chapter II. For the discussion presented herein, it suffices to
know that degeneracy is an extremal state of the market, and the present work is concerned with the description of
the typical (or, normal) states.
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augmented filtration generated by W . We assume that W and N are independent
under P. The arrival times of the potential external market orders and the values of
the potential fundamental price at these times are described by a counting random






1A (t, Jt(x))N(dt, dx),
where J : (t, x) 7→ Jt(x) is a predictable random function (as defined in [39]). We
assume that J is adapted to FW (in particular, it is independent of N). It is clear
that the compensator of M is finite on [0, T ] × R, it is absolutely continuous w.r.t.
Lebesgue measure in time and space, and it is adapted to FW . Then, it can be
represented as λtft(x) dt dx, with an R-valued process λ ≥ 0 and a random func-
tion f : (t, x) 7→ ft(x) ≥ 0, progressively measurable and adapted to FW , and s.t.∫
R ft(x)dx = 1. Notice that, conditional on F
W
T , M is a Poisson random measure
with the compensator λtft(x) dt dx. The t-components of the atoms of M are the
arrival times of the potential external market orders, and their x-components repre-
sent the values of the potential fundamental price at these times. A positive value
of x corresponds to the arrival time of a potential external buy order, and a neg-
ative value corresponds to the arrival time of a potential external sell order. More





The process λ describes the intensity of arrival of the potential external market orders
(both buy and sell). The function ft is the probability density of the value of the
potential fundamental price at time t. We refer to f as the density process of the jump
sizes. When the jump size of the fundamental price (along with the demand elasticity,
defined below) is not enough to trigger a trade, the jump remains “unregistered”
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by the agents, and the fundamental price returns to zero. The elasticity of the
external demand for the asset is described by the progressively measurable random
field D : (t, p) 7→ Dt(p), adapted to FW . We assume that, a.s., Dt(·) is a strictly
decreasing continuous function taking value zero at zero. Then, the total external
demand to buy and sell the asset at time t, at the price level p and at all more
favorable prices, is equal to
(3.1)










At any time t, every agent (i.e. strategic player) is allowed to submit a market
order or a limit order. The assumptions made further in the chapter make it possible
to submit a limit order at such a level that it may never get executed – this, effectively,
allows the agents to wait (i.e. do nothing). We do not allow for any time-priority in
the limit orders. Instead, we assume that the tick size is zero (the set of possible price
levels is R), and, hence an agent can achieve a priority by posting her order slightly
above or below the competing ones (and arbitrarily close to them). The game stops
at the terminal time T or at the time when the first trade occurs – whichever one is
the earliest. The mechanics of order execution are explained in the next subsection.
There is an infinite number of agents, and the inventory of an agent is measured
in “shares per unit mass of agents” (see a discussion of this assumption in chapter
II). We assume that the agents are split into two groups: the ones whose initial
inventory s is positive (the long agents, typically, indicated with a superscript “a”),
and those whose initial inventory s is negative (the short agents, indicated with a
superscript “b”). We assume that the absolute size of each agent’s inventory is the
same, s ∈ {−1, 1}, and that an agent with inventory s posts orders of size s. These
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assumptions are motivated by the results of our previous investigation in chapter II,
which demonstrate that, in equilibrium, the absolute value of the agent’s inventory
only scales the size of her orders proportionally, but does not change their type and
location (which, ultimately, is due to the fact that each agent is infinitesimally small
and has no risk aversion). We also assume that we are given a pair of measurable





, which is dominated by P. An agent with beliefs α models the
external demand under measure Pα. The empirical distribution of the agents across
beliefs is given by a pair of countably additive finite measures µ = (µa, µb), on A and
B, respectively. Note that, because the game stops right after the first market order
is executed, the empirical distribution µ remains constant throughout the game. We
make the following assumption on the measures {Pα}.
Assumption III.1. Under every Pα, W remains a Brownian motion, and the jump
process of N is a process with conditionally independent increments w.r.t. FWT (in
the sense of [39]).
The above assumption holds throughout the chapter. It implies that, under every
Pα, X is a process with conditionally independent increments w.r.t. FWT . Using this
observation and the absolute continuity of Pα w.r.t. P, it is easy to deduce that,





with some nonnegative FW -adapted λ and FW -progressively measurable fα, s.t.∫
R f
α
t (x)dx = 1. The interpretation of λ
α and fα is the same as the interpreta-
tion of λ and f , but under the measure Pα. It is clear that the above assumption is
satisfied if ZαT = dPα/dP is given by a stochastic exponential of a process that is an
79






Γαt (x) [N(dt, dx)− λtft(x)dtdx],
where Γα ≥ −1 is FW -progressively measurable. The compensator of N under Pα is
obtained by multiplying its compensator under P by 1+Γα, hence, Assumption III.1
is clearly satisfied in this case (cf. [39]). In Section 3.5, we provide an example of a
family of probability measures {Pα} in the above form.
3.2.2 The continuum-player game
Throughout the rest of this chapter we, mostly, work with the filtration FW , hence,
we denote F = FW . The state of an agent is (s, α) ∈ ({1} × A) ∪ ({−1} × B) =: S.
Let us now discuss the controls of the agents and the order execution rules. First,
we assume that α, representing the agent’s beliefs, does not change over time.3
Therefore, the state process of an agent represents only her inventory, which can
only change once (because the game ends after the first trade). The control of every
agent is given by a pair of processes (p, v) = (pt, vt)t∈[0,T ], progressively measurable
with respect to F (note that the controls are, in particular, predictable). The process
p takes values in P(R), the space of probability measures on R, equipped with the
weak topology, while v takes values in R. The first coordinate, pt, indicates the
time-t distribution of the agent’s limit orders across the price levels. For example,
if pt is a Dirac measure located at x, then, at time t, the agent posts all her limit
orders at the price level x. The collection of all limit orders is described by the Limit
Order Book (LOB), which is a pair of process ν = (νat , ν
b
t )t∈[0,T ], with values in the
finite sigma-additive measures on R, adapted to F. Herein, νat corresponds to the
cumulative limit sell orders, and νbt corresponds to the cumulative limit buy orders,
3Note that the conditional distribution of the future demand can change dynamically, according the new infor-
mation revealed.
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respectively, where the functions Q− and Q+ act on sigma-additive measures κ on R
via
(3.2) Q+(κ) = sup supp(κ), Q−(κ) = inf supp(κ).
Notice that pbt and p
a
t are always well defined as extended random variables, but
may take infinite values. Assume that, at time t, an agent posts a limit sell order
at a price level p′. If the demand to buy the asset at or below the price level p′,
D+t (p
′), exceeds the amount of all limit sell orders posted below p′ at time t, i.e.
D+t (p
′) > νat ((−∞, p′)), then the limit sell order of the agent is executed. Analogous
execution rules hold for the limit buy orders. Thus, for an agent following strategy
(p, v), her limit order is (partially) executed by an external market order at the time


















for the long and short agents, respectively. The value of vt indicates the critical level
of the bid or ask price (i.e. a threshold), at which the agent decides to submit a
market order. We assume that the size of the agent’s market order is equal to her
inventory, and it is executed at the bid or ask price available at the time when the
order is submitted. Thus, the agent will submit her own market order at the time
τ v,a = inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : vt ≤ pbt}, τ v,b = inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : vt ≥ pat },
4For convenience, we sometimes refer to νt as a “measure”, rather than a “pair of measures”.
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for the long and short agents, respectively.5 The collection of all thresholds v is
described by the pair of processes θ = (θat , θ
b
t )t∈[0,T ], with values in the finite sigma-






Remark III.2. The above definitions of the execution times make use of the assump-
tion that each agent is infinitesimally small, and, hence, her order is necessarily
executed once the demand reaches it. They also use the following two implicit as-
sumptions: each agent believes that her limit order will be executed first among all
orders at the same price level, and her market order will be executed at the best
price available. These assumptions and their connection to a finite-player game are
discussed in chapter II.
Consider the first “significant” execution times of external market orders:
T a = inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : D+t (pat ) > νat ((−∞, pat ))},
T b = inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : D−t (pbt) > νbt ((pbt ,∞))},
(3.3)
Similarly, we define the first “significant” execution times of internal market orders:
(3.4) τa = inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : vat ≤ pbt}, τ b = inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : vbt ≥ pat }.
For a long agent with strategy (p, v), the game ends at the time T p,a∧ τ v,a∧T ∧T a∧
T b∧ τa∧ τ b (and similarly for the short agents). If an agent has any inventory left at
the end of the game, then it is marked to market. The precise rules for computing an
agent’s payoff are described below. For a given market (ν, θ,M,D), let us introduce
the clearing prices:




t 1{p̃c,at ≥pat },
5It is clear that, for every stopping time τv,a/b with respect to F, there exists a process vt, adapted to F, such
that τv,a/b has the above representation.
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Consider a long agent who follows a strategy (p, v). Then, the payoff function of the
agent is described by the following list of rules.
• Assume that T p,a ∧ T a ∧ T b < T ∧ τa ∧ τ b (note that equality is impossible, as
the right hand side is predictable and the left hand side is totally inaccessible).







t)pt(dz), with t = T
p,a ∧ T a.





• Assume that T ∧ τa ∧ τ b < T p,a ∧ T a ∧ T b.
– If τa ∧ T ≤ τ b then the payoff is pbτa .
– If τ b < τa ∧ T then the payoff is pa
τb
.
Remark III.3. The above choice of the payoff is motivated by the desire to project the
agent’s view on what happens after the game is over. In particular, if an external
market order arrives but does not fully execute the agent’s limit orders, then the
residual is marked to the bid price shifted by the clearing price (i.e. the new projected
value of the bid price, after the game is over). If an internal market order is executed
first, then, depending on which side of the book initiates this order, the agent’s
position is marked to the bid or to the ask price.
Similar rules apply to the short agents. Thus, the objective function of an agent
in the market (ν, θ,M,D), starting at the initial state (1, α) and using the control
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(p, v), is given by:


















pT̂ p,a(dz)1{T̂ p,a<T b∧τ̂v,a∧τb}+(












where T̂ p,a = T ∧ T p,a ∧ T a, τ̂ v,a = T ∧ τ v,a ∧ τa, and we assume that 0 · ∞ = 0.
Similarly,



















}) pT̂ p,b(dz)1{T̂ p,b<Ta∧τ̂v,b∧τa}
− (paT b + p
c,a








where T̂ p,b = T ∧ T p,b ∧ T b, τ̂ v,b = T ∧ τ v,b ∧ τ b. Every agents aims to maximize the
objective. In the following definitions, we assume that a stochastic basis, a Brownian
motion W , a random measure M , a random field D, spaces A and B, an associated
set of measures {Pα}α∈A∪B, and the empirical distribution µ, are fixed and satisfy
the assumptions made earlier in this section. The above objectives may seem very
convoluted – this is because they are meant to provide a close approximation to
the real-world execution rules and marking to market. In the next subsection, we
establish a more transparent representation of the objectives.
Definition III.4. For a given market (ν, θ) and a state (s, α) ∈ S, a pair of F-
progressively measurable processes (p, v) is an admissible control, if the positive
part of the expression inside the expectation in (3.5) (if s = 1) or (3.6) (if s = −1)
has a finite expectation under Pα.
Definition III.5. For a given market (ν, θ) and state (s, α) ∈ S, we call an admissible
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control (p, v) optimal if
J (ν,θ),(p,v)(s, α) ≥ J (ν,θ),(p′,v′)(s, α)
P-a.s., for any admissible control (p′, v′).
In the above, we make the standard assumption of games with a continuum of
players : each agent is too small to affect the distribution of cumulative controls (de-
scribed by ν) when she changes her control. Next, we define the notion of equilibrium
in the proposed game.
Definition III.6. A given market (ν, θ) and a pair of F-progressively measurable
random fields (p, v) : Ω× [0, T ]× S→ P(R)× R form an equilibrium, if
1. for µ-a.e. (s, α) ∈ S, (p(s, α), v(s, α)) is an optimal control for (ν, θ) and (s, α),
2. and the following holds P-a.s., for any t < T̄ := T ∧ T a ∧ T b ∧ τa ∧ τ b) and any
x ∈ R:
νat ((−∞, x]) =
∫
A
pt (1, α; (−∞, x])µa(dα),
νbt ((−∞, x]) =
∫
B
pt (−1, α; (−∞, x])µb(dα),
(3.7)
(3.8)









Remark III.7. In the above definition, it is implicitly assumed that the empirical
measure of the agents’ states remains constant in time until the game is over for all
players. This is, indeed, the case, if the equilibrium is such that, P-a.s., for all t < T̄ ,
we have:
(3.9) µ ◦ ((s, α) 7→ St(s, α))−1 = µ,
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with
St(1, α) = 1[0,T p(1,α),a∧τv(1,α),a)(t), and St(−1, α) = −1[0,T p(−1,α),b∧τv(−1,α),b)(t).
The condition (3.9) may fail if a non-zero mass of agents manages to execute their
orders strictly before T̄ : i.e. if T p(1,α),a ∧ τ v(1,α),a < T̄ for a set of α with a positive
µa-measure, or T p(−1,α),b ∧ τ v(−1,α),b < T̄ for a set of α with a positive µb-measure.
However, the first scenario is impossible, because the external market orders only
arrive at a finite number of times and, before T a ∧ T b ≥ T̄ , only a zero mass of
agents can execute their limit orders against any such market order (cf. (3.3)). It
is also true that, at any time t, before τa ∧ τ b ≥ T̄ , only a zero mass of agents can
execute their internal market orders (cf. (3.4)). However, the set of such times t
may be uncountable. Therefore, to ensure that µ remains constant and, hence, (3.9)
holds, it suffices to consider only the equilibria satisfying, P-a.s., for all t, except,
possibly, a countable set:
vt(1, α) ≥ vat , vt(−1, α) ≤ vbt , ∀α ∈ A ∪ B.
In the subsequent sections, we construct such an equilibrium.
3.2.3 Representation of the objective
In this section, we provide an equivalent representation of the objective of the
agents, which makes it more tractable and more convenient for the analysis that
follows. This representation is derived following standard arguments, making use of
the independence of the driving Poisson measure and W . First, we introduce new
notation that will be used throughout the chapter. For any α ∈ A ∪ B, t ∈ [0, T ],
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(3.11) lc,at (x) = sup
{
p < Q+(νat ) : Dt(p− x) > νat ((−∞, p))
}
,
(3.12) lc,bt (x) = inf
{
p > Q−(νbt ) : −Dt(p− x) > νbt ((p,∞))
}
,



















y + lc,bt (u)
)
du,



















fαt (u) (x+ l
c,a
t (u)) du.
Notice that, if X has a positive jump at time t, then the clearing price at time
t is given by p̃c,at = l
c,a
t (Xt). Similarly, if X has a negative jump at time t, then
p̃c,bt = l
c,b
t (Xt). Using the above notation, we can obtain the following simplified
expression for the objective.
Lemma III.8. Let Assumption III.1 hold. Given a market (ν, θ), for any α ∈ A∪B
and any admissible strategy (p, v), we have:
(3.15)












































































where τ̂ v,a = T ∧ τ v,a ∧ τa, τ̂ v,b = T ∧ τ v,b ∧ τ b and the expectations are taken under
P.
Proof: The proof follows easily by conditioning onW . Notice that, conditional on FT ,
M is a Poisson random measure, with the deterministic compensator λαt f
α
t (x) dt dx,
which is finite on [0, T ]×R. Recall also that D, ν, θ, p, v, pa, pb, τ v,a, τ v,b, τa, τ b, and
all the random functions defined above the lemma, are adapted to F. Conditional
on FT , they become deterministic functions of time. Recall the fundamental price
process, Xt =
∫






Notice that T̂ p,a is the time of the first positive jump of Yt, and T
b is the time of
its first negative jump. Notice also that, conditional on FT , the clearing price p̃c,at




t (Yt). Thus, conditional on
FT , the expression inside the expectation in (3.5) becomes a function of the time
and size of the first jump of Y . Conditional on FT , X is the jump process of a
Poisson random measure with the compensator λαt f
α
t (u)dudt. It is also clear that,
conditional on FT , Y is the jump process of a non-homogeneous compound Poisson




, and with the distribution of jump sizes
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) (1{x≤pbt∧0} + 1{x≥(pat∧Q−(pt))∨0}) dx.
A standard computation, then, yields (3.15). The equation (3.16) is derived similarly.
The expectations in (3.15) and (3.16) are taken under P, because the expressions
inside the expectations are adapted to F = FW , and W has the same distribution
under P and Pα.
3.3 A two-player game
In this section, we consider an auxiliary two-player game. It is related to the
continuum-player game, but the precise connection will be established in the subse-
quent sections. Assume that all the probabilistic constructions made in Subsection
3.2.1 are in place. Namely, we are given a stochastic basis, with a Brownian motion
W , a Poisson measure N , a counting random measure M , a family of probability
measures {Pα}, and with the demand elasticity process D, as described in Section
3.2. We assume that Assumption III.1 holds. Assume, in addition, that A = {α0}
and B = {β0}. Consider a two-player game, in which the first (long) player starts
with the initial inventory 1 and has beliefs α0, and the second (short) player starts
with the initial inventory −1 and has beliefs β0. The game proceeds according to
the rules similar to those described in the previous section: each agent can post limit
orders on the respective side of the book, or can terminate the game by submitting
a market order. The execution of limit orders against the external market orders oc-
curs in exactly the same way as described in the previous section. However, herein,
at any given time, each agent is only allowed to post limit orders at a single location
(i.e. the control pt is a Dirac measure). In addition, the main difference between the
present game and the one defined in the previous section is that, herein, each player
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has a non-zero mass and, hence, can affect the LOB. In fact, since there is only one
player on each side of the book, the LOB is given by a combination of two Dirac
measures: νat = δpat , ν
b
t = δpbt , controlled by the locations of the players’ limit orders:
pa for the long agent, and pb for the short one. Clearly, pa also coincides with the
ask price, and pb is the bid price. Note that each of these prices is now controlled by
a single agent, which is not the case in the original game described in the previous
section. The same is true for the stopping thresholds: θa and θb are given by Dirac
measures, and the locations of these measures correspond to the thresholds va and
vb used by the long and short agents, respectively. In this new game (due to its
simplicity), it turns out to be more convenient to work with the associated stopping
times τa and τ b. In fact, we will further constraint the agents’ controls, so that
τa = τ b =: τ and paτ = p
b
τ = p̄τ . The meaning behind these constraints is clear:
every agent assumes that the counterparty will execute a market order at exactly
the same time as she does, and that these orders are executed at the same price.
Taking into account the above considerations, we transform (3.5) into the objective




pT p,a1{T p,a<T b∧τ} + 2p
b
T b1{T b<T p,a∧τ} + p̄τ1{T p,a∧T b>τ}
]
,
where pb, p̄ and p are R-valued F-adapted processes, τ is a stopping time with values
in [0, T ], and
T b = inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : Xt < pbt}, T p,a = inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : Xt > pt}, Xt = M({t}×R).




pT p,b1{T p,b<Ta∧τ} + 2p
a




where pa, p̄ and p are R-valued F-adapted processes, τ is a stopping time with values
in [0, T ], and
T a = inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : Xt > pat }, T p,b = inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : Xt < pt}.

































where cα is defined in (3.10) and
























































To ensure that the above expressions are well defined, and to analyze the equilibrium
in a two-player game, we need to make the following assumptions.
Assumption III.9. There exists a constant C ′ > 0, s.t., P-a.s., |λαt |, |fαt (x)| ≤ C ′,
for all α ∈ A ∪ B, t ∈ [0, T ] and x ∈ R.
We also assume that the possible price jump sizes are bounded.
Assumption III.10. There exists a constant Cp > 0, s.t., P-a.s., supp(fαt ) ⊆
[−Cp, Cp], for all α ∈ A ∪ B and t ∈ [0, T ].
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Denote by S2 the set of continuous F-adapted processes Y , such that sup0≤t≤T |Yt| ∈
L2. We say that the terminal execution price p̄ is admissible if p̄ ∈ S2. A control
(p, τ) is admissible if p is F-progressively measurable, satisfying, P-a.s., |pt| ≤ Cp
for all t ∈ [0, T ], and τ is F-stopping time. Next, we introduce the notions of opti-
mality and equilibrium in the two-player game – they are analogous to Definitions
III.5–III.6.
Definition III.11. For a given admissible (pb, p̄), we call an admissible control (p, τ)
optimal for the long agent if
J̃a,(p
b,p̄),(p,τ) ≥ J̃a,(pb,p̄),(p′,τ ′),
for any admissible control (p′, τ ′). Similarly, for a given admissible (pa, p̄), we call an
admissible control (p, τ) optimal for the short agent if
J̃ b,(p
a,p̄),(p,τ) ≥ J̃ b,(pa,p̄),(p′,τ ′),
for any admissible control (p′, τ ′).
Definition III.12. A combination (pa, pb, τ, p̄) is an equilibrium in the two-player
game, if it is admissible and, given (pb, p̄), the control (pa, τ) is optimal for the long
agent, while, given (pa, p̄), the control (pb, τ) is optimal for the short agent.
In the next subsection, we characterize the equilibrium strategies via a system of
Reflected Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (RBSDEs).
3.3.1 Characterizing the equilibria via a system of RBSDEs
The next assumptions are used to guarantee the uniqueness and regularity of the
optimal control of an agent.
Assumption III.13. P-a.s., for any α ∈ A ∪ B and t ∈ [0, T ], fαt (·) is continuous
in the interior of its support, fαt (0) = 0, and 0 < F
+,α
t (0) < 1.
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Assumption III.14. P-a.s., for any α ∈ A and t ∈ [0, T ], F+,αt (·)/fαt (·) is a de-
creasing function in the interior of supp(fαt ) ∩ R+, vanishing at the right end of the
interval. Similarly, P-a.s., for any β ∈ B and t ∈ [0, T ], F−,βt (·)/f
β
t (·) is an in-
creasing function in the interior of supp(fβt ) ∩ R−, vanishing at the left end of the
interval.
Remark III.15. The monotonicity of F+,αt (·)/fαt (·), for example, is implied by the log-
concavity of the distribution of positive jumps (similarly, for the negative jumps).
Instead of requiring that F+,αt (·)/fαt (·) is decreasing, it suffices to assume that its
growth rate is bounded from above by 1 − ε, for a constant ε > 0 independent of
(t, ω).
To prove the existence of a solution to a system of RBSDEs characterizing the
equilibria in a two-player game, we also need to assume that “the range of beliefs is
relatively bounded”.

















∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ C, ∀x ∈ R t ∈ [0, T ].
First we analyze the individual optimization problem of an agent, taking the
actions of the counterparty as given. Assume that we are given a process p̄ ∈ S2 and
progressively measurable (pa, pb), such that P-a.s., |pat |, |pbt | ≤ Cp, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. Let us
introduce the value functions of the agents:





























































where Tt is the set of F-stopping times with values in [t, T ], p is any F-progressively
measurable process, with |p| ≤ Cp, and cα, ga and gb are defined in (3.10), (3.20)
and (3.22). In addition, we introduce the following random functions:
Ga,xt (y, z) = −cα
0
t (x, z)y + g
a
t (x, z), x, y ∈ R,
Gat (y, z) = sup
x∈R








t (y), z) , y ∈ R,
where P at provides the optimal price location at the ask side, given in a feedback
form:




t (p), y ∈ R.
Similarly, for any admissible pa, we define




t (p), y ∈ R,








z, P bt (y)
)
, y ∈ R.
The value of P at (y) can be described as the unique nonnegative solution p of





unless y is too large, in which case P at (y) is the upper boundary of the support of f
α0
t ,
or too small, in which case P at (y) = 0. Similarly, P
b
t (y) is the unique non-positive
solution p of





or the lower boundary of the support of fβ
0
t , if y is too small, or zero, if y is too
large.
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Lemma III.17. Let Assumptions III.1–III.14 hold. Then, the random functions P a
and P b are progressively measurable and satisfy, P-a.s., for all t ∈ [0, T ]:
0 ≤ P at (y) ≤ Cp, −Cp ≤ P bt (y) ≤ 0, P at (y) ≥ y, P bt (y) ≤ y, ∀y ∈ R,
and, in addition, P at (·) and P bt (·) are non-decreasing and 1-Lipschitz.
Proof: The progressive measurability property and the above inequalities follow
directly from Assumptions III.9–III.13. The monotonicity and 1-Lipschitz property
follow from Assumption III.14 and the representations (3.27)–(3.28).
The above lemma, along with Assumptions III.9–III.13, implies that, for any ad-




t) are bounded processes, and that Gat (y, pbt)
and Ga,ptt (y, pbt) are Lipschitz in y, uniformly over a.e. (t, ω). This allows us to use
Proposition 7.1 from [42], to show that, for any admissible (p, pb, p̄), the process Y ,
which is a continuous modification of
Yt := Ĵ
a,(pb,p̄),p






























is the unique S2 solution of the affine RBSDE,
−dYt = Ga,ptt (Yt, pbt)dt− ZtdWt + dKt 0 ≤ t ≤ T(3.29)
Yt ≥ p̄t 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
∫ T
0
(Yt − p̄t)dKt = 0(3.30)
YT = p̄T ,(3.31)
where Z is a progressively measurable square-integrable (multidimensional) process,
K ∈ S2 is increasing and satisfies K0 = 0. Similarly, the existence results from [42]
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imply that
−dYt = Gat (Yt, pbt)dt− ZtdWt + dKt 0 ≤ t ≤ T(3.32)
Yt ≥ p̄t 0 ≤ t ≤ T
∫ T
0
(Yt − p̄t)dKt = 0(3.33)
YT = p̄T(3.34)
has a unique solution (Yt, Zt, Kt). Then, Theorem 7.2 in [42] implies that Y is a
continuous modification of V a, and that pat = P
a
t (Yt) and τ
a = inf{s ≥ 0: Ys = p̄s}
form an optimal control for the long agent. Similarly, for a given admissible (pa, p̄),
there exists a unique solution (Yt, Zt, Kt) to
−dYt = Gbt (pat , Yt)dt− ZtdWt − dKt 0 ≤ t ≤ T(3.35)
Yt ≤ p̄t 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
∫ T
0
(p̄t − Yt)dKt = 0(3.36)
YT = p̄T ,(3.37)
Y is a continuous modification of V b, and pbt = P
b
t (Yt) and τ
b = inf{s ≥ 0: Ys = p̄s}
form an optimal control for the short agent. It turns out that, because the optimal
stopping time has to be the same for both agents in equilibrium, we can formulate a
system of equations for V a and V b without p̄. In order to state this result formally,
we need to introduce the following random functions
(3.38)














, y, z ∈ R,
(3.39)














, y, z ∈ R,
where cα, ga and gb are defined, respectively, in (3.10), (3.20) and (3.22), and P a and
P b are given by (3.25) and (3.26).
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Lemma III.18. Let Assumptions III.1–III.16 hold. For any equilibrium (pa, pb, τ, p̄)
in the two-player game (in the sense of Definition III.12), the value functions of the
agents, V a, V b ∈ S2, satisfy
(3.40)

−dV at = G̃at (V at , V bt )dt− Zat dWt + dKat
−dV bt = G̃bt (V at , V bt )dt− Zbt dWt − dKbt
V at ≥ V bt ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
∫ T
0
(V at − V bt )d(Kat +Kbt ) = 0
V aT = V
b
T ,
with some increasing processes Ka, Kb ∈ S2, starting at zero, and with progres-
sively measurable square-integrable (Za, Zb). Moreover, (p̂a, p̂b, τ̂ , p̄) also form an











τ̂ = inf{s ≥ 0: V as = V bs }. Conversely, given a solution to (3.40), we can define
the optimal controls (p̂a, p̂b, τ̂) as above, and choose p̄ = (1 − η)V a + ηV b, with any
progressively measurable process η taking values in (0, 1), to obtain an equilibrium
(p̂a, p̂b, τ̂ , p̄).
Proof: Consider an equilibrium (pa, pb, τ, p̄). As discussed earlier, the standard results
on BSDEs (cf. [42]) imply that (V a, Za, Ka) solves (3.32)–(3.34), and (V b, Zb, Kb)
solves (3.35)–(3.37) (both systems are considered with the same p̄). It follows from
the optimality of τ , via the standard theory, that V bτ = p̄τ = V
a
τ . Consider the
long agent. It is clear that the objective of the long agent cannot increase if we
replace p̄ by V b in its definition (cf. (3.19)). On the other hand, τ is optimal and
p̄τ = V
b
τ , hence, the value function V
a remains the same if we replace p̄ by V b in its
definition (cf. (3.23)). Therefore, (V a, Za, Ka) solves (3.32)–(3.34) with p̄ replaced
by V b. Similar argument applies to the short agent, and yields that (V b, Zb, Kb)
solves (3.35)–(3.37) with p̄ replaced by V a. Next, using the optimality of pa and
the comparison principle for the BSDE (3.29), we easily deduce that, for a.e. (t, ω),
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t ) whenever λ
α0
t > 0 and V
a
t < sup supp(f
α0
t ). On
the other hand, Assumption III.16 implies that, if λα
0
t = 0 or V
a





t = 0 or V
a
t ≥ sup suppf
β0













conclude that V b satisfies (3.35)–(3.37) with pa replaced by p̂a. Similarly, we conclude
that V a satisfies (3.32)–(3.34) with pb replaced by p̂b. Thus, (V a, V b) satisfy (3.40).
Next, consider a solution to (3.40). Choosing p̄ as shown in the statement of the
lemma, we conclude that (V a, Za, Ka) solves (3.32)–(3.34), with pb replaced by p̂b.
Then, the standard results (cf. [42]) imply that, given p̂b and p̄, V a is the value
function of the long agent, and her optimal control is given by p̂a and
inf{s ≥ 0: V as ≤ p̄s} = inf{s ≥ 0: V as = V bs } = τ̂ .
Similar argument applies to the short agent, completing the proof.
3.3.2 Existence of a solution
In this subsection, we address the question of existence of a solution to the RBSDE
(3.40). The main difficulty in analyzing (3.40) is the non-standard form of the
reflection: the components of the solution reflect against each other, as opposed
to reflecting against a given boundary. Related equations have been analyzed in the
literature on BSDEs constrained by oblique reflections (e.g. in [20]): indeed, our
problem can be viewed as a limit of oblique reflection problems (see [20], for further
details). However, the present problem is new, and, in particular, the question of
existence of its solution has not been addressed in the existing literature. Before
we analyze the existence, it is convenient to consider the question of uniqueness.
Note that the arbitrary choice of η in Lemma III.18 indicates that there may be
multiple solutions to (3.40). Indeed, a different choice of η produces a different p̄,
which results in a different pair of value functions (V a, V b), which, nevertheless,
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have to solve the same system (3.40). This heuristic observation turns out to be
correct and, in fact, allows us to construct a solution to (3.40). Consider a solution




t , we notice that there
must exist a process η, with values in [0, 1], such that dKat = ηtdKt, dK
b
t = (1 −




t − V bt and Ỹ 2t = (1 − ηt)V at + ηtV bt as the new
variables, replacing V a and V b. Assuming that η is sufficiently regular, one can obtain
a system of RBSDEs for (Ỹ 1, Ỹ 2), in which only the first component reflects against
zero, and Ỹ 1T = 0. Conversely, we can start by prescribing η and a terminal condition
for Ỹ 2, solving the associated system of RBSDEs for (Ỹ 1, Ỹ 2), and, then, recover
(V a, V b) from (Ỹ 1, Ỹ 2, η) via the above formulas. Naturally, the resulting (V a, V b)
are expected to satisfy (3.40). This method seems to describe all solutions to (3.40),
however, herein, we are only interested in constructing a particular one.6 Hence, we
choose η ≡ 1/2 and Ỹ 2T = 0, to obtain Y 1 = Ỹ 1 = V a−V b and Y 2 = 2Ỹ 2 = V a+V b,
which are expected to satisfy:
(3.41)

−dY 1t = G1t (Y 1t , Y 2t )dt− Z1t dWt + dKt
Y 1t ≥ 0,
∫ T
0
Y 1t dKt = 0, Y
1
T = 0
−dY 2t = G2t (Y 1t , Y 2t )dt− Z2t dWt, Y 2T = 0
where Y 1, Y 2 ∈ S2, the processes Z1, Z2 are progressively measurable and square-
integrable, K ∈ S2 is increasing and satisfies K0 = 0. In addition, we denote
G1t (y1, y2) = G̃at
(




(y1 + y2)/2, (y2 − y1)/2
)
,
G2t (y1, y2) = G̃at
(




(y1 + y2)/2, (y2 − y1)/2
)
6It is an interesting topic for future research, to describe rigorously all solutions of (3.40)
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where G̃a and G̃b are defined in (3.38) and (3.39). The following lemma formalizes
the connection between (3.41) and (3.40).







Y 2, V b =
1
2





















form a solution to (3.40).
Proof: Follows easily by a direct verification.
However, the existence of a solution to (3.41) is far from obvious. Indeed, the
generator of this system can be written as
(3.42) G1t (y1, y2) = −c1t (y1, y2)y1 + c2t (y1, y2)y2 + g1t (y1, y2),















































































































with cα, P a, P b, ga and gb defined in (3.10), (3.25), (3.26), (3.20) and (3.22). It is
easy to see that every cit(·, ·) and git(·, ·) is bounded and globally Lipschitz, uniformly
over a.e. (t, ω). However, due to the presence of the multipliers y1 and y2, Git(·, ·) is
unbounded and does not possess the global Lipschitz property. There exists an ex-
istence theory for one-dimensional BSDEs with linear growth. However, the present
equation is multidimensional, and it cannot be reduced to the one-dimensional case:
event if we restrict one coordinate yi to a bounded range, the corresponding genera-
tor Gi is not bounded or Lipschitz in yi, as the other component can take arbitrarily
large values. Nevertheless, we can make use of the fact that the generator of (3.41)
has the “correct” asymptotic behavior, to prove the existence of a solution. In par-
ticular, we exploit the fact that, due to the assumptions made earlier in this section,
whenever ‖(Y 1t , Y 2t )‖ becomes large, the generator (G1t ,G2t ) pushes (Y 1t , Y 2t ) in the
direction in which the largest |Y it | decreases.
Proposition III.20. Let Assumptions III.9–III.16 hold. Then, there exists a solu-
tion to (3.41), s.t. its components Y 1 and Y 2 are absolutely bounded by a constant.
Such a solution is unique.
Proof: Step 1: Existence for the fully capped system. For any constant C > 0, denote
ΨC(y) = (−C ∨ y) ∧ C. Clearly, this function is 1-Lipschitz in y and absolutely





−c1t (Y 1t , Y 2t )ΨC11 (Y
1
















dt− Z1t dWt + dKt,
−dY 2t =
(
−c2t (Y 1t , Y 2t )ΨC12 (Y
1
t )− c1t (Y 1t , Y 2t )ΨC22 (Y
2









Here, and in some expressions that follow, we omit the terminal condition, barrier,
and the minimality condition for Kt, as they remain unchanged throughout. As-
sumptions III.9–III.16 imply that c1t (y
1, y2), c2t (y
1, y2), g1t (y
1, y2) and g2t (y
1, y2) are
bounded and globally Lipschitz in (y1, y2), uniformly over a.e. (t, ω). Hence, the
generator of (3.44) is globally Lipschitz in (y1, y2) (and independent of (Z1, Z2)),
and the standard existence results for Lipschitz BSDEs (cf. for example, Theorem
2.2 in [59]) yield the existence (and uniqueness) of a solution to (3.44). Denote the
Y -component of this solution (Y 1ct , Y
2c
t ).
Step 2: Bounds on solution components via partial uncapping. We want to bound the
components (Y 1ct , Y
2c
t ), of the solution to the capped system, by using the control-
stopping interpretation of the individual (R)BSDEs comprising our system. Consider
the associated equation for Y 1, with Y 2ct being given:
(3.45)
−dY 1t =(
−c1t (Y 1t , Y 2ct )Y 1t + c2t (Y 1t , Y 2ct ) ΨC21 (Y
2c








dt− Z1t dWt + dKt,
Y 1t ≥ 0,
∫ T
0
Y 1t dKt = 0, Y
1
T = 0
Note that, as c1t ,c
2
t , g
1 and ΨC21 are bounded, this one-dimensional RBSDE has a
continuous generator with linear growth in Y 1, and, for example, by Theorem 4.1 in
[59], it has a solution, which we denote Y 1t . Next, for Y
1 and Y 2c constructed above,
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and consider the one-dimensional RBSDE (for Ỹ ), obtained from (3.45) by pretend-






−c̃1t Ỹ 1t + c̃2tΨC21 (Y
2c




dt− Z1t dWt + dKt
Ỹ 1t ≥ 0,
∫ T
0
Ỹ 1t dKt = 0, Ỹ
1
T = 0
Note that Ỹ = Y 1 is the unique solution of this equation. On the other hand, the
above RBSDE is affine in Ỹ , and, for example, by Theorem 7.1 in [42], its unique
solution admits the following interpretation, as the value function of an optimal
stopping problem:




















We will use this representation to establish a bound on |Y 1|. First, note that, under
our assumptions, there exist constants C0 > 0 and λ ∈ (0, 1), such that, for all t, y1,
y2, and a.e. ω, we have:





















































































































≤ λ < 1,
with cα, P a, P b, ga and gb defined in (3.10), (3.25), (3.26), (3.20) and (3.22). The
first inequality holds with C0 = 5Cp, and it follows from the boundedness of P
a,
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P b and the jump sizes. The second one follows from Assumption III.16. The above
inequalities imply: ∣∣∣∣∣ c̃2tΨC21 (Y 2ct ) + g̃1tc̃1t
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ λC21 + C0,
for all t and a.e. ω. The latter estimate, together with the following lemma, imply
the desired upper bound:
|Y 1t | ≤ λC21 + C0
for all t and a.e. ω.
Lemma III.21. Consider any constant C > 0, any continuous function S : [0, T ]→
R, absolutely bounded by C, any nonnegative continuous function c on [0, T ], and





















|Yt,τ | ≤ C, ∀ 0 ≤ t ≤ τ ≤ T.






































Thus, we have a solution Y 1 of (3.45) which satisfies |Y 1t | ≤ λC21 + C0, P-a.s., for
all t. Then, for C11 ≥ λC21 + C0, we have ΨC11 (Y
1
t ) = Y
1
t , and, hence, Y




−c1t (Y 1t , Y 2ct )ΨC11 (Y
1












dt− Z1t dWt + dKt
Y 1t ≥ 0,
∫ T
0




Note that the above RBSDE coincides with the Y 1-equation in (3.44). This one-
dimensional RBSDE has a globally Lipschitz generator and, thus, a unique solution.
This implies that Y 1 = Y 1c, and we obtain the desired bound on Y 1c:
|Y 1ct | ≤ λC21 + C0,
P-a.s. for all t, provided C11 ≥ λC21 + C0. Similarly, considering the Y 2 part of the
capped system (3.44), with Y 1c fixed, we obtain
|Y 2ct | ≤ λC12 + C0,
P-a.s. for all t, provided C22 ≥ λC12 + C0.
Step 3: Solution of the appropriately capped system solves the original system. To
show that the solution (Y 1ct , Y
2c
t ) of (3.44) also solves the original system (3.41),
we only need to show that, given the bounds on (Y 1c, Y 2c), the capped system’s
generator coincides with the original generator, which translates into
ΨC11 (Y
1c
t ) = Y
1c
t , ΨC22 (Y
2c
t ) = Y
2c
t , ΨC21 (Y
2c
t ) = Y
2c
t , ΨC12 (Y
1c
t ) = Y
1c
t .
The first two equalities are satisfied if
C11 ≥ λC21 + C0, C22 ≥ λC12 + C0,
while the last two require
λC12 + C0 ≤ C21 , λC21 + C0 ≤ C12 .













With the above choice of capping, the solution to (3.44) also solves (3.41), thus,
showing the existence of a solution of (3.41). This solution is bounded by construc-
tion. The uniqueness of a bounded solution follows from the fact that, when (y1, y2)
vary over a bounded set, the generator of (3.41) is Lipschitz, hence, the standard
results yield uniqueness.
Remark III.22. The above proof provides an existence result for any system (3.41),
whose generator is given by (3.42)–(3.43), with arbitrary (bounded and Lipschitz)
progressively measurable random functions {ci, gi}, as long as the following holds for
a.e. (t, ω) and all (y1, y2) ∈ R2:
2∑
i=1
∣∣git(y1, y2)∣∣ ≤ C0c1t (y1, y2), ∣∣c2t (y1, y2)∣∣ ≤ λc1t (y1, y2),
with some constants C0 > 0 and λ ∈ (0, 1).
3.4 Equilibrium in the continuum-player game.
In this section we construct an equilibrium for the continuum-player game de-
scribed in Section 3.2, in the sense of Definition III.6. The main difficulty in con-
structing the equilibrium stems from the mixed control-stopping nature of the game
(and, of course, the fact there are multiple participants). Therefore, we attempt to
break the problem into two parts - isolating the “stopping” part of the game. In
order to do this, it is convenient to make assumptions that guarantee the existence
of the so-called “extremal” agents on each side of the book. These agents are called
“extremal”, because their beliefs dominate the beliefs of the other agents on the
same side of the book, in the appropriate sense. We denote the extremal beliefs
on the long side by α0, and, on the short side, by β0. It is worth mentioning that
the “extremal” beliefs are, in fact, the mildest ones: i.e. the agents with beliefs α0
are the least bullish among the long ones, and the agents with beliefs β0 are the
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least bearish among the short ones. There are two economic interpretations of the
extremal agents. First, they can be viewed as market-makers, as they are closer to
being market-neutral, than any other agent on the same side of the book (although,
we do not have any designated market maker in this game). Second, they can be
viewed as the fastest traders. Indeed, instead of thinking of these beliefs in terms
of bullishness or bearishness, it is possible to interpret the extremal beliefs as the
beliefs that the jumps of the fundamental price are small (relative to the beliefs of
other players). This, in turn, can be interpreted as the ability of extremal agents
to predict, and react to, the smallest changes in the price (whereas the other agents
are too slow for this, and, hence, they only take into account larger jumps). In this
section, we construct an equilibrium in which the time of the first internal market
order and the bid and ask prices are determined by the extremal agents, while the
rest of the shape of the LOB is due to the other agents’ actions. The construction
of an equilibrium, thus, splits into two parts. In the first part, the extremal agents
find an equilibrium among themselves, using the results of the auxiliary two-player
game, and determining the time of the first internal market order τ and the bid and
ask prices pa and pb. In the second part, the other agents, taking (pa, pb, τ) as given,
determine their optimal actions. Of course, we, ultimately, prove that the strategy
of every agent is optimal in the overall market, consisting of both extremal and non-
extremal agents. The resulting LOB ν has two atoms – at the bid and ask prices –
comprised of the limit orders of the extremal and some of the non-extremal agents.
The rest of the LOB contains limit orders of the non-extremal agents only.
In order to implement the above program, we assume that A = {α0} ∪ Â and
B = {β0}∪B̂. We assume that Assumptions III.1–III.16 hold throughout this section.
In addition, we make the following assumptions.
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Assumption III.23. For any α ∈ Â, β ∈ B̂ and a.e. (t, ω), we have:
λαt F
+,α












t (p), ∀p ≥ 0,
λαt F
−,α












t (p), ∀p ≤ 0.














∀ p ≥ 0.
Assumption III.23 ensures that the distribution of the fundamental price at any
time t, from an α-agent’s perspective, dominates stochastically the respective dis-
tribution from the α0-agent’s perspective. The opposite relation holds for the short
agents. The first inequality in Assumption III.24 ensures that
∣∣logF+,α0t (·)∣∣ decays
faster than
∣∣logF+,αt (·)∣∣, which is also consistent with the interpretation that α0-
agents assign smaller probabilities to the large jumps of the fundamental price, and
larger probabilities to the small jumps, as opposed to the α-agents. Analogous inter-
pretation holds for the second inequality in Assumption III.24. Assumption III.24
ensures that, in an empty LOB, the non-extremal agents would prefer to post their
limit order further away from zero than the extremal ones do.
Lemma III.25. Let Assumptions III.1–III.24 hold. Fix any α ∈ Â and β ∈ B̂.
Then, for a.e. (t, ω), the following holds for all y ∈ R: p 7→ (p − y)F+,αt (p) is
non-decreasing in p ∈ [y, P at (y)], and p 7→ (y − p)F
−,β
t (p) is non-increasing in p ∈
[P bt (y), y].
Proof: The statement follows easily by differentiating the target functions, recalling
(3.27)–(3.28), and making use of Assumption III.24.
We also need to make an assumption that limits the maximum possible demand
size, as viewed by the extremal agents. Namely, the extremal agents believe that the
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external demand can never exceed the inventory held by these agents.



















































where Q+ and Q− are defined in (3.2).
In order to construct an equilibrium, we need to impose certain topological con-
ditions on the space of beliefs and on the mapping α 7→ fα.
Assumption III.27. The spaces Â and B̂ are compact metric spaces, with the Borel
sigma-algebras on them (i.e. µa and µb are measures with respect to the Borel sigma-
algebras). In addition, for a.e. (t, ω), the mapping α 7→ fαt is continuous as a
mapping Â→ L1[0, Cp] and as a mapping B̂→ L1[−Cp, 0].
Finally, we need to ensure that the demand size curve is “not too flat”.
Assumption III.28. There exists an increasing continuous (deterministic) function
ε : [0,∞)→ [0,∞), s.t. ε(0) = 0 and, for a.e. (t, ω), |D−1t (x)−D−1t (y)| ≤ ε(|x− y|),
for all x, y ∈ R.
Now, we proceed to construct a special class of equilibria in the continuum-player
game. As announced earlier, the equilibrium is constructed by, first, solving the
auxiliary two-player game, as described in Section 3.3. In the two-player game, we
assume that the two agents have beliefs α0 and β0. Thus, we consider the unique
bounded solution (Y 1, Y 2) to (3.41) and construct the associated (V a, V b), which
solve (3.40), according to Lemma III.19. Then, Lemma III.18 implies that (V a, V b)



























Using these auxiliary quantities, we aim to construct an equilibrium for the continuum-
player game, in which (ν, θ) satisfy the following two conditions. First,









with progressively measurable ν̄a and ν̄b taking values in the space of sigma-additive
measures on R, such that, P-a.s., for all t ∈ [0, T ], ν̄at is supported on [pat , Cp] and ν̄bt
is supported on [−Cp, pbt ].7 Second,
(3.48) θat = µ




Note that, in such a market, we have
τa = τ b = τ̂
The following theorem is the main result of this chapter.
Theorem III.29. Let Assumptions III.1–III.28 hold. Then, there exist progres-
sively measurable measure-valued processes (ν, θ), satisfying (3.47)–(3.48), and pro-
gressively measurable random fields p, v : Ω× [0, T ]× S→ P(R)×R, which form an
equilibrium, in the sense of Definition III.6. Moreover, an equilibrium can be con-
structed so that vt(1, α) = V
a
t , vt(−1, α) = V bt , for all (t, ω, α), and the optimal limit
order strategies of extremal agents are as follows: pt(1, α
0) = pat , pt(−1, β0) = pbt, for
all (t, ω).
The remainder of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem III.29. First,
we show that, in a market (ν, θ), as described by (3.47)–(3.48), it is never (strictly)
7The components ν̄a and ν̄b are introduced for convenience, in order to indicate that νat ({pat }) ≥ µa({α0}) and
νb({pbt}) ≥ µb({β0}).
110
optimal for the agents to post limit sell orders below the ask price or to post limit
buy orders above the bid price. In addition, it is never (strictly) optimal for the
agents to submit a market order before τ̂ . To achieve this, we need to compare the
value functions of the agents to V a and V b, making use of Assumptions III.23, III.24.
Lemma III.30. Let Assumptions III.1–III.24 hold, and let (ν, θ) satisfy (3.47)–
(3.48). Given any α ∈ A and any admissible control (p, τ), for a long agent with
beliefs α, there exists an admissible control p′, s.t., P-a.s., supp(p′t) ⊂ [pat ,∞), for all
t ∈ [0, T ], and (p′, τ̂) does not decrease the objective value, i.e.
J (ν,θ),(p,τ)(1, α) ≤ J (ν,θ),(p′,τ̂)(1, α).
Similarly, given any β ∈ B and any admissible control (p, τ), for a short agent with
beliefs β, there exists an admissible control p′, s.t., P-a.s., supp(p′t) ⊂ (−∞, pbt ], for
all t ∈ [0, T ], and (p′, τ̂) does not decrease the objective value, i.e.
J (ν,θ),(p,τ)(−1, β) ≤ J (ν,θ),(p′,τ̂)(−1, β).





































c̄αt (x, y) = c
α
t (x, y)1{t≤τ̂}, h̄
α,a
t (κ, x, y) = h
α,a
t (κ, x, y)1{t≤τ̂}, x, y ∈ R κ ∈ P(R),
with cα and hα,a defined in (3.10) and (3.13). Next, for any t ∈ [0, T ], any α ∈ A,
and any admissible p, we introduce




The standard results on RBSDEs imply that Y α,p is the unique S2 solution of the
affine RBSDE,




t )dt− ZtdWt + dKt 0 ≤ t ≤ T(3.50)
Y α,pt ≥ pbt∧τ̂ 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
∫ T
0
(Y α,pt − pbt∧τ̂ )dKt = 0(3.51)
























with cα and hα,a defined in (3.10) and (3.13). Recall that V a satisfies (3.40), with
the generator


































t ) = Gat (V at , pbt)1{t<τ̂}.
Hence, (V at∧τ̂ ) satisfies the same RBSDE as (Y
α0,pa
t ). From the comparison principle,




t∧τ̂ . On the other hand, for any α ∈ A, let us choose












































































where lc,b is defined in (3.12), and the last inequality is based on the Assumptions














































































V at∧τ̂ . Consider an arbitrary strategy (p, τ). By switching between p
a and p, we can
construct a new strategy p′, such that Y α,p
′
t ≥ V at∧τ̂ ∨ Y
α,p




t (y) = Ḡ
α,pa
t (y) ∨ Ḡ
α,p
t (y),
and solve the RBSDE (3.50)–(3.52). By the standard argument, the Y -component
of the solution is Y α,p
′
, where p′t is defined to be equal to δpat if the maximum in




t ), and it is equal to pt otherwise. The






t ≥ V at∧τ̂ ∨ Y
α,p
t . Then, the




inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : Y α,p
′
















Next, we show that the control p can be chosen so that, P-a.s., for all t, supp(pt) ⊂
[pat ,∞). Consider any control p. By switching, if necessary, between pa and p, we
can ensure that Y α,pt ≥ V at∧τ̂ . Then, for t < τ̂ , the generator of Y α,p is given by













t ∧Q−(pt))y + λαt pbtF
+,α
t (Q
















































z ∧ lc,at (u) + pbt1{z>lc,at (u)}
)]
pt(dz)du
Let us estimate the first four terms in the right hand side of the above (i.e. the ones







t ∧Q−(pt))y + λαt pbtF
+,α
t (Q




































Notice that, for t < τ̂ and y = Y α,pt , we have p
b





















Due to Lemma III.25, the function z 7→ (z−y)F+,αt (z) is nondecreasing in z ≤ P at (y).
As pbt ≤ 0, the function z 7→ pbt pt ((pat ,∞))F
+,α
t (z) is also nondecreasing, and, hence,
the above supremum is attained at z = pat , provided P
a
t (y) ≥ pat . The latter does
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hold for t < τ̂ and y = Y α,pt , as P
a
t (·) is non-decreasing, pat = P at (V at ) and Y
α,p
t ≥ V at .
Thus, the generator Ḡα,pt (Y
α,p
t ) does not decrease if we replace p by











The comparison principle, then, yields Y α,pt ≤ Y
α,p′
t . Moreover, the optimal stopping
strategy associated with Y α,p
′
is τ̂ . Repeating the argument used earlier in this
proof, we conclude that any strategy (p, τ̂) can be modified to (p′, τ̂), satisfying the
properties stated in the lemma, so that the objective value does not decrease. The
case of short agents is treated similarly.
The above lemma has a straight-forward but useful corollary.
Corollary III.31. Let Assumptions III.1–III.24 hold, and let (ν, θ) satisfy (3.47)–
(3.48). Given any α ∈ A, let (p, τ) be an optimal strategy for the long agents with
beliefs α, in the class of all admissible strategies satisfying: P-a.s. supp(pt) ⊂ [pat ,∞),
for all t ∈ [0, T ], and τ = τ̂ . Then (p, τ) is optimal in the class of all admissible
strategies, in the sense of Definition III.5. Similarly, given any β ∈ B, let (p, τ) be
an optimal strategy for the short agents with beliefs β, in the class of all admissible
strategies satisfying: P-a.s. supp(pt) ⊂ (−∞, pbt ], for all t ∈ [0, T ], and τ = τ̂ . Then
(p, τ) is optimal in the class of all admissible strategies, in the sense of Definition
III.5.
Thus, no matter which limit order strategy p an agent is using, it is optimal for
her to choose the following stopping threshold:
v̂(s) = V a1{s>0} + V
b1{s<0}.
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This implies that, given a LOB ν in the form (3.47) and the stopping strategy v̂
as above, if an optimal limit order strategy p̂(s, α) exists for any state (s, α), then
(p̂(s, α), v̂) form an optimal control for the agents in state (s, α), in the sense of
Definition III.5. Moreover, in such a case, θ, given by (3.48), satisfies the condition
(3.8). Next, we need to construct a LOB ν, in the form (3.47), and the associated
optimal limit order strategies for all agents, s.t. (3.7) is satisfied. We begin by
showing that, for any ν in the form (3.47), the strategies (δpa , V
a) and (δpb , V
b) are
optimal for the extremal agents.
Lemma III.32. Let Assumptions III.1–III.26 hold, and let (ν, θ) satisfy (3.47)–
(3.48). Then, given (ν, θ), the strategy (δpa , V
a) is optimal for a long agent with
beliefs α0, and the strategy (δpb , V
b) is optimal for a short agent with beliefs β0, in
the sense of Definition III.5.
Proof: Consider a long agent with beliefs α0. In view of Corollary III.31, it suffices to
show the optimality in the class of strategies (p, τ̂), with supp(pt) ⊂ [pat ,∞). Notice
that Assumption III.26 implies:







Using the above observation, we recall the constructions from the proof of Lemma
III.30, to obtain, for any strategy p and all t < τ̂ :
Ḡα
0,p





























pat pt({pat }) + (pat + pbt)pt ((pat ,∞))
)
.
As pbt ≤ 0, the above expression is maximized at pt = δpat . Using the comparison
principle for the RBSDE satisfied by Y α
0,p, we conclude that p = δpa produces the
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largest Y α
0,p and, hence, the largest objective value for the long agents with beliefs
α0. The case of short agents is treated similarly.
3.4.1 Equilibrium strategies of the non-extremal agents
In this subsection we construct the measure-valued processes (νa, νb), in the form
(3.47), and a progressively measurable random field (p̂t(s, α)), such that the controls
(p̂(1, α), V a) and (p̂(−1, α), V b) are optimal for the non-extremal agents with beliefs
α, long and short, respectively (recall that the optimal strategies for the extremal
agents are constructed in Lemma III.32), and the fixed-point constraint (3.7) is
satisfied. In view of Lemma III.30, we can restrict the possible controls p to the
those satisfying: supp(pt) ⊂ [pat ,∞), for all t ∈ [0, T ]. It is also obvious that we can
restrict the support of pt to be in [−Cp, Cp]. As the stopping strategy is fixed, for































































and cα and hα,a defined in (3.10) and (3.13). Due to Assumptions III.23 and III.26,
we have
lc,bt (x) = inf
{
p > Q−(νbt ) : −Dt(p− x) > νbt ((p,∞))
}
= pbt ∨ x, ∀x ∈ supp(fαt ).
In addition, for any z ≥ pat ,
{u > 0 : lc,at (u) ≥ z} = {u > 0 : u ≥ z −D−1t (νat ([pat , z)))},



























































































Notice that the above objective does not depend on νb (for a given pb), hence, we
can separate the equilibrium problems of the long and short agents (this is only
true for the non-extremal agents, of course). For simplicity, we only consider the
problem of the long agents – the short agents can be treated similarly. Denote by
κt and ν̂
a
t the push-forward measures of pt and ν
a
t , under the mapping x 7→ x − pat .
Clearly, the measurability property is preserved by this transformation, hence, we
can reformulate the equilibrium problem as a search for κ and ν̂a, with the values
in the space of measures with support in [0, Cp]. In the new variables, the objective





















































Note that J̄α,(p) solves a BSDE with the affine generator











In order to maximize J̄α,(p), it suffices to find a strategy κ which maximizes the above
generator. The latter is, in turn, equivalent to maximizing ĥα,at (·, pat , pbt). Thus, we
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need to find a progressively measurable random field (κt(α)), with values in P(R)
(with the weak topology on it), s.t., for µa-a.e. α ∈ Â,
(3.53) κt(α) ∈ argmaxκ′∈ψĥ
α,a
t (κ
′, pat , p
b
t)
holds for dt × P-a.e. (t, ω), where ψ = {p ∈ P(Π): supp(p) ⊆ Π} and Π = [0, Cp].
The standard BSDE results, then, imply that κ(α) is optimal for the agents in state
(1, α), for µa-a.e. α ∈ Â. If, in addition, we ensure that the fixed-point constraint
(3.7) is satisfied (and a similar construction holds for the short agents), we obtain
an equilibrium in the continuum-player game, in the sense of Definition III.6. Notice
that we can rewrite
ĥα,at (κ

























(3.54) Ft(α, p, ν̂
a












u+ pat −D−1t (ν̂at ([0, u)))
)
du.
Assuming the extremal long agents post limit orders at pa, the fixed-point constraint
(3.7) (more precisely, the part of (3.7) that corresponds to the long agents) becomes:





a(dα), ∀x ≥ 0.
The above equations can be solved separately for different (t, ω), hence, to this end,
we fix (t, ω) and omit the t subscript whenever it causes no ambiguity. The statements
that follow hold for a.e. (t, ω). It turns out that it is more convenient to search for
a measure
K(dα, dx) = κ(α; dx)µa(dα),




, the space of finite sigma-additive measures on
Â × Π, with the first marginal µa. Transition from K to κ is accomplished via the
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Mµa(A) (Π) solving the following system
(3.56)
 K ∈ argmaxK∈Mµa(Â×Π)
∫
F (α, p, ν)K(dα, dp),





whereMµa(A) (Π) is the space of finite sigma-additive measures on Π, with the total
mass µa(A) = µa({α0})+µa(Â). The above system can be formulated as a fixed-point
problem, in an obvious way. However, the main challenge in solving this problem
stems from the fact that F (α, ·, ·) is not continuous: e.g. it may be discontinuous in
p, if ν has atoms. Therefore, we replace F by its “mollified” version:
F̂ (α, p, ν) = sup
p′∈Π
F (α, p′, ν)− |p′ − p| .
The following lemma shows that we can replace F by F̂ in (3.56), and any solution
to the new problem will solve the original one.
Lemma III.33. For any α ∈ Â and ν ∈Mµa(A) (Π), the function p 7→ F̂ (α, p, ν) is
1-Lipschitz in p ∈ Π, and
argmaxp∈Π F̂ (α, p, ν) = argmaxp∈Π F (α, p, ν).
Proof: For convenience, we drop the dependence on (α, ν). The first statement is
clear from the definition. It is also clear that supp∈Π F̂ (p) = supp∈Π F (p), and we
denote this supremum by S. As F̂ is continuous in Π, it achieves its supremum,
hence, it suffices to show that F (p0) = S, for every p0 such that F̂ (p0) = S (note
that the opposite implication is obvious). Assume the contrary, then F (p) ≤ S − ε,
for some ε > 0 and all p ∈ Π ∩ (p0 − ε, p0 + ε) by the upper semi-continuity of F .
Then, we obtain F̂ (p0) ≤ S − ε, which is a contradiction. To see that F is upper
semi-continuous, notice that it is left-continuous, with only downward jumps, which
follows directly from (3.54).
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Summarizing the above discussion, to find a solution to (3.56), it suffices to find





3 K 7→ K̃ (ν̃(K)) ,
where
(3.57) ν̃(K; dx) = µ({α0})δpa(dx) +K(Â× dx) ∈Mµa(A) (Π)
is single-valued, and
(3.58) K̃(ν) = argmaxK∈Mµa(Â×Π)
∫





Proposition III.34. Let Assumptions III.27, III.28 hold. Then, the correspondence
K : K 7→ K̃ (ν̃(K)), defined by (3.57)–(3.58), has a fixed point.
Proof: To prove the proposition, we use the Kakutani’s theorem for correspondences





equipped with the weak topology, is convex and compact (by Prokhorov’s theorem).
In addition, it can be viewed as a subspace of the dual of the space of continuous
functions on Â×Π, which is semi-normed. Thus, in order to apply the Kakutani’s the-
orem, it only remains to show that K is upper hemi-continuous (uhc), with nonempty
compact convex values. Notice also that K̃(ν) is convex by definition (as an argmax
of a linear functional on a convex set), hence, K is convex-valued, and we only need
to show that it is uhc, with non-empty compact values. As p 7→ ν̃(p) is a continuous
function, and a composition of a continuous function and a uhc correspondence is a
uhc correspondence, it suffices to verify that ν 7→ K̃(ν) is a uhc non-empty compact
valued correspondence. To achieve this, we use the classical Berge’s theorem (cf.
[49], section E.3), which reduces to problem to the continuity of the functon
(3.59) (K, ν) 7→ φ(K, ν) =
∫






× Mµa(A) (Π), metrized via the Lévy-Prokhorov metric. In the
remainder of the proof, we show that φ(K, ν) is jointly continuous in (K, ν). More
precisely, φ(K, ν) is continuous in K, and it is continuous in ν (with respect to
Lévy-Prokhorov metric), uniformly over K.
First, we show that φ(K, ν) is continuous in K. By the definition of weak topology,
the desired continuity would follow from the joint continuity of F̂ (α, p, ν) with respect
to (α, p). Due to Lemma III.33, F̂ (α, p, ν) is 1-Lipschitz in p (uniformly over α ∈ Â),
hence, it suffices to check that F̂ (α, p, ν) is continuous in α. The latter follows from
the fact that F (α, p, ν) is continuous in α, uniformly over p ∈ Π. Indeed, notice that,
if, for some α′ ∈ U(α), we have |F (α′, p, ν)− F (α, p, ν)| ≤ ε ∀p ∈ Π, then
F̂ (α′, p, ν) = F (α′, p′, ν)− |p′ − p| ≤ F (α, p′, ν)− |p′ − p|+ ε ≤ F̂ (α, p, ν) + ε,
which, together with the analogous symmetric inequality, shows that
∣∣∣F̂ (α′, p, ν)− F̂ (α, p, ν)∣∣∣ ≤ ε
The first equality in the above follows from the fact that F is upper semi-continuous
in p (and bounded from above by 2Cp), which is shown in the proof of Lemma III.33,
and, hence, the supremum in the definition of F̂ is achieved at some p′. To show
that F (α, p, ν) is continuous in α, uniformly over p ∈ Π, we recall (3.54), and the
desired continuity follows directly from Assumption III.27.





. As every such K has a fixed finite total mass, due to the defi-
nition of φ, the desired continuity follows from the fact that F̂ (α, p, ν) is continuous
in ν, uniformly over (α, p) ∈ Â × Π. To prove the latter, fix ε > 0, and let d0 be
Lévy-Prokhorov metric on Mµa(A) (Π). Let us show that there exists an increasing
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continuous deterministic function C0 : [0,∞)→ [0,∞), s.t. C0(0) = 0 and∣∣∣F̂ (α, p, ν1)− F̂ (α, p, ν2)∣∣∣ ≤ C0(ε), ∀ p ∈ Π, α ∈ Â, d0(ν1, ν2) ≤ ε.
If we manage to show that there exists an increasing continuous deterministic func-
tion B : [0,∞)→ [0,∞), s.t. B(0) = 0 and
(3.60) F (α, p, ν1) ≤ F (α, (p− ε) ∨ 0, ν2) +B(ε),
then
F̂ (α, p, ν1) = F (α, p
′, ν1)− |p′ − p| ≤ F (α, (p′ − ε) ∨ 0, ν2)− |p′ − p|+B(ε)
≤ F (α, (p′ − ε) ∨ 0, ν2)− |(p′ − ε) ∨ 0− p|+B(ε) + ε ≤ F̂ (α, p, ν2) +B(ε) + ε.
The latter, together with the analogous inequality in which ν1 and ν2 are switched,
yields the desired uniform continuity of F̂ in ν. Thus, it is only left to prove (3.60).
For any p ∈ Π, by the definition of the Lévy-Prokhorov metric, we have:
ν1([0, p)) ≥ ν2([0, (p− ε) ∨ 0))− ε
and, hence, by Assumption III.28,
−D−1(ν1([0, p))) ≥ −D−1 (ν2([0, (p− ε) ∨ 0)))− ε(ε).
Then, for any p ∈ Π,








(p− ε) ∨ 0 + pa −D−1(ν+2 ((p− ε) ∨ 0))
)
+Mfε(ε),
where we used the fact that fα is bounded by some constant Mf . The above estimate,
along with the boundedness of pa, pb and F+,α, yields the desired inequality (3.60)
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for the first term in (3.54). Integrating the above estimate, we obtain the analogous
inequality for the last term in the right hand side of (3.54), thus, completing the
proof.






Kt,ω ∈ K̃ (ν̃(Kt,ω)) ,
and, hence, (Kt,ω, ν̃(Kt,ω)) satisfies (3.56). Next, we need to establish the measur-
ability of Kt,ω with respect to (t, ω). Namely, we need to show that there exists a





(3.61) Kt,ω ∈ argmaxK′∈Mµa(Â×Π)φt,ω (K
′, ν̃(Kt,ω)) ,
for Leb ⊗ P-a.e. (t, ω), where φ and ν̃ are defined in (3.59) and (3.57). We denote
S = [0, T ]×Ω, and let S be the progressive sigma-algebra (defined w.r.t. the filtration




and introduce the correspondence
g1 : S × X→ X, given by
(t, ω,K) 7→ argmaxK′∈Xφt,ω(K ′, ν̃(K)).
Notice that X is separable and metrizable, and consider the function (t, ω,K,K ′) 7→
φt,ω(K
′, ν̃(K)), defined on (S×X2,S⊗B(X2)). Note that this function is continuous
in K ′ (as shown in the proof of Proposition III.34) and measurable in (t, ω,K) (as it is
continuous in K and measurable in (t, ω), as shown in the proof of Proposition III.34),
hence, it is a Carathéodory function. Then, the Measurable Maximum theorem (cf.
Theorem 18.18 in [2]) implies that g1 is a (S ⊗ B(X))-measurable correspondence
with nonempty and compact values. Consider another correspondence g2 : S → X,
given by
(t, ω) 7→ {K ∈ X : K ∈ argmaxK′φt,ω(K ′, ν̃(K))} .
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Let us show how to measurably select from g2, for Leb⊗P-a.e. (t, ω). The standard
measurable selection results (cf. Corollary 18.27 and Theorem 18.26 in [2]) imply
that such a selection is possible if g2 has S ⊗B(X)-measurable graph and non-empty
values. The latter follows from Proposition III.34, and the former is guaranteed by
the following lemma.
Lemma III.35. The correspondence g2 has a S ⊗ B(X)-measurable graph.
Proof: Denote this graph by Γg2 . Let IX : X→ X× X be given by IX(K) = (K,K).
Then, Γg2 = (id× IX)
−1 (Γ), where Γ ⊂ S × X× X is given by
Γ = {(t, ω,K,K ′|(t, ω) ∈ S, K ∈ X, K ′ ∈ argmaxK′′∈Xφt,ω(K ′′, ν̃(K)))}
∩ {(t, ω,K,K)|(t, ω) ∈ S, K ∈ X} .
Clearly, id× IX is a measurable map, and the set {(t, ω,K,K)|(t, ω) ∈ S, K ∈ X} is
measurable. Therefore, we only need to check that
{(t, ω,K,K ′|(t, ω) ∈ S, K ∈ X, K ′ ∈ argmaxK′′∈Xφt,ω(K ′′, ν̃(K)))}
is S ⊗ B(X2)-measurable. The latter set is precisely the graph of g1, and it is mea-
surable as the correspondence g1 is measurable (cf. Theorem 18.6 in [2]).





, satisfying (3.61) for Leb ⊗ P-a.e. (t, ω). It only remains to
construct κ from K, by disintegration. Let us introduce A = S × Â, equipped




, and the measure Q on A × Π, defined via
Q(dt, dω, dα, dp) = Kt,ω(dα, dp)dtP(dω). Note that the marginal distribution of
Q on A is µa(dα)dtP(dω). Then, as the natural projection from A × Π to Π has
a Borel range, Theorems 5.3 and 5.4 from [41] imply that there exists a kernel
κ : A 3 (t, ω, α) 7→ κt,ω(α) ∈ P(Π), which is a regular conditional distribution of the
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natural projection from A× Π to Π, given the natural projection from A× Π to A,
under Q. Namely, for every absolutely bounded measurable f : A×Π→ R, we have
(3.62)∫
A×Π
f(t, ω, α, p)Kt,ω(dα, dp)dtP(dω) =
∫
A×Π
f(t, ω, α, p)κt,ω(α; dp)µ
a(dα)dtP(dω).
The above property yields that ν̂at,ω = ν̃(Kt,ω) and κt,ω satisfy the fixed-point con-
straint (3.55). It only remains to show that κ satisfies (3.53), for Leb ⊗ P ⊗ µa-
a.e. (t, ω, α). Assume that this is not the case, then, there exists a measurable set
B ⊂ [0, T ] × Ω, with positive measure, s.t. for any fixed (t, ω) ∈ B, there exists a
measurable set C ⊂ Â, s.t. µa(C) > 0 and, for all α ∈ C,∫
R
F̂t,ω(α, p, ν̃(Kt,ω))κt,ω(α; dp) ≤
∫
R












The above inequality becomes non-strict for all α ∈ Â \C. Then, for a fixed (t, ω) ∈
B, we can choose a measurable κ̃ : Â → P(Π) (in the same way as we chose a














F̂t,ω(α, p, ν̃(Kt,ω))κt,ω(α; dp) <
∫
R
F̂t,ω(α, p, ν̃(Kt,ω))κ̃(α; dp),
for all α ∈ C, and the non-strict inequality holds for all α ∈ Â. Integrating with
respect to µa, and using (3.62) with f(t, ω, α, p) = F̂ (t, ω, α, p, ν̃(Kt,ω))), we obtain
a contradiction with (3.61) on the set B (which has a positive measure). Thus, for
µa-a.e. α ∈ Â, (3.53) holds for Leb ⊗ P-a.e. (t, ω). This means that, if we define
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p̂t(α) as the push-forward of κt(α), under the mapping x 7→ x + pat , the resulting
strategy p̂(α) maximizes the generator Ĝαt (y), for any y and a.e. (t, ω). Then, we
define νat to be the push-forward of ν̂
a
t , under the mapping x 7→ x+ pat , and use the
standard BSDE results to conclude that, for µa-a.e. α ∈ Â,
J (ν,θ),(p̂(α),V






holds for all admissible strategies p′, which means that p̂(α) is optimal for the long
agents with beliefs α. With such a choice of νa and p̂, the fixed-point condition on
νa, given in (3.7), is satisfied, as it is equivalent to (3.55) (assuming the extremal
long agents post limit orders at pa, which is optimal for them). This, along with
Corollary III.31, implies that (p̂(α), V a) is an optimal strategy for the long agents
with beliefs α ∈ Â. The short agents are treated similarly. Thus, we complete the
proof of Theorem III.29.
Remark III.36. Notice that, as announced in Remark III.7, we have constructed an
equilibrium, satisfying




t , vt(−1, α) = vbt = V bt , ∀α ∈ A ∪ B, (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω.
Therefore, in such an equilibrium, no agents execute market orders before the end
of the game τ̂ , and, hence, the empirical distribution µ remains constant and (3.9)
holds.
3.5 Example
In this section, we consider the simplest concrete example of our model and show
how it can be used. Consider a stochastic basis (Ω, F̃ = (Ft)t∈[0,T ] ,P), with a Poisson
random measure N , whose compensator is λtft(x)dxdt, as described in Subsection
3.2.1. We assume that Jt(x) = x (i.e. M ≡ N), so that N is the jump measure of
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the (potential) fundamental price process X. We also assume that T = 20, λt ≡ 1
and ft is the density of a uniform distribution on [−C0, C0], where the constant C0
is chosen to be sufficiently large, so that this interval contains the supports of all fα











|0 ≤ i < K
}
are the uniform partitions of unit intervals, and K = 500 is used for most of the
computations herein. The restrictions of µa (resp. µb) on Â (resp. B̂) assign a mass
of 1/K to every point of the corresponding discrete space. Note that this implies
µa(Â) = µb(B̂) = 1. We also define µa({α0}) = µb({β0}) = 0.1.









λα = λ+,α + λ−,α.
Herein, we use C+,α0 = C−,α0 = C+,β0 = C−,β0 = 0.5 and
C+,α = a+ bα, C−,α = C−,α0 , ∀α ∈ Â,
C−,β = a− bβ, C+,β = C+,β0 , ∀ β ∈ B̂,






− 1, dZαt = Zαt−
∫
R
Γα(x) [N(dt, dx)− λf(x)dtdx],
and define Pα << P by its Radon-Nikodym density ZαT . One can easily check, using
the general results in [39] (or in [23], for the deterministic case, used herein) that,
under such Pα, N is a Poisson random measure with the compensator λαfα(x)dxdt.
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We assume that the demand elasticity is deterministic, constant in time, and
linear in price:
Dt(p) = −kp,
with the elasticity parameter k = 0.2.
With the above choice of {C±,α0 , C±,β0 , µa({α0}), µb({β0}), k}, it is easy to see
that Assumption III.26 is satisfied. Notice that the choice of λ±,α, for α ∈ Â ∪ B̂,
does not affect the equilibrium, as long as Assumptions III.23 and III.24 are satisfied.
This is, clearly, the case if we choose λ±,α = λ±,α
0
and λ±,β = λ±,β
0
, for α ∈ A and
β ∈ B. Herein, we consider several different sets of values for {λ±,α0 , λ±,β0}.
Let us construct an equilibrium in this example. Notice that, in the present case,
the Brownian motion W does not affect the jump intensities and, in turn, the agents’
objectives, hence, the RBSDE system (3.41) becomes a system of reflected ODEs.
We can solve it easily, using a simple Euler scheme, then, recover the value functions
(V a, V b), as shown in Lemma III.19, and construct the bid and ask prices, (pa, pb), in
the feedback form, as shown in Lemma III.18. We implement this strategy with the
parameters chosen above, and with λ+,α0 = 2.5, λ−,α0 = 1, λ+,β0 = 1, λ−,β0 = 2.5 (so
that the extremal ask agents are bullish whereas the extremal bid agents are bearish).
The results are shown in the left part of Figure 3.1. Using the same parameters, we
consider the book beyond the best bid and ask prices. In order to construct it, we
solve the fixed-point problem (3.56) numerically. The latter is achieved by limiting
the set of possible price levels for the limit orders to a finite set (i.e. to a partition
of a large interval), which reduces (3.56) to a finite-dimensional fixed-point problem.
In addition, we allow each agent to post a limit order at a single price level only,
which further simplifies the problem.8 Thus, we find a solution by the standard
8Note that this restriction does not compromise the optimality of the agents’ actions, provided a fixed point
can be found. Indeed, it is a well known phenomenon that, in a continuum-player game, an equilibrium with pure
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recursive iteration, maximizing, at each step, the objective over a finite set. The
resulting optimal limit order strategies of the agents (at time zero) are plotted in the
right part of Figure 3.1, as a function of the agents’ beliefs α ∈ Â ∪ B̂. Notice that
the optimal limit order strategy p(·) is piece-wise constant. It is worth mentioning
that this discreteness seems to be inherent in the model and not just an artifact of
the discretization of prices or beliefs that we chose herein. Indeed, Figure 3.1 was
obtained with 500 different values of beliefs (i.e. K = 500) and with 1000 possible
price levels, while the number of jumps of p(·) is clearly much smaller than any one
of these numbers. In fact, we have repeated the computations, increasing both K
and the number of possible price levels, and the results do not change. Naturally,
the associated LOB is given by a finite combination of Dirac measures – it is shown
in the left part of Figure 3.2.
Finally, we demonstrate how the proposed framework can be used to model the
indirect market impact: i.e. how a change to the LOB may create a “feedback” effect
and cause further changes to it. Note that the initial change may be triggered by
a trade (which is the case in the classical literature on optimal execution), or by a
new limit order. An extreme example of the latter is the so-called “spoofing” – i.e.
posting a large limit order with the goal to make the price of the asset move in the
opposite direction.9 To the best of our knowledge, to date, there exists no model
capable of explaining how exactly this activity causes the LOB (and, in particular,
the price) to change. To model this process within the present example, we assume
that {λ±,α0 , λ±,β0} are, in fact, functions of a relevant market indicator, which we
controls also provides an equilibrium for a setting with distributed controls. This is, in fact, one of the advantages of
the continuum-player games. We consider distributed controls only to prove that the equilibrium does exist, which
is much harder (if at all possible) to show for a setting with pure controls.





= 2.3 exp (Is) , λ−,α
0
= 1 exp (−Is) ,
λ+,β
0
= 1 exp (Is) , λ−,β
0
= 2.3 exp (−Is) ,
where s = 2.6 is the sensitivity. We further assume that I is the so-called market
imbalance: the ratio of the size of all orders at the best bid over the size of all orders
at the best ask, less one. It is a well known empirical fact (cf. [21]) that such an
indicator has a predictive power for the direction of the next price move. Note that
I is a function of the LOB, which, in turn, is an outcome of an equilibrium, in which
I is the input. Strictly speaking, our results do not guarantee the existence of an
equilibrium with this additional fixed-point constraint. Nevertheless, we can try to
compute it numerically. For example, choosing the initial factor value I = .0984456,
we obtain the equilibrium LOB (consistent with the chosen level of market imbalance
I) shown in the right part of Figure 3.2 (at the top). Next, we add an extra limit
buy order of size 0.05, located at the best bid price, to this LOB – as shown in the
bottom graph in the right part of Figure 3.2. Clearly, the new LOB is no longer in
equilibrium, hence, the agents will adjust their controls to reach a new equilibrium.
Of course, in theory, this process happens instantaneously, and we simply observe
the outcome of the new equilibrium. However, it is also very insightfull to see how
the new equilibrium is reached, in a sequence of steps. At each step, we fix the value
of I given by the imbalance of the LOB at the previous step, and compute the new
LOB from the equilibrium, and so on. Figure 3.3 shows what happens to the LOB
and to the functions (V a, V b) in the first five steps. We can see that the change in
the factor makes the agents more bullish about the asset, and they tend to move
their limit orders higher. In particular, the size of the best bid increases, while the
size of the best ask decreases, further increasing the market imbalance. The left part
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of Figure 3.3 also shows that, starting from step three, the value functions V a and
V b coincide at time zero, which means that the agents, in fact, choose to submit
an internal market order, terminating the game. Thus, our model, in particular,
shows how the market imbalance can be interpreted as a “self-fulfilling prophecy”:
the fact that the agents base their beliefs on the market imbalance, itself, implies
that a sufficient increase in the market imbalance will, indeed, trigger a market buy
order.
Of course, the analysis provided in this section is merely an example, which is
meant to illustrate how our results can be used to model the changes in a LOB
resulting from the changes in a relevant market indicator. In general, we do not need
to limit ourselves to the market imbalance, but may consider other indicators: e.g.
choosing the size and direction of the last trade as the relevant indicator, would allow
one to model the “indirect” impact of a market order on the LOB (in addition to
the obvious, direct, impact resulting from immediate execution of the limit orders).
In our future research, we plan to find an appropriate model specification (including
the choice of the most appropriate market factors), that is consistent with empirical
findings, and to test the predictions of our model against the real market data.
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Figure 3.1: On the left: value functions (V b, V a) (red and blue), and the bid and ask prices (pb, pa)
(purple and orange), as functions of time. On the right: the optimal price level of a
limit order, as a function of the beliefs α ∈ Â∪ B̂. Parameters: λ+,α0 = 2.5, λ−,α0 = 1,
λ+,β0 = 1, λ−,β0 = 2.5.
Figure 3.2: Left: LOB at time zero, with λ+,α0 = 2.5, λ−,α0 = 1, λ+,β0 = 1, λ−,β0 = 2.5. Right:
equilibrium LOB at time zero, with the parameters depending on the market imbalance
I (top), and the same LOB, with an additional (yellow) limit order (bottom).
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Figure 3.3: On the left: value functions (V b, V a) (red and blue), as functions of time. On the right:
LOB at each step of the convergence to a new equilibrium.
CHAPTER IV
Effects of Tick Size
4.1 Introduction.
In this chapter we continue our investigation of agent-based approaches to mod-
eling various phenomena in market microstructure initiated in chapters II, III. This
time we focus on a continuous-time case with discrete prices, to model more realisti-
cally the actual markets which have a finite tick size. Unlike in those two chapters,
we only consider a two-agent game with one long and one short agent. It should be
understood that the equilibrium we construct for this game can be extended to an
equilibrium for the continuum-player game with two clusters of equivalent agents on
buy and sell sides, similarly to chapter III.
What we focus on here is instead the relevance of the location of the agents’
estimate of the ’true price’ relative to multiples of the tick size: this spatial inho-
mogeneity is important for understanding the clustering of market orders and, more
generally, the non-uniformity of market impact across time. Consider the following
as an example of a possible practical relevance of this spatial structure: if we think of
the true price as an imbalance-weighted bid-ask price, it is well-known that for many
1-tick stocks the trade volume is higher on average when this true price is close to
bid or ask. But this is exactly what our model would imply, as with realistic param-
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eters equilibria it produces are such that the agents would join external investors in
submitting market orders when the true price is close to a multiple of the tick size.
Moreover, the spatial structure implied by the model depends on the potentially
measurable model parameters (volatility, adverse selection level), suggesting some
avenues for empirical investigations we plan to pursue in the future work.
The main challenges of this work are on the mathematical side. The game we
consider reduces to a system of two Markovian control-stopping optimization prob-
lems, coupled through controls and stopping barriers which are discontinuous func-
tionals (actually, floors and ceilings) of the other agent’s value function. A fixed
point problem which solving such system reduces to lacks continuity, contractivity
or monotonicity properties, rendering it intractable by conventional methods. We
are able to solve it for the case of a 1-dimensional Brownian motion true price, which
allows us to utilize the geometric approach to (possibly rather irregular) linear dif-
fusion stopping problems developed in [26],[25]. This approach, combined with the
quasi-periodic structure of the problem arising from the discreteness of admissible
order price levels, allows us to establish a sufficiently strong monotonicity property of
agents’ value functions in the case when the true price volatility is sufficiently high.
This monotonicity implies the agents’ value processes are sufficiently noisy, which
means that the discontinuity of the coupling between the agents gets smoothed out.
Along with a few other special properties of agents’ value functions, this allows us
to restrict the fixed point problem to a subset on which its continuity can actually
be established.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2 we describe the game mechan-
ics and introduce the main ingredients of the model. In section 4.3 we investigate
the properties of the individual agent’s value function given that the price controls
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of both agents and the other agent’s value function are fixed. We first show its basic
relative boundedness and quasi-periodicity properties. We then introduce the analyt-
ical machinery of second order ODEs related to linear diffusions, which together with
the geometric approach to the linear diffusion optimal stopping mentioned above al-
lows us to establish a sufficiently strong monotonicity of an agent’s value function
for all admissible price controls. The section ends with a proposition establishing
the continuity of one agent’s value function in the other agent’s value function pro-
vided the latter is appropriately monotonous, relatively bounded and quasi-periodic.
In section 4.4 we first address the control parts of agents’ optimization problems:
we introduce response control operators and show the price controls they produce
are indeed optimal. Our situation is somewhat less regular than the one treated
in standard references, so we have to exploit the special structure of the problem
and introduce some additional tricks to show this optimality. We then show these
response control operators are continuous in the appropriate topology and also show
how the coupled optimization problem we are solving reduces to a certain fixed point
problem. Finally we show the continuity of this fixed point problem and the exis-
tence of a fixed point of a special type, which implies the existence of a solution to
our coupled optimization system.
4.2 Buyers-sellers game
Consider two agents, long and short, aiming to sell and buy, respectively, one unit
of the asset.
Every agent can post a limit order (of the respective type – buy or sell) at a chosen
price level, or submit a market order (of the same type). We denote the location
of a limit order posted by the long agent at time t by pat . Similarly, we denote the
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location of a limit order posted by the short agent at time t by pbt . Both processes
take values in he set of integers Z. We interpret their values as prices in multiples of
tick size for the asset.
We denote the stopping time at which the long agent executes a market order by
τa. Similarly, we denote the stopping time at which the long agent executes a market
order by τ b.
Each agent believes that the external investors arrive to the market according to
a Poisson process N with intensity λ.
The current estimated mean value of the fundamental price, from the point
of view of each agent, is given by the process X, with
Xt = X0 + σBt,
where B is a Brownian motion, independent of N .
The processes (pa, pb) and the stopping times (τa, τ b) are adapted to FB.
At any arrival time t of N , the value of the fundamental price, p0t , is determined
by
p0t = Xt + ξ
where ξ is a random variable, independent of B, with mean 0 and cdf F .
An external market buy order is executed at time t if and only if t is an arrival
time of N and p0t ≥ pat . Similarly, an external market sell order is executed at
time t if and only if t is an arrival time of N and p0t ≤ pbt .
If a long (short) agent submits an internal market sell (buy) order at time t, it
is executed at bV bt c (resp. dV at e), where V b, V a are value processes for short and
long agents respectively. Given our perfect information/perfect rationality setup, a
sell agent would run away from a predictable buy market order if it doesn’t improve
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on her value function, and would take it if it does, so the smallest price (which also
should be an integer) at which the long agent would agree to trade is dV at e. Hence,
a short agent can execute her market buy order at this price level.
The game ends at the time of the first trade: when the first market order is
executed. The agent, or agents, who participated in that trade receive/pay the
price the trade was struck at. If the trade ended via an external market buy (resp.
sell) order, so that only one of the agents actually traded, at some time τ , and
ξτ = p
0
τ −Xτ , then the short (resp. long) agent’s remaining inventory is marked to
dXτ+αξτe (resp. bXτ+αξτc). The choice of Xτ+αξτ (where 0 < α < 1 is the adverse
selection parameter) is based on the following. The observed difference between the
actual fundamental price p0 and the mean fundamental price X is informative (to a
degree controlled by α) for the subsequent estimate of the mean fundamental price,
or, in other words, the external order flow affects linearly the agents’ estimate of the
mean fundamental price. Taking the ceiling and floors is meant to approximate the
’next round’ pa and pb.
In this work, we consider a game with infinite time horizon and only allow for
Markovian strategies, so that pat , p
b
t are (time-independent) functions of Xt, and τ
a,
τ b are hitting times of Xt.
Then agents value processes are given by functions of Xt as well. It’s not hard
to show that if one of the agents is using such Markovian controls, it is possible for
the other agent to choose optimal controls which are Markovian as well. (We do not
claim that all equilibria of the game are Markovian.)
Similarly to chapter III, one can show that an equilibrium in the control-stopping
game described above can be constructed by solving the following fixed point problem
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for the functions (pa∗, pb∗, V̄ a, V̄ b):
(4.1)

V̄ a(x) = suppa∈Aa supτ J
a
(
x, τ, pa, pb∗, V̄ b
)
,
V̄ b(x) = infpb∈Ab infτ J
b
(
x, τ, pa∗, pb, V̄ a
)
,
where the classes of admissible control functions, Aa, Ab, are defined below, in As-

























































































with Ex[·] = E [·|X0 = x] and
(4.4) c(pa, pb, x) = λ
(





(4.5) ga(pa, pb, x) = λ
(
pa (1− F (pa − x)) + F b(pb, x)
)
,

















4.3 Agents’ optimal stopping problems
In this section, we introduce the assumptions and derive a number of properties
of the agents’ objective functions. In the subsequent section, we use these results to
establish the existence of a solution to the target fixed-point problem, and, in turn,
construct an equilibrium of the associated control-stopping game.
First we introduce the notion of admissible prices. Unfortunately, we have to
constrain agents’ choice a bit a priori, namely, we have to assume agents bid and ask
prices are always such that the order execution rate at either side is bounded away
from zero. It is necessary to have this undegenerate discounting for our analytical
machinery to work, and we couldn’t find a way to obtain this property endogenously
in sufficient generality. In all the realistic examples we investigated this constraint
is not binding. More specifically, define
Aa0 = {x|1− F (x) ≥
cl
2λ




Aa(x) = x+Aa0, Ab(x) = x+Ab0
For any cl > 0 we define
Definition IV.1. The control pa(x) (pb(x)) is admissible if it is a measurable func-
tion and
pa(x) ∈ Aa(x) ∩ Z, ∀x
(
resp.pb(x) ∈ Ab(x) ∩ Z, ∀x
)
and there exists at least one pb (resp. pa) with the above property such that pa ≥ pb.
One can check admissibility of pa, pb implies in particular that
‖pa(x)− x‖∞ ≤ C,
∥∥pb(x)− x∥∥∞ ≤ C
for some C > 0, where ‖ · ‖∞ denotes L∞ norm. It also implies
c(pa(x), pb(x), x) ≥ cl, ∀x
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Also, from the definition of c, and as λ is fixed throughout the chapter, we get
(4.9) c(pa(x), pb(x), x) ≤ cu = 2λ > 0
We denote by Aa (Ab) the sets of all admissible pa (resp. pb). These sets might
be empty for all cl > 0 if the support of ξ is too narrow, so we need to make the
following
Assumption IV.2. There exists cl > 0 so that the corresponding Aa, Ab are non-
empty.
We fix such cl for the rest of the chapter.
Another property we are going to use a lot is the following
Definition IV.3. We say a measurable function f is C-close to x, where C > 0 is
a constant, if
‖f(x)− x‖∞ ≤ C





















x, τ, pa, pb, v
)
.
It’s easy to see these are well-defined and C-close to x for some C for all admissible
controls pa, pb and admissible barriers v.
Note that pa, pb, V̄ a, V̄ b and x are measured in ticks, and only the relative
measurements are interpretable, not the absolute numbers, so the sensible equilibria
should satisfy
(4.12)
V̄ a(x+1) = V̄ a(x)+1, V̄ b(x+1) = V̄ b(x)+1, pa∗(x+1) = pa∗(x)+1, pb∗(x+1) = pb∗(x)+1
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We will use this property a lot in what follows so we introduce a term for it:
Definition IV.4. We say a function f(x) has 1-shift property if
f(x+ 1) = f(x) + 1, ∀x ∈ R
An important first step toward establishing the existence of an equilibrium of (4.1)
in the class of functions which have 1-shift property and are C-close to x would be to
check these properties are preserved by individual agents’ optimization functionals
V a(· · · ), V b(· · · ):
Lemma IV.5. If admissible barriers va, vb and admissible controls pa, pb have 1-shift
property then so do V a(x, pa, pb, vb) and V b(x, pa, pb, va). Additionally, we have
c(x+ 1, pa + 1, pb + 1) = c(x, pa, pb)
ga
c
(x+ 1, pa + 1, pb + 1) =
ga
c
(x, pa, pb) + 1,
gb
c
(x+ 1, pa + 1, pb + 1) =
gb
c
(x, pa, pb) + 1,






(x, pa(x), pb(x)) have the 1-shift property.
Proof: Immediate after rewriting the objective in the form (4.14).
In what follows we will often suppress the dependence on pa(x), pb(x) from nota-
tion to avoid clutter, and denote
c(x) = cp(x) = c(p
a(x), pb(x), x)
ga(x) = gap(x) = g
a(pa(x), pb(x), x)
gb(x) = gbp(x) = g
b(pa(x), pb(x), x)










where we use the subscript p when we want to emphasize the dependence of certain
coefficients on pa(x), pb(x).







are C-close to x then so are V a(x, pa, pb, vb) and V b(x, pa, pb, va).
Proof: We will now show the claim for V a(· · · ), the one for V b(· · · ) being analogous.
From the definitions (4.10) and (4.2) we get










































































where makes use of g
a
c
− x ≤ C, bvbc − x ≤ vb − x ≤ C, by assumption. To get the





























where we used τ =∞.
In what follows, we analyze V a(x, pa, pb, vb) (V b(x, pa, pb, va being analogous) more
closely, in particular establishing its monotonicity in x and continuity in vb (resp.
va), under appropriate conditions. Throughout this analysis, we think of pa and pb as
fixed functions of x, while we vary x and vb(va). We are going to make heavy use of
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the well-known connection between linear diffusions and certain second-order ODEs.
Our discounting and running cost functions are a bit less regular (measurable and
locally bounded, but not continuous) than is commonly assumed in the literature,
so a modicum of care is required in making this connection rigorous.
First, as in [38], define, for given pa(x), pb(x)





















, x > 0
and





















, x ≤ 0
Clearly ψ(0) = φ(0) = 1, ψ is strictly increasing, φ is strictly decreasing. The
results from [38] (and the absolute continuity of the killing measure for the diffusion
corresponding to our discounted problem) imply f = φ or f = ψ has right derivative,





c(x)f(x)dx = f+(b)− f+(a)
for all b > a. Passing to the limit b ↓ a or a ↑ b shows that f+ is continuous. One
can also show the following.
Lemma IV.7. If f is continuous and has continuous right derivative on [a, b] then
f ∈ C1(a, b).
The (elementary) proof of this fact can be found in the appendix. Thus, the






c(x)f(x)dx = f ′(b)− f ′(a)
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As c ∈ L∞(R) and f ∈ C(R), fxx exists a.e. and satisfies
σ2
2
fxx − cf = 0, a.e.
for f = ψ or f = φ, and, in particular, f ∈W2,loc.
Next, define
























where the Wronskian W = ψ′(x)φ(x) − φ′(x)ψ(x) is actually independent of x and
positive. Using the fact that φ(x)
∫ x
−∞ ψ(y)g
a(y)dy (and other similar terms) is
equal to the integral of its (a.e. defined) derivative as a product of two absolutely-













and so has a continuous derivative, which is moreover a.e. differentiable (as φ′, ψ′




faxx − cfa = −ga, a.e.
Similar claims hold for f b. This implies in particular that fa, f b are in W2,loc. Apply-








and passing to the limit over a sequence of increasing to infinity stopping times one
can further get the following probabilistic representation












and similarly for f b.
We’ll also make use of the following elementary bounds on φ, ψ:
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See appendix for the proof.
Next, these fa, f b inherit the C-closeness to x and 1-shift property from prices:






are C-close to x then so are
fa(x), f b(x).
Proof: The claim about fa follows from

















and similarly for the one about f b.
Lemma IV.10. If admissible pa, pb have 1-shift property then so do fa, f b.
Proof: Follows from the representation (4.22) and lemma IV.5.
More interestingly, the 1-shift property of pa, pb implies fa, f b approach f0(x) = x
in C1 in fast-diffusion limit, and admit two-sided derivative bounds as long as the
diffusion coefficient is nonzero:






are C-close to x, then for f = fa, f b we have
(4.23) 1− w ≤ f ′(x) ≤ 1 + w
where the constant w depends only on C, cl, cu, σ and satisfies
(4.24) w(σ)→ 0 asσ →∞.
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Proof: We’ll only show the upper bound on the derivative for fa only, the proof of
other parts being analogous. Differentiating the representation (4.18) we get



















As our diffusion killed at the rate c(x) − cl has ±∞ as natural boundary points,














From the representations above we see φ(y)c(y) 2
σ2|φ′(x)| is a density on [x,∞) and
ψ(y)c(y) 2
σ2ψ′(x)
is a density on (−∞, x]. Using this and ga
c
(x) ≤ x+ C we get









f ′′(x)− c(x)f(x) = −xc(x)




= 1 and we get
(fa)′ (x) ≤ 1 + 2C |φ
′(x)|ψ′(x)
W
Thus to show the claim we only need to establish the appropriate bound on the last
summand above.
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To do this, first note c(x+ 1) = c(x) implies φ(x+ 1) = γφ(x),ψ(x+ 1) = 1
γ
ψ(x),


























































































































Note on [0, 1] 1 ≥ φ(x) ≥ γ, 1
γ
≥ ψ(x) ≥ 1, which together with |φ′|, ψ′ estimates
from above gives
(4.30)



























































Note also that as 1
γ








This together with the previous expression implies the existence of the desired upper
bound on 2C |φ
′(x)|ψ′(x)
W








(4.32) ·̂ : h→ ĥ(y) = h
φ
(F−1(y))
where ĥ is defined on (0,∞). Then for given pa, pb, va, vb we have the following
description of the value function of the individual stopping problem.
Proposition IV.12. For any admissible controls pa, pb and admissible barriers
va, vb, the individual agents’ value functions V a(x) = V a(x, pa, pb, vb), V b(x) =
V b(x, pa, pb, va) are uniquely determined by
V̂ a(y) = mcm ̂(J b − fa)(y) + f̂a(y)
V̂ b(y) = −mcm ̂(f b − Ja)(y) + f̂ b(y)
(4.33)
where mcm(f) denotes the smallest nonnegative concave majorant of a function f .
150
Proof: We only prove the claim for V a. First, note





























































bvb(Xτ )c − fa(Xτ )
)]
hence











bvb(Xτ )c − fa(Xτ )
)]
Given bvbc(x)− fa(x) is measurable and locally bounded, the last term above (i.e.,
the value function of a pure stopping problem (with discounting)) has the claimed
mcm-characterization by Proposition 3.4 from [25].
For the use in the proofs below, we’d also need a y-domain version of the shift-
properties from Lemma IV.10.
Lemma IV.13. Given admissible pa, pb which have 1-shift property, and φ, ψ defined
as in (4.16,4.15), we get




where γ = φ(1), 0 < γ < 1.
Furthermore












for any 1-periodic H(x). In particular this can be applied to H = va − fa, f b − vb, if
va, vb have 1-shift property, by Lemma IV.10.
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The next proposition is the most important one in this subsection, and it is the
key to our proof of existence of a Markovian equilibrium for sufficiently large σ.
Without the monotonicity established therein, the fixed point problem we need to
solve appears to be too discontinuous to be tractable.
Proposition IV.14. Consider admissible controls pa, pb, admissible barriers va, vb





are C-close to x. Then,
V (x) = V a(x, pa, pb, vb), V b(x, pa, pb, va) is absolutely continuous and its derivative
satisfies:
(4.36) |V ′(x)− 1| ≤ w, a.e.
with w(σ)→ 0, as σ →∞, uniformly in pa, pb, va, vb with the properties above. In
particular, there exists ε > 0, s.t.
V ′(x) ≥ ε, a.e.
for all σ large enough.
Proof: We only prove the lower bound on the derivative of V a, other parts being
similar. Note that Proposition IV.12 implies





As fa, φ,F ∈ C1(R), and the mcm above is absolutely continuous as it is concave,
then so is V a, and for its (a.e. defined) derivative we have









From Proposition IV.11, we get (fa)′(x) ≥ 1− w with w as in the statement of the
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proposition, so we only need to show










with w̃ having appropriate asymptotic properties. As, by Lemma IV.5, V a is 1-
periodic, it is sufficient to only consider x on any bounded interval of length at least






Note that the assumed 1-shift property of vb and fa, via Lemma IV.10, imply that











h0(y). It can be easily checked that this property passes on to its
minimal concave majorant h(y). Define
φ̄(y) = φ̂2(y) = φ(F−1(y))








(φ2) > 0 and so φ̄(y) is convex by the following
lemma which can be proven by a straightforward calculation.
Lemma IV.15. Let H ∈ W2,loc then Ĥ(y) is convex (resp. concave) on (y1, y2),
yi = F(xi), if
σ2
2
Hxx − cH > 0, (resp. < 0) a.e. on (x1, x2)
Furthermore, φ̄ is decreasing and satisfies φ̄( y
γ2







Note that, as (h0φ̄)(
1
γ2





for all y (and not just y ∈ [1, 1
γ2
]), as follows from the definition of c̃.
Next, suppose that c̃ ≤ 0. We will show that, in this case, h(y) ≡ 0, and w̃ = 0
gives the desired lower bound for (4.37), and thus there is nothing left to prove.
Indeed, the constant function 0 is a concave majorant of h0 in this case. If the actual









) for all integer k will also lie on the graph of h.
But one can check the slope between two consecutive such points increases if z < 0
contradicting the concavity of h.







and bvbc, fa (see Lemma IV.9) are (C+1)-close to x , we get c̃ ≤ 2C+2. . Moreover
1/φ̄(y) = 1̂ (that is, the ·̂-transform applied to a constant function 1) is concave by








and so c̃/φ̄(y) is actually a concave majorant of h0(y) which implies
h(y) ≤ c̃
φ̄(y)
, ∀y ∈ (0,∞)
From the definition of c̃ we can find a sequence of points {yi} on [1, 1γ2 ] s.t. (h0φ̄)(yi)→
c̃. Let y∗ be any concentration point of that sequence. Then, from the continuity of





Recall that we only need to establish (4.37) on some x-interval of length ≥ 1. It




]. Note that, as y∗ ∈ [1, 1γ2 ], this x-interval necessarily lies inside [0, 2]. Note
also that
φ(x) = φ̄(F (x)), φ′(x) = φ̄′(F (x))F ′(x)
and so the left-hand side of (4.37) can be rewritten as
F ′(x)
(
φ̄′(F (x))h(F (x)) + φ̄(F (x))h′(F (x))
)
To estimate the above, it would suffice to get an estimate of F ′(x), for x ∈ [0, 2], and
of
φ̄′(y)h(y) + φ̄(y)h′(y),
for y ∈ [y∗, y∗γ2 ].







so we need to estimate W :
W = ψ′(0)φ(0) + |φ′(0)|ψ(0) = ψ′(0) + |φ′(0)|
Each of these derivatives can be estimated using their integral representation, as in
the proof of Proposition IV.11, using the asymptotic properties of φ and ψ from





















for x ∈ [0, 2]. So it remains to estimate
φ̄′(y)h(y) + φ̄(y)h′(y)
for y ∈ [y∗, y∗γ2 ] ⊂ [1,
1
γ4
]. As φ̄′ < 0, h > 0, and, as shown below, h′ > 0, to estimate
the above expression from below we need the estimates on φ̄′ from below, on h from
above, on φ̄ from below, and on h′ from below. Clearly, φ̄(y) ≥ γ2, for the chosen
range of y. In addition, as h is dominated by c̃
φ̄
, we get h(y) ≤ c̃
γ2
on the y-range we
consider.
To estimate h′(y) on [y∗,
y∗
γ2
], note that h(y) coincides with c̃/φ̄(y) at the endpoints














as, otherwise, we get a contradiction with the domination relationship between these
two functions in the left neighborhood of y∗
γ2
. In the above, and in the rest of the ar-
gument, h′(y) is understood as the left derivative at y = y∗/γ
2, as the right derivative
at y = y∗, and as any element in the superdifferential for y ∈ (y∗, y∗γ2 ).


























for any y ∈ [y∗, y∗γ2 ] and −φ̄

















) = γφ̄′(y). Combinig the estimates above we get for x ∈ [F−1(y∗),F−1(y∗)+1]
F ′(x)
(

















As F ′(x)φ̄′(F (x)) = φ′(x) ≥ φ′(0), c̃ ≤ 2C + 2, the last expression above is further-
more





























0, as σ → ∞, at a rate depending only on cl, cu. This, in turn, yields (4.37) and
completes the proof of the proposition.
If we assume the existence of a positive lower bound on derivatives of the barrier
functions of the agents’ stopping problems, as suggested by the last proposition, it
becomes relatively easy to prove the continuity of the value function with respect to
the barrier.
Proposition IV.16. Assume admissible controls pa, pb and admissible barriers J1, J2






are C-close to x . Then, if |J1(x)− J2(x)| ≤ δ for all x in R, we get
(4.38)
∣∣V a(x, pa, pb, J1)− V a(x, pa, pb, J2)∣∣ ≤ ε(δ), ∀x ∈ R
for some ε(δ)→ 0, as δ → 0. Analogous statement holds for V b.
Proof: We will show that V a(x, pa, pb, J1) ≥ V a(x, pa, pb, J2)− ε(δ), which, together
with the symmetric inequality (proved analogously), yields the statement of the
proposition. For any δ > 0, consider an almost-optimal τ2, such that
Ja(τ2, x, p
a, pb, J2) ≥ V a(x, pa, pb, J2)− δ
Then it suffices to find τ1 such that
Ja(τ1, x, p
a, pb, J1) ≥ Ja(τ2, x, pa, pb, J2)− ε(δ)
We construct τ1 ≥ τ2 separately on two different Fτ2-measurable sets. On the event
Ω1 =
{
ω : bJ1(Xτ2)c ≥ bJ2(Xτ2)c
}
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we set τ1 = τ2. If bJ1(Xτ2)c < bJ2(Xτ2)c we still have
J1(Xτ2) ≥ J2(Xτ2)− δ






























, τ11 = inf {t ≥ τ2 : Xt ≤ Xτ2 − 1} , τ1 = τ10∧τ11.
In the subsequent derivations, we express various quantities in terms of the following
expression, which can be interpreted as the ’relative to x’ objective, and which is
more convenient than its ’absolute’ version.



















(bJ (Xτ )c −Xτ )
]
where |bJ(x)c − x| ≤ C + 1 and |ga(x) − c(x)x| ≤ cuC by the assumption of the
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proposition. Using the above expression, we get
Ja(τ1, x, p













































Note that the first one of the three summands inside the expectation above is non-
negative for every ω, by the definition of Ω1. Note also that, as |ga(x)−c(x)x| ≤ cuC,
we have the following bound for the second summand:











cuCEx|τ1 − τ2| = cuCE0τ ′ ≤ ε(δ)
where
τ ′ = inf {t ≥ 0: Xt /∈ (−1, δ/ε)}
and E0τ ′ is easily seen to go to 0 as O(δ) for δ → 0. So it only remains to deal with
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As |J(x)− x| ≤ C, for J = J1, J2, and as

































))]∣∣∣ ≤ (2C + 2)Px(τ1 = τ11) = ε(δ)
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where the first inequality follows from Xτ10 = Xτ2 + δ/ε and




by (4.39); the second inequality follows from Xτ2 −Xτ10 = −δ/ε and bJ2(x)c − x ≥















∣∣∣∣ ≤ cuEx|τ1 − τ2| = O(δ),
which concludes the proof.
4.4 Optimization over prices and existence of equilibrium.
For any admissible va, vb, define
P a(va)(x) = min argmaxp∈Aa(x)∩Z (p− va(x))F+ (p− x)








F+(x) = 1− F (x)
for a cdf F .
The following fundamental proposition allows us to reduce the control-stopping






Ja(x, τ, P a(V
a
), pb, vb)














Ja(x, τ, pa, pb, vb)





Proof: Subtracting x from all V
a
and Ja as in (4.43), (4.42) below, we see it’s
sufficient to show the claim for these relative versions.
What we need to do here is the verification that our response-form control pa =
P a(V
a
) is optimal, which requires some sort of differential characterization of the
objective
V a(x, p, pb, vb) = sup
τ
Ja(x, τ, p, pb, vb)
for any control p, together with a comparison principle allowing us to claim our
response-form control constructed in a way to maximize the appropriate generator
would indeed result in maximal objective. We use the theory of variational inequal-
ities (VIs) to implement this program. Unfortunately, we could not locate any VI
results to deal with our case (unbounded domain, L∞ discount factor and running
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costs, discontinuous obstacle) directly: we have VI existence, uniqueness and com-
parison results, but are lacking stopping problem to VI solution connection under this
combination of circumstances, so we’ll need to do additional approximation steps.
More specifically, in step 1 we show we can replace our discontinuous barrier
bvbc by its continuous majorating approximation sε = sε(bvbc), without affecting
the value of the associated optimal stopping problem, no matter which admissible
(p, pb) are chosen. In step 2, we use a sequence of smooth approximating functions
J bn ↓ sε and continuity of VI solutions in the obstacle from [8] to show that the value
function corresponding to sε satisfies an appropriate VI. Finally, in step 3 we use the
comparison results for that VI to show P a(V
a
) is indeed the optimal control.
As we’re now going to use obstacles which aren’t floors of some other function,
we need to redo the definitions (4.2), (4.10), and also to put them in a relative to x
form to get better boundedness properties for the coefficients, so we define for any
admissible controls p, pb, admissible barrier J b,
(4.42) Ja0 (x, τ, p, p


























(4.43) V a0 (x, p, p
b, J b) = sup
τ
Ja0 (x, τ, p, J
b)


















Notice V a0 and f
a




are such. Also f =
V a0 , f
a
0 satisfies |f ′| ≤ w by applying slight modifications of Lemmas IV.6, IV.5 and






Step 1. This step is taken care of by the following lemma, whose (geometric) proof
can be found in the appendix.
Lemma IV.18. If p, pb are admissible controls, vb an admissible barrier, p, pb, vb






are C-close to x, and
(
vb
)′ ≥ 1− w > 0, then there
exists continuous piecewise linear sε ≥ bvbc independent of pb, p, satisfying 1-shift
property and C-close to x, and such that
V a0 (·, p, pb, bvbc) = V a0 (·, p, pb, sε)
for all p, pb satisfying the properties above.
Step 2. First we need to introduce some notation from [8]. Let µ > 0. We introduce
the weight function
mµ(x) = exp(−µ|x|)
Denote by Hµ = W0,2,µ, Vµ = W1,2,µ appropriate mµ-weighted Sobolev spaces on R
(we need weighted spaces as our coefficients are bounded and periodic while we want
to make them integrable over the whole unbounded domain).















p(x)− cp(x)x ∈ Hµ




v ∈ Vµ|v ≥ J b − x a.e.
}
the appropriate set of test functions.
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We will call VI(p, J b) the following VI (in the weak form)
(4.45) a(u, v − u) = ap(u, v − u) ≤ (fp, v − u), ∀v ∈ Kµ(J b)
where
(u, v) = (u, v)µ =
∫
m2µuv
We say u is a solution of the above VI if u ∈ Kµ(J b) and u satisfies (4.45).




b − x are in L∞(R), and as the form a(·, ·) is
coercive for µ sufficiently small, we get that (for such µ) the VI (4.45) has a unique
solution in Kµ(J
b) for any admissible p, any J b C-close to x, by Theorem 1.13, [8]
p. 217.
Let J bn be a C
∞-approximation from above of sε, associated with v
b as in Lemma
IV.18, which is 1/n close to sε in sup-norm. Then by Theorem 3.19, [8] p. 387
, un = V
a
0 (·, p, pb, J bn) is the unique solution (for sufficiently small µ) of VI(p, J bn).
Denote also by u0 the unique solution of VI(p, sε). Rewriting these VIs as unweighted
VIs for mµu and restricting to a bounded domain, one can generalize Theorem 1.10,
[8] p. 207, to get un → u0 in L∞(R). The latter fact, together with the easy to check
convergence of value functions
V a0 (·, p, pb, J bn)→ V a0 (·, p, pb, sε) = V a0 (·, p, pb, bvbc),
implies that the latter value function is the unique solution of VI(p, sε).
Step 3. By Theorem 1.4, [8] p. 198 , extended to the unbounded domain as in
Remark 1.21, p. 219, the unique solutions u, ũ ∈ Kµ(J b) of VIs
a(u, v − u) ≤ (h, v − u), ∀v ∈ Kµ(J b)
resp. a(ũ, v − ũ) ≤ (h̃, v − ũ), ∀v ∈ Kµ(J b)
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sharing the obstacle J b and the form a, but with different right-hand sides h, h̃,





(x)− x, p̄ = P a(V a).





0 (·, p̄, pb, bvbc) = V a0 (·, p̄, pb, sε) ≥
V a0 (·, p0, pb, sε) = V a0 (·, p0, pb, bvbc) =: ū0 = ū0(p0)
for any admissible p0. It is shown in step 2 that ū satisfies a version of (4.45) with
running costs fp̄ and the quadratic form ap̄, which after some algebraic manipulations
turns out to be equivalent to
(4.46) ap0(u, v − u) ≤ (f̃ , v − u), ∀v ∈ Kµ(J b)
where f̃ = fp0 + a,
a = gp̄ − cp̄(u+ x)− (gp − cp(u+ x)) ≥ 0,
which follows from the definition of p̄ = P a(V
a
) and the fact that ū(x) + x = V
a
(x).
As ū0 satisfies the above equation with running costs function fp0 instead of f̃ , and
fp0 ≤ f̃ , we can apply the comparison principle stated at the beginning of this step,
which completes the proof.
Proposition IV.17 allows us to sidestep the optimization over pa or pb in the
definitions of V̄ a and V̄ b, respectively, by using the feedback controls P a and P b
throughout. To ensure that these feedback controls are well-behaved, we make the
following assumption (compare to chapter III, Assumptions 2, 5).
Assumption IV.19. The distribution of ξ has density f , which is bounded so that
f(x) ≤ Cf , ∀x, with some constant Cf > 0, and which is supported inside [−C0, C0]
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for some constant C0 > 0. Furthermore, f is continuous in the interior of its support,






(x) is increasing, ∀x ∈ int suppf
where int denotes the interior of a set.
See also Remark 4 in chapter III for sufficient conditions for Assumption IV.19.
This assumption, in particular, implies that the optimal feedback prices will always
be C ′0 = C0 + 1 close to x, and also inherit the 1-shift property from the value
functions they correspond to:
Lemma IV.20. If
pa(x) = P a(va)(x), pb(x) = P b(vb)(x)
for some admissible barriers va, vb, then
|pa(x)− x| ≤ C ′0, |pb(x)− x| ≤ C ′0
and ∣∣∣∣gac (x)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ C ′0, ∣∣∣∣gac (x)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ C ′0
If in addition va (vb) has 1-shift property, then so does pa (resp. pb).
Proof: From definition (4.41) and supp ξ ⊂ [−C0, C0], it’s easy to see that p(x) − x
must be no smaller than the largest integer ≤ −C0 and no larger than the smallest
integer ≥ C0 so that
p(x) ≥ x− C ′0, p(x) ≤ x+ C ′0
Similar conclusion holds for pb(x).
From (4.4,4.5) we get∣∣∣∣gac (x)− x
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣(pa(x)− x) (1− F (pa(x)− x)) + F b(pb(x), x)− xF (pb(x)− x)(1− F (pa(x)− x)) + F (pb(x)− x)
∣∣∣∣
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A similar representation holds for gb. Thus, to prove the claim, it suffices to show
|pa(x)− x| ≤ C ′0, |F b(pb(x), x)− x| ≤ C ′0F (pb(x)− x)
The first inequality has already been established. For the second one, we have
F b(pb(x), x)− x =
∫ pb(x)−x
−∞
bx+ αyc − xdF (y)
To finish the proof it’s enough to notice that
|bx+ αyc − x| ≤ C ′0
when y ∈ supp ξ (as dF (y) = 0 otherwise). The claim for gb
c
can be proven analo-
gously.
1-shift property for pa, pb given that of va, vb is immediate from (4.41).
Next, for any admissible barriers va, vb, define




·, P a(va), P b(vb), vb
)
, V b(·, P a(va), P b(vb), va)
)
It’s easy to see the components of the right-hand side of the equation above are
themselves admissible barriers, so we can iterate this mapping. We will actually be
only interested in the restriction of Φ to either A0 or A0(w), where
Definition IV.21. We say v ∈ A0 if v ∈ C(R), has 1-shift property and is C ′0-close
to x. We say v ∈ A0(w) if v ∈ A0, v absolutely continuous and 1− w ≤ v′ ≤ 1 + w
a.e.
Note by lemma IV.20 and the results from the previous section Φ maps A0×A0 into
itself, or more precisely into A0(w)× A0(w) for w sufficiently large (see proposition
IV.14).
Using Proposition IV.17, we will show, below, that a fixed point of this mapping
in the appropriate subset gives a solution to the system (4.1). But first we need to
establish the existence of such a fixed point.
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The first step is to show that Φ is continuous on A0(w) for w < 1. To this end,
we first choose an appropriate topology and the space for intermediate price controls
P a(v), P b(v), and show that P a(v), P b(v) are continuous operators in va, vb ∈ A0(w).
Then, we show that V a
(




·, pa, pb, va
)
are each continuous (as op-
erators) in (functions) pa, pb jointly, with respect to the chosen topology, uniformly in
va, vb ∈ A0. This, together with the continuity of V a
(




·, pa, pb, va
)
in va and vb, established in Proposition IV.16, yields the continuity of Φ.
First we define the space for the intermediate price controls:
Definition IV.22. Denote by B0 the space of functions which are admissible prices
and have 1-shift property.
This definition also implies the functions in B0 are C0-close to x, by the definition
of admissibility IV.1 and assumption IV.19. We equip B0 with a topology induced
by its natural restriction mapping into L1([0, 1]). Note P a(v), P b(v) ∈ B0 for any
admissible barrier v with 1-shift property.
The following, somewhat tricky, lemma is the first result we need in order to
establish the continuity of Φ.
Lemma IV.23. The mappings
va 7→ P a(va), vb 7→ P b(vb)
from A0(w), w < 1, (with uniform topology) to B0 (with the topology described above)
are continuous.
Proof: We only show the P a version, the P b one being analogous. We do it in two
steps. First we show that, given va, with the properties described in the statement
(in particular, increasing), P a(va)(x) is also an increasing function of x. Then, we
use this monotonicity property to show the desired continuity of P a.
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Step 1. For a fixed va, we denote px = P
a(va)(x). Assume, to the contrary, that
for some x1 > x2 we have px1 < px2 . Note the admissible control set Aa(x) shifts
upward with x, and so if px2 was admissible at lower x2, and px2 > px1 with the
latter being admissible at x1, then px2 is admissible at x1 as well, and similarly px1
is admissible at x2. Then to obtain a contradiction it is sufficient to just show px2
gives better objective value at x1 than px1 :
(4.48) (px2 − va(x1))F+(px2 − x1) > (px1 − va(x1))F+(px1 − x1)
This is clearly true if px1 ≤ va(x1). Hence, without loss of generality, we assume
px1 > v








(4.50) (px2 − va(x2))F+(px2 − x2) ≥ (px1 − va(x2))F+(px1 − x2)
from the fact that px2 is the optimal price at x2 and is thus no worse than another
admissible at x2 price px1 . The assumption px1 > v
a(x1) above implies also px2 >
va(x2), as v
a(x2) < v

























f(px1 − x)F+(px2 − x)− f(px2 − x)F+(px1 − x)
F+ (px2 − x)
2 =
f(px1 − x)f(px2 − x)











which, in turn, follows from the fact that F+/f is decreasing, by Assumption IV.19.
Given the above monotonicity properties of the terms in (4.51), we deduce (4.49),
thus, obtaining the desired contradiction and proving the monotonicity of P a(va)(·).
Step 2. One can easily check P a(va1) ≥ P a(va2), if va1(x) ≥ V a2 (x) for all x. To
show that P a(va1) and P
a(va2) are close in the topology of B0, it suffices to show that∫ 1
0
|P a(va1)− P a(va2)| dx
is small. Notice that∫ 1
0
|P a(va1)− P a(va2)| dx =
∫ 1
0
|P a(va1 ∧ va2)− P a(va1 ∨ va2)| dx
as P a(v)(x) is uniquely determined by the value of v at x, and {va1(x), va2(x)} =
{va1(x) ∨ va2(x), va1(x) ∧ va2(x)} for all x.
Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume that va2 ≥ va1 . Assume va1 and va2
are also δ-close in sup-norm, so we have va2 ≤ va1 + δ. Then, we need to show that∫ 1
0
|P a(V a2 )− P a(V a1 )| dx→ 0
as δ → 0.
Note that the monotonicity and the 1-shift property of the integer-valued function
P a(va2) imply that it coincides with bx−α2c (except, possibly, on a countable number
of jump points of the latter), for some α2. Similar conclusion holds for P
a(va1), with
some α1 ≥ α2, as va2 ≥ va1 . If we can further show that




then a straightforward calculation would yield∫ 1
0
|P a(va1)− P a(va2)| dx = O(δ)
Thus, it remains to show (4.52). To this end, we note that, under our assumptions






P a(va1)(x∗) < P
a(va2)(x)
and recalling that x∗ ≥ x and va1(x∗) = va2(x), we follow the arguments in step 1 to
obtain a contradiction. Thus,
P a(va1)(x∗) ≥ P a(va2)(x)
which implies (4.52).
The following lemma provides the last result we need in order to prove the conti-
nuity of Φ.
Lemma IV.24. The operators (pa, pb) 7→ V a0 (·, pa, pb, J b), V b0 (·, pa, pb, Ja), from B0×
B0 to A0, are continuous, uniformly over J
a, J b ∈ A0.
Proof: We’ll only show the continuity of V a0 in p
a, pb, uniformly over x and in J b ∈ A0
, the other part being analogous. Recall that
V a0 (x, p
a, pb, J b) = sup
τ
Ja0 (x, τ, p
a, pb, J b)







2), with the same τ , are also close, uniformly in τ . To this end we can write,
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recalling the formula (4.42)
Ja(x, τ, pa1, p
b
1, J








































































































So to complete the proof it is sufficient to show the expectations of the absolute
values of each of the three terms on different lines inside the expectation above are






2) are close in their topology.
For the third term, note that as | exp(−x)−exp(−y)| ≤ max (exp(−x), exp(−y)) |x−
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where the positive constants C can differ between the lines. The second inequality
in the above follows from the closeness to x of J b, and the last follows from the fact
that
c(pa(x), pb(x), x) = λ
(
F+(pa(x)− x) + F (pb(x)− x)
)
is Lipschitz in pa(x) and pb(x), as the density of ξ is bounded by assumption IV.19.
Similarly, it’s not hard to show that




using the boundedness of the density of ξ and the uniform closeness of all admissible



















Finally, we notice that |ga1(Xt)− c1(Xt)Xt| ≤ C, which follows from the fact that
ga1/c1 is C
′
0-close to x, and recall that c1 ≤ cu. This allows us to estimate the first
174



































where the second inequality follows from integration by parts, after discarding some
negative terms.




















It only remains to estimate the latter expectation in terms of L1 ([0, 1]) norms of
pa1 − pa2, pb1 − pb2. The latter follows easily by passing the expectation inside the
integral and using the standard estimates of a Gaussian kernel.
Now we state our main result.
Theorem IV.25. Let σ be sufficiently large so that w, defined in Proposition IV.14,
is < 1.
Let A = A0(w)× A0(w). It is a closed convex subset of C(R)2.
Then Φ, defined in (4.47), is a continuous mapping of A into itself.
In particular, as A is also compact, Φ has a fixed point.
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Proof: Given our choice of w, Φ maps A into itself, see definition IV.21. The closeness
and convexity of A are also clear.
A is compact because A0(w) is. A0(w) is compact because (by 1-shift property)
the restriction mapping C(R) → C([0, 1]) induces an isomorphism between A0(w)
and a closed subset of the compact set of functions in C[0, 1] which are bounded by
C ′0 + 1 and are Lipschitz with constant 1 + w.
Finally, Φ is continuous because it can be written as a composition of
e : (va, vb) 7→
(
va, vb, P a(va), P b(vb)
)
and
V : (va, vb, pa, pb) 7→
(
V a(·, pa, pb, vb), V b(·, pa, pb, va)
)
In the above, e : A → A × (B0)2 is continuous by Lemma IV.23. The operator
V : A × (B0)2 → A is continuous as it is continuous in (pa, pb) ∈ (B0)2, uniformly
over va, vb ∈ A0(w), by Lemma IV.24, and it is continuous in va, vb ∈ A0(w) by
Proposition IV.16.
The existence of a fixed point for Φ follows from the Schauder fixed point theorem.
Combining the last theorem with proposition IV.17 we immediately get
Corollary IV.26. There exists a solution (V a, V b, P a(V a), P b(V b)) of the problem
(4.1).
Remark IV.27. Note for any solution (V a, V b, P a(V a), P b(V b)) of (4.1) we have
(4.54) P a(V a)(x) = pa(x) ≥ pb(x) = P b(V b)(x), ∀x ∈ R
Indeed, let pamax(x) (p
b
min(x)) be the largest (smallest) integer in Aa(x) (Ab(x)).




max(x) ≥ pbmin(x). By definition (4.41), pa(x) = P a(V a)(x) ≥ V a(x) if
V a(x) ≤ pamax(x), pa(x) = pamax(x) otherwise, and similarly for pb(x). Thus (4.54) is
clear if V a(x) > pamax(x) or V
b(x) < pbmin(x). If neither of these hold, then
pa(x) ≥ dV a(x)e ≥ bV b(x)c ≥ pb(x)
4.5 Appendix.
4.5.1 Proof of lemma IV.7
We need to show that if f is continuous and has continuous right derivative on
[a, b] then f is continuously differentiable on (a, b). If for any x < y in (a, b) we can





then for any x ∈ (a, b) we can take y ↓ x and y ↑ x limits in f(y)−f(x)
y−x using the above
and the continuity of f+ to get that f−(x) = f+(x) hence f is differentiable for every
x, and its derivative coincides with f+ and hence continuous. So it only remains to
show (4.55) holds.
Consider
h(u) = f(u)− f(x)− (u− x)f(y)− f(x)
y − x
Clearly h has continuous right derivative on [x, y], h(x) = h(y) = 0, and (4.55) is
equivalent to the existence of ξ ∈ [x, y] such that h+(ξ) = 0. Assume the contrary.
Then as h+ is continuous it must have values of only one sign over [x, y]. Note
also h is not identically 0 in this case, and so replacing it with −h if necessary we
can assume it has maximum > 0 achieved at some xmax ∈ (x, y). Then from the
definition of right derivative we must have h+(xmax) ≤ 0, hence < 0, hence h+ must
be < 0 on [x, y]. But if h+(x) < 0, h(x) = 0 then h also achieves minimum < 0 at
some xmin ∈ (x, y) which immediately leads to contradiction with h+(xmin) < 0.
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4.5.2 Proof of lemma IV.18
The idea is that if we take bxc or a similar stepping function, and modify it around
jump points by replacing jumps by steep line segments, this wouldn’t affect its mcm.
Recall our value function can be represented as
V a0 (x, p, p
b, J b) = fa0 (x) + φ(x) mcm
(
̂J b − fa0 − x
)
(F(x))
Where the only dependence on the obstacle is inside the mcm, and fa0 , V
a
0 were
defined in (4.44,4.43). So it is sufficient to show that this y-domain mcm doesn’t
change if we replace J b = bV bc by J b = sε.
First we need to define sε. We know bV bc has 1-shift property, jumps up by
1 at a sequence of points {x0 + n}n∈Z, and is constant in between two consecu-
tive points from that sequence. We define sε(x) to coincide with bV bc outside the
intervals (x0 + n − ε, x0 + n], and to coincide with the line segment connecting
(x0 + n− ε, bV bc (x0 + n− ε)) and (x0 + n, bV bc (x0 + n+)) on those intervals; note
sε is a line segment with slope 1/ε in the left ε-neighborhood of bV bc jump point,
and coincides with it (and locally constant) elsewhere. Notice also sε ≥ bV bc by
construction, and so mcm
(




̂bV bc − fa0 − x
)
and it only re-
mains to prove the opposite inequality. Note also, under our running assumption
of sufficiently large σ, fa0 + x is strictly increasing, and so bV bc − fa0 − x achieves
its maximum exactly at points {x0 + n}; if this maximum is non-positive, we know
from the proof of proposition IV.14 that the corresponding mcm is ≡ 0, and so the
claimed inequality is clear as sε−fa0 −x has the same supremum as bV bc−fa0 −x. So
from now on we deal with the case where that supremum is positive, which implies
mcm
(
̂bV bc − fa0 − x
)
> 0 everywhere.
Similarly to the mcm of the function dominating its modification by replacing it
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(F(x)) dominates the function obtained from f by replacing its values
on some [x0, x1] by the values of aφ(x)+bψ(x) function coinciding with f at x0,x1 (as
̂operation converts aφ+ bψ into a line segment). So to show mcm( ̂sε − fa0 − x) ≤
mcm
(
̂bV bc − fa0 − x
)
it suffices to show sε − fa0 − x is dominated on [x0, x0 + 1] by
aφ(x) + bψ(x) interpolation between (x0, y) and (x0 + 1, y), where y = bV bc(x0) −
fa0 (x0)− x0 = bV bc(x0 + 1)− fa0 (x0 + 1)− (x0 + 1).




hxx − ch = 0, a.e.
and is continuously differentiable, we get a contradiction if we assume h achieves
maximum on [x0, x1] in the interior of this interval, as then by the equation above
h and so hxx are positive (as y > 0) in the neighborhood of that maximum, which













As y = supbV bc− x− fa0 , the (C + 1)-closeness to x (0) of V b (resp. f 0x) implies y ≤
2C+2. But this means hx is bounded by a constant independent of the choice of p, p
b,
V b with properties as in the statement of the lemma. As h(x1) = sε(x1)−x1−fa0 (x1),
and sε(x) − fa0 − x has slope ≥ 1/ε − 1 − w on [x1 − ε, x1], if ε is small enough so
that this last expression is above the constant bounding hx, we get
sε(x)− fa0 − x ≤ h, x ∈ [x1 − ε, x1]
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hence also elsewhere on [x0, x1], and on other intervals [x0 + n, x0 + n + 1] by the
same argument. This shows
mcm
(













̂bV bc − fa0 − x
)
as claimed.
4.5.3 Proof of lemma IV.8




















≤ Ex [exp (−clτ0)] = ψ0(x)
where ψ0 is the ψ corresponding to c(x) ≡ cl and so is a unique positive increasing





− clf = 0
















≤ E0 [exp (−cuτx)]−1 = ψ1(x)





− cuf = 0






. This gives the required bound by observing cl < cu
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